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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Judge Guido Calabresi referred to constitutional experience in
Germany and Italy in concluding a concurring opinion dealing with an
equal protection challenge to the disparity between the sentences required
for crack and powder cocaine offenders.' Citing decisions from those
nations' constitutional courts, Judge Calabresi suggested the possibility that
U.S. courts might someday hold that the disparity violated the Equal
Protection Clause because new information not available to the enacting
Congress might demonstrate that the distinction was irrational.
Constitutional experience in Germany and Italy was relevant to interpreting
the U.S. Constitution, Judge Calabresi argued, because the constitutional
systems there were our "'constitutional offspring,"' a reference to the fact
that they "unmistakably dr[e]w their origin and inspiration from American
constitutional theory arid practice." 2 Reciprocating was appropriate because
"[w]ise parents do not hesitate to learn from their children." 3
Judge Calabresi's comment is a symptom of broader tendencies in
contemporary constitutional law.4 Several Supreme Court opinions5 and
recent law journal articles6 expressly raise the question of the relevance of
1. See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464,468-69 (1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 469.
3. Id.
4. I should note that some readers have found that Judge Calabresi's formulation calls to
mind another set of concerns in recent comparative law scholarship. Critics contend that
traditional scholarship in the field contains an ethnocentric bias, which takes the form of implicitly
or explicitly commending "Western" law when it is compared to law elsewhere. For recent
overviews, see David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and
International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545; and Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure
Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (1999). For these
readers, Judge Calabresi's use of the words "parents" and, in particular, "children" evokes the
condescension associated with that strand of comparative law scholarship, even though the
manifest content of Judge Calabresi's reference commends non-U.S. law to U.S. decisionmakers.
Some recent scholarship in comparative constitutional law, in taking U.S. constitutional law as the
model for all nations now developing new constitutional arrangements, has been far less careful
than Judge Calabresi. For example, a condescending tone suffuses CONSTTrUTIoNALISM AND
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD (Louis Henkin &
Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
5. See infra Part II; cf. Elizabeth Greathouse, Justices See Joint Issues with the EU, WASH.
POST, July 9, 1998, at A24 (reporting on a press briefing at which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor
and Stephen Breyer asserted that they might use and cite decisions by the European Court of
Justice).
6. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 963, 1005 (1998); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theoiy of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 371-73 (1997); Michel Rosenfeld,
Justices at Work: An Introduction, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1609, 1609-12 (1997); John Ferejohn,
The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitutions, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 501, 502
(1997) (reviewing RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995)); Jeremy Waldron, Dirty Little
Secret, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 510, 527-28 (1998) (reviewing ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER,
WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996)). An example that seeks to demonstrate the
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learning from our "offspring." But precisely how can we go about
learning? Scholars in the field of general comparative law have paid a great
deal of attention to similar questions.7 Some of the best work in the field
suggests skepticism about any direct "borrowing" of solutions developed
in one system to resolve problems in another! One version of the difficulty
is this: Comparative study is sometimes said to allow a person embedded in
one system to gain some distance from it.9 Having become intellectually
estranged from that system, one can then see that seemingly unchangeable
arrangements actually might be altered without substantial loss and
sometimes with substantial gain.10 Familiar arrangements seem necessary to
us, but comparative study demonstrates that they might be false necessities.
And yet the estrangement, the sense that particular arrangements might
indeed be false necessities, could be misleading. Some think that
comparative study is worth little if it consists of yanking something that
seems useful out of one system in which it is embedded and inserting it into
another." Put another way, we might begin by believing that certain
arrangements are necessary, then have that belief displaced by comparative
study into thinking them false necessities, only to learn, on deeper
relevance to broader issues of constitutional theory is Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World
Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997), which notes, with the author's typical exuberance,
that "the global transformation has not yet had the slightest impact on American constitutional
thought." Id. at 772. Much here turns on the definition of "American constitutional thought." See
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990)
(suggesting the possibility of an overstatement); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at xxxiii (3d ed. 1996) (noting the effort in a widely used casebook "to
introduce readers to some comparative materials").
7. The analytic framework developed here is not novel in the study of comparative law
generally, nor do I contend that the three analytic methods I describe exhaust the possibilities. My
sense of the literature in general comparative law, however, is that scholars tend to argue that one
of the analytic methods is superior to the others, in contrast to my more eclectic approach. For a
critique of comparative law scholarship along these lines, see Riles, supra note 4.
8. For a summary observation, see J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European
Constitutionalism and Its Discontents, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 354, 355 (1996-1997) ("The
dangers of 'borrowing' from one legal system to another are famous: the law of any polity is a
construct embedded in a specific social and political culture and its transmutation to other polities
is not easily achieved."). The most influential analysis of the existence, advantages, and
disadvantages of "borrowing" as a general legal phenomenon is ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993). For a careful analysis of
the logic of claims about the possibilities of successful borrowings, see William Ewald,
Comparative Jurisprudence (11): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489 (1995).
9. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1005 (asserting that the purpose of
comparative study is to "make the object.. . 'strange' to us").
10. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 6, at 527 (arguing that comparative study can identify
"which bright ideas have proven resilient under real life conditions and which have proven
impracticable" ).
11. See, e.g., Daniel H. Foote, The Roles of Comparative Law: Inaugural Lecture for the Dan
Fenno Henderson Professorship for East Asian Legal Studies, 73 WASH. L. REV. 25, 36 (1998)
("Just as it is dangerous for us to assume that U.S. standards will apply in other societies in the
same way that they do in ours, so too is it risky, without first carefully considering other aspects
of U.S. society that may affect the equation, to counsel the United States to adopt an approach that
works well elsewhere.").
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comparative study, that they were necessary all along. 2 And if that is so, it
is unclear what comparative study can do to inform the making of
constitutional law. 3
This Article offers a more systematic approach to the possibility of
learning from constitutional experience elsewhere. Its main effort is to
describe three ways-functionalism, expressivism, and a process I call
bricolage, using a term made familiar to social scientists by Claude Lvi-
Strauss-in which comparing constitutional experience elsewhere might
contribute to interpreting the U.S. Constitution. In addition, I seek to assess
with some precision what the contribution of each approach might be.14
Although I discuss these three approaches briefly here, I devote separate
Parts to them in the remainder of this Article. My claim is, in the end, rather
modest: U.S. courts can sometimes gain insights into the appropriate
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution by a cautious and careful analysis of
constitutional experience elsewhere.
Functionalism claims that particular constitutional provisions create
arrangements that serve particular functions in a system of governance. 5
Comparative constitutional study can help identify those functions and
show how different constitutional provisions serve the same function in
different constitutional systems. It might then be possible to consider
whether the U.S. constitutional system could use a mechanism developed
elsewhere to perform a specific function, to improve the way in which that
function is performed here.
According to the expressivist view, constitutions help constitute the
nation, to varying degrees in different nations, offering to each nation's
people a way of understanding themselves as political beings. The United
States may lie at one extreme of a continuum, but that would only make it
all the more important to think about whether comparative inquiries could
advance an expressivist understanding of U.S. constitutional law. It might
seem that comparative study could do little with respect to constitutional
provisions or doctrines understood in this constitutive sense, because each
12. Cf. Rosenfeld, supra note 6, at 1609-10 (noting that "apparent similarities between
different constitutional jurisprudences often prove to be quite superficial and, conversely, seeming
differences can sometimes conceal more deeply rooted similarities" (citation omitted)).
13. Of course, comparative constitutional law can and probably should be part of the general
liberal education of lawyers in the modem world. See infra Part VI. But that is not what the
academic and judicial proponents of comparative study seem to mean when they suggest that we
should learn from our children.
14. If the functionalist approach might also be thought of as rationalist, the expressivist
approach is social constructionist, and the "bricolage" approach is postmodernist. It is not
surprising that most advocates of the utility of comparative constitutional study offer functionalist
arguments, which are consistent with modernism's rationalism.
15. For a short statement of the functionalist assumption, see Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in
Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CEH. L. REv. 519, 535 (1992). Glendon explains that
"[elvery country is grappling with a set of problems that are in a general way similar." Id. For a
bibliographic overview of functionalism, see Kennedy, supra note 4, at 588 n.73.
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nation's constitution constitutes its people differently. The bulk of Part IV's
discussion of expressivism aims at developing arguments that make it
possible to think about learning from experience elsewhere in an
expressivist mood.
The process I call bricolage is perhaps the method least familiar to U.S.
constitutional scholars. Describing a people she studied who annoyingly
seemed to appropriate elements of its culture from anything at hand,
Margaret Mead wrote, "A picture of a local native reading the index to the
Golden Bough just to see if they had missed anything, would be
appropriate." 16 Claude L6vi-Strauss called this sort of activity bricolage, the
assembly of something new from whatever materials the constructor
discovered. 7 Contemporary references to comparative constitutional
materials may be a form of bricolage. Functionalists and expressivists
worry about whether appropriating selected portions of other constitutional
traditions is sensible, or whether the appropriation will "work" in some
sense. The bricoleur does not have these concerns about maintaining proper
borders among systems.
Comparative constitutional analysis can use the idea of bricolage in
several ways. In contrast to functionalism and expressivism, which offer
ways of interpreting particular constitutional provisions, bricolage cautions
against adopting interpretive strategies that impute a high degree of
constructive rationality to a constitution's drafters. Further, the idea of
bricolage can displace our sense of the taken-for-granted in the
constitutional system with which we are most familiar, without suggesting,
as the functionalist would, that we can replace some parts of what we take
for granted with elements appropriated from other systems. Finally,
bricolage brings the historical contingency of all human action to the fore.
It may therefore help us think about the recent interest in comparative
constitutional law in the Supreme Court and the legal academy.
The suggestion that bricolage might somehow help us use comparative
constitutional experience in interpreting the U.S. Constitution raises an
immediate question: What does L6vi-Strauss have to do with interpreting
the Constitution? More precisely, constitutional interpretation is an exercise
within U.S. constitutional law, which has its distinctive methods and
sources on which interpreters may justifiably rely. We must know what
methods and sources authorize interpreters to refer to constitutional
16. Margaret Mead, Note from New Guinea, 34 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST (2d ser.) 740 (1932)
(letter), reprinted in JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY
ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART 230 (1988). Sir James Frazer's Golden Bough is a classic
anthropological collection of myths from diverse cultures. See generally JAMES FRAZER, GOLDEN
BOUGH (1900).
17. See CLAUDE LvI-STRAuss, THE SAVAGE MIND 16-17 (University of Chicago Press
1966) (1962).
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experience elsewhere before we can examine how that experience aids us in
interpreting the Constitution. The next Part of this Article develops the
argument that the Constitution, either in particular provisions or in the
interpretive methods we have developed, licenses reliance on experience
elsewhere through the three approaches I have sketched.
The succeeding Parts examine functionalism, expressivism, and
bricolage in more detail. Each has the same structure. After briefly
describing the approach that is the topic of the Part, I analyze a problem in
U.S. constitutional law, initially using only domestic sources and then
adding the functionalist's, expressivist's, or bricoleur's contribution. Each
Part then proceeds to discuss the limitations of relying on experience
elsewhere in the specific ways that functionalists, expressivists, and
bricoleurs would, and concludes by sketching some connections among
these varying approaches. Part VI defends the comparative enterprise as a
form of liberal education in law.
Before launching into the extended discussions that follow, an advance
warning seems necessary. By far the bulk of this Article deals with U.S.
constitutional law, not the constitutional law of other nations. This apparent
imbalance is justified, however, by the underlying inquiry. To know what
we can learn from constitutional experience elsewhere, we must first find
out how far we can go using only domestic resources. Comparative study
may well produce only small, though perhaps important or at least
interesting, adjustments to what we can conclude from those resources.S
Indeed, it would be quite surprising to draw dramatically different
conclusions once we introduce comparative considerations, for that would
mean that people who had done and thought about U.S. constitutional law
for two centuries had somehow overlooked something quite fundamental.
II. THE LEGAL RELEVANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Those who interpret the U.S. Constitution rely on sources that the U.S.
constitutional tradition accepts: evidence of original understanding, the
Supreme Court's precedents, and the like.19 This Part examines how
constitutional experience in other nations can be added to the list of such
sources.
Stanford v. Kentucky" rejected one attempt to use comparative law to
affect the outcome of a controversy over the proper interpretation of the
18. Another way of putting this point is that all learning necessarily occurs at the margin of
what we have already learned. We have to discover where that margin is before we can determine
what we can learn from any particular novel technique or field.
19. For an influential typology of constitutional interpretation, see PHILIP BOBBITr,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
20. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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U.S. Constitution. The case involved a challenge to the execution of two
murderers who were, respectively, sixteen and seventeen years old at the
time they committed their crimes.2' The challenge relied on the principle
that punishments inconsistent with the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society" 22 violated the Eighth
Amendment's bar to the imposition of "cruel and unusual punishments."''r
To determine such standards, the challengers looked not only to the
practices of jurisdictions in the United States, but to the practices elsewhere
in the world. They noted, for example, that many countries, including those
in Western Europe typically described as advanced industrial societies, had
abolished capital punishment or severely restricted its use to a narrow class
of truly unusual crimes.24 Where nations retained capital punishment, a
majority barred the execution of juveniles. And, finally, they pointed out
that only eight criminals under the age of eighteen had been executed
anywhere in the world in the decade prior to Stanford. According to the
challengers, then, the law and practice "generally throughout the world"
demonstrated that the execution of juveniles was inconsistent with
"evolving standards of decency" and therefore should be held
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.' A majority of the Court
rejected this argument. According to Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court,
"it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive." 26 Practices in
other nations accordingly were not "relevant" to the Court's interpretive
task, which demanded a determination of whether a practice was "accepted
among our people." 27
Stanford establishes that comparative material is not always relevant to
the Court's job of interpreting the U.S. Constitution. We might say that the
Constitution must license the use of comparative material for the courts to
be authorized to learn from constitutional experience elsewhere.' The kind
21. Stanford consolidated two cases. In one case, the criminal was 17 at the time of the
murder, in the other, the criminal was 16. See id. at 365-66.
22. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
24. For the details in this and the succeeding sentences, see Stanford, 492 U.S. at 389-90
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. Il at369n.1.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. In older formulations, the Court found a limited license for interpreting the Due Process
Clause with a view to the experience of the Anglo-American people. See, e.g., Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) ("The question ... is whether.., a procedure is
necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty."); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 602 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) ("The ultimate test remains that which has been the
only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of
voluntariness."); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884) (" [A] process of law, which is
not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of
settled usage both in England and in this country."). A slightly more offensive version of the same
reliance on a broader tradition occurs in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)
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of license one thinks the Constitution requires will of course turn on one's
interpretive theory. For example, if one believes that constitutional
interpretation is the application of reason to problems of governance within
a framework set out in the Constitution's words, experience elsewhere is
relevant because it provides information that an interpreter committed to
reason might find helpful.29 Even those with a less capacious vision of
constitutional interpretation might nonetheless find it permissible to rely on
constitutional experience elsewhere in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. I
believe that different kinds of licenses can sometimes be found for the three
ways in which we can learn from constitutional experience elsewhere,
although the license for functionalist uses of that experience is most easily
explained.3"
The existence of a license to rely on foreign constitutional experience
arose more recently in Printz v. United States,31 a case in which the Court
invalidated on federalism principles the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act's requirement that state law enforcement officials perform
reasonable background checks on people who sought to purchase
handguns.32 Justice Breyer pointed out, in his dissent, that other nations
with federal systems "have found that local control is better maintained"
by allowing the national government to use local governments to administer
national law.33 This experience, according to Justice Breyer, could "cast an
empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common
legal problem."'  Justice Breyer can be taken to be working within a
functionalist model of the value of comparative constitutional law for
constitutional interpretation.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion did not see Justice Breyer's position in
functionalist terms, however. Its reply was that "such comparative analysis
[is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Malinski, Justice Frankfurter noted that the Due Process Clause
requires judges to determine whether "the whole course of the proceedings ... offend[s those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples
even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses." Idl
29. See infra Part VI. Similarly, a person who believes that the Constitution is completely
open-ended would be indifferent to invoking experience elsewhere, as she could accomplish her
interpretive goals without reference to that experience. Such a person would find invoking
experience elsewhere to be useful, if at all, as a rhetorical device, and under conditions discussed
in Section V.C below.
30. The legal realist tradition has such strong functionalist elements that, I believe, U.S.
constitutionalists should find it easy to see how the Constitution might license functionalist uses
of comparative constitutional law. As I argue below, however, the claim that the Constitution does
indeed license such uses depends on a particular vision of the Constitution.
31. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
32. Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 102(a)(1), 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(s)(2) (1994)).
33. Printz, 521 U.S. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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course quite relevant to the task of writing one." 35 This answer is not
entirely responsive to Justice Breyer's position. A specific constitutional
provision, such as the Due Process Clause, might license comparative
analysis. More important in Printz, general interpretive methods might also
confer such a license. On Justice Breyer's analysis, for example, the
Constitution's protection of federalism rests at least in part on policy, or
what he called "empirical," judgments. Experience in other countries,
when used with appropriate caution, can inform the Court's assessment of
the constitutionally relevant policies. Alternatively, his position might be
that the Constitution licenses reliance on comparative analysis when other
sources of interpretation are not decisive-when, for example,
considerations of text, structure, and democratic theory fail to determine the
constitutional question at issue.
36
Raines v. Byrd37 illustrates how we might find a license for examining
comparative materials.3" As part of the Line Item Veto Act,39 Congress
authorized " [a]ny Member of Congress or any individual adversely
affected" by the Act to bring an action challenging its constitutionality.40
After presenting an analysis demonstrating to the Court's satisfaction that
individual members of Congress lacked the standing required by Article
II's case of controversy requirement, despite this statutory provision, Chief
Justice Rehnquist observed that "[t]here would be nothing irrational about a
system which granted standing in these cases" and pointed out that "some
European constitutional courts operate under one or another variant of such
a regime." 41 But, he said, that "is obviously not the regime that has
obtained under our Constitution to date." 
42
How might the Court conclude that Article I licenses comparative
analysis for purposes of interpreting the standing requirement? The
argument would operate on the level of interpretive method. Broadly
speaking, we can identify two components of the Court's standing
jurisprudence, the second of which itself has two elements. The first
35. Id. at 921 n.ll.
36. A slight variant of this position would take as its premise the proposition that legislation
is constitutional unless (1) considerations such as text, structure, and democratic theory establish
its unconstitutionality; or (2) it is arbitrary or irrational. Comparative analysis might show that the
legislation is not arbitrary.
37. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
38. I discuss in this Article the question of finding a license for invoking experience
elsewhere only as an aid in interpreting the "case or controversy" requirement. For a discussion
of what a comparative inquiry might show, see Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest:
Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 324 (1998).
39. Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (Supp. III
1998)).
40. 2 U.S.C. § 692(a)(1) (Supp. M 1998).
41. Raines, 521 U.S. at 828.
42. Id.
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component, most clearly articulated in Flast v. Cohen,43 can be called a
court-centered functionalism. The concern is that cases be presented to the
courts "in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable
of judicial resolution."44 The second component of standing doctrine can be
called a separation-of-powers functionalism. Again, Flast offered one
version of the concern, that Article Ell "define[s] the role assigned to the
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts
will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government." 45  Separation-of-powers functionalism itself has two
elements. The first focuses on the balance of power between the legislature
and the Executive.46 In this way, standing doctrine conforms to a more
general principle of separation-of-powers law, which, in some important
aspects, focuses on whether congressional legislation contributes to the
aggrandizement of power by one branch at the expense of another.47 The
second element of separation-of-powers functionalism is court-centered.
Here the concern is that the courts not exceed their proper role, regardless
of whether in so doing they would enhance the power of Congress or the
Executive at the expense of the other.43
43. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
44. Id. at 101. The underlying idea is that the standing requirement ensures a concrete
adversary context, so that courts can obtain enough information from the parties to resolve
constitutional questions appropriately. Court-centered functionalism also requires that the litigant
be injured. This requirement provides the courts with information about how the challenged
statute operates in a real-world context.
45. Id. at 95.
46. Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992), fleshed out this element. There Congress had enacted a statute authorizing "any person"
to sue to enjoin violations of the Endangered Species Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). Several
individuals claimed that the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce had violated
the Act by limiting administrative review of projects funded by other agencies to those projects
occurring in the United States or on the high seas, excluding administrative review of projects
occurring in foreign nations. They rested their claim, in part, on the Act's citizen-suit provision.
The Court held that the citizen-suit provision could not authorize an action that would "convert"
the generalized "public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual
right."' Id. at 577. The reason was "obvious": "To permit Congress to [do so] ... is to permit
Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important
constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' Id. (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. H, § 3).
47. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam) (recognizing that the Framers
"built into the tripartite Federal Government... a self-executing safeguard against the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other").
48. One might put it this way: The first element of separation-of-powers functionalism
addresses problems that might arise if the courts sided with Congress or the Executive in a
controversy between them, while the second element addresses problems that might arise if the
courts' powers were enhanced at the joint expense of Congress and the Executive, even with their
acquiescence.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998), made it clear that this
element is indeed distinct from the legislative/executive element. A neighborhood group sued
Steel Company, alleging that it had violated a federal statute requiring that the Company make
timely reports of its storage and discharges of toxic and hazardous chemicals. At the time the suit
was filed, the Company had brought its filings up to date, and the Court held that the statute did
1234
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With this apparatus in place, we can return to Raines v. Byrd. Article HI
requires courts to engage in several functional inquiries: whether a
particular suit provides the courts with adequate information; whether a
judicial resolution of the controversy will alter the balance of power
between Congress and the Executive; and whether a judicial decision will
unnecessarily or imprudently enhance judicial power without regard to its
effects on the other branches. But functional inquiries are inherently
empirical. They prompt the courts to make some assessment of the way
institutions work in the real world-how will courts work when given
information of a certain sort, what will happen to relations between
Congress and the President if the courts resolve the constitutional question,
and the like. And, finally, in resolving empirical inquiries it makes sense for
a decisionmaker to use whatever empirical information he or she can. In
this way, a functionalist analysis of Article DI does indeed license
comparative inquiry.
The limits on the foregoing argument should be clear. I have developed
the view that the Constitution licenses comparative analysis with respect to
both federalism and separation of powers. In its narrow version, the
argument is that the Constitution might sometimes license comparative
inquiry when other sources of constitutional interpretation run out. One
might think, however, that those sources never run out. To take one recent
formulation, where "there is no constitutional text speaking to th[e] precise
question," one must look to "historical understanding and practice .... the
structure of the Constitution, and.., the jurisprudence of [the] Court" to
determine the constitutionality of a statute.49 On one view, where these
sources do not resolve the question, the constitutional inquiry is at an end:
The statute at issue is constitutionally permissible."0 Functionalism's pull is
not authorize suit for past violations with no continuing effects. See id. at 1019. The case differed
from Lujan because it was a suit against a private company, and resolving it in the plaintiffs' favor
would not in any obvious way interfere with the President's duty to see that the laws are faithfully
executed. But, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, "[o]ur opinion is not motivated.., by the more
specific separation-of-powers concern [about the Take Care Clause] .... The courts must stay
within their constitutionally prescribed sphere of action, whether or not exceeding that sphere will
harm one of the other two branches." Id, at 1016 n.4.
The Court has given little content to this element, which perhaps might be better described as
formal rather than functional. (The distinction between formal and functional approaches to
separation-of-powers questions was made familiar by Peter Strauss. See Peter Strauss, Formal and
Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions: A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1972).) To develop Justice Scalia's metaphor, Lujan involves a case in
which Congress sought to shift something from the Executive's sphere into that of the courts.
Steel Co., in contrast, appears to be a case in which Congress imposed a regulatory requirement
but set up an enforcement regime that placed citizen complaints of a certain type outside the
sphere of any of the branches. A truly functional account of this case would have to explain why
such an enforcement regime promotes both Congress's regulatory goals and constitutional
concerns about the functioning of the three branches.
49. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
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so strong, however, that it seems worthwhile to consider whether we could
learn from experience elsewhere, taking the Constitution to license at least
some functional inquiries that could be informed by such experience.51
In addition, there are ways of learning that need not depend directly on
functionalism. 2 The expressivist approach to comparative constitutional
law takes as its premise that comparative inquiry may help us see our own
practices in a new light and might lead courts using non-comparative
methods to results they would not have reached had they not consulted the
comparative material. The license for expressivist analysis is not at all
distinctive to comparative approaches. Rather, it is that judges of wide
learning-whether in comparative constitutional law, in the classics of
literature, in economics, or in many other fields-may see things about our
society that judges with a narrower vision miss. 3 And, having seen our
society from this broader perspective, such judges might find themselves
50. The possibility of a license for comparative inquiry might nonetheless survive even this
formulation. The argument I have developed takes the view that examination of "the structure of
the Constitution" authorizes courts to consider functional matters. Comparative inquiry would
indeed be irrelevant if one thought that functional considerations were irrelevant to the
interpretation of the Constitution as a whole, or of particular constitutional provisions or
arrangements.
51. For critiques of functionalism, see infra Section III.B.
52. Justice Breyer has suggested another reason to attend to quasi-constitutional
developments elsewhere. Dissenting from a denial of review in Elledge v. Florida, 119 S. Ct. 366
(1998), Justice Breyer pointed out that determining whether a person under sentence of death
suffered cruel and unusual punishment when his stay on death row was extremely long (and due
to the government's "faulty procedures") would ease the tension between U.S. law and
international human rights law created by the holding of the European Court on Human Rights in
Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). Soering held that the extradition of
a capital defendant to the United States would violate Article 3 of the European Convention of
Human Rights, in part because of the delays attendant to the administration of capital punishment
in Virginia. See id. at 45. This is not, however, a suggestion that U.S. constitutional interpretation
should rely on constitutional experience elsewhere in the sense I am using (even apart from the
point that international human rights law is not yet constitutional, again in the sense I am using). It
is a suggestion that the administration of domestic law could be improved by coordinating it with
legal developments elsewhere.
53. On this view, judges can use comparative constitutional law as part of an interpretive
approach that resembles a version of common law reasoning, in which experience elsewhere is a
source of insight into the ways in which alternative interpretations might advance constitutional
policies. (For an argument that constitutional interpretation takes the form of common law
reasoning, see David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHi. L. REV.
877 (1996).) This view may also account for some of the resistance to reliance on comparative
constitutional experience as well, because the constitutional law of other nations has no obvious
place in the hierarchy of authorities that common law judges ordinarily consult. But see infra text
accompanying note 359 (suggesting how that law might become part of the hierarchy of
authority). On some views of common law reasoning, only authority matters; on other views,
judges properly draw on empirical evidence and other sources of policy insight. These contrasting
approaches to common law reasoning parallel the alternatives offered by Justices Scalia and
Breyer for reliance on comparative constitutional experience. See also Vicki C. Jackson,
Ambivalent Resistance, Comparative Constitutionalism and Opening Up the Conversation:
"Proportionality," Rights, and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming Winter 1999)
(describing other sources of resistance to, and attractions of, comparative constitutionalism in U.S.
adjudication).
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using standard methods of constitutional interpretation-text, structure,
history, democratic theory-to reach results that their colleagues would not
have reached. In this aspect, comparative constitutional law operates in the
way that general liberal education does. To the extent that we think that
judges are licensed to rely on what they take from great works of literature
as they interpret the Constitution, we should think that they are licensed to
rely on comparative constitutional law as well. 4
The license for bricolage is more subtle. As Justice Scalia pointed out
in Printz, bricolage is clearly available at the stage of constitution-
drafting.55 In attempting to figure out what constitutional provisions make
sense for the regime that a new constitution is going to put in place,
constitution-drafters will inevitably scavenge around to see what they can
appropriate from the materials available to them in other constitutions.56
Justice Scalia noted the discussions of other constitutional systems in The
Federalist Papers.57 He could have added that, in preparing for the
constitutional convention, James Madison engaged in a comprehensive
survey of prior constitutional experience,58 or noted that John Adams
compiled an impressive collection of such experiences. 59 Bricolage in
constitutional interpretation, in contrast, seems harder to justify. Why
should judges be able to rely on the cultural materials made available to
them by comparative analysis in interpreting the U.S. Constitution?'
The question is particularly serious if we understand bricolage as a
process of random or playful selection from materials at hand. Both
randomness and playfulness seem incompatible with the justificatory
obligations we ordinarily think judges have. Perhaps we can take the sting
out of the question without quite offering a positive justification for
54. It should be clear that judges rely on their general liberal education not by extracting
"holdings" from great works of literature, but, for instance, by developing a sensitive
appreciation for the many ways people live their lives in, and respond to, institutional structures. It
would, of course, be a bad idea for U.S. constitutionalists to rely on experience elsewhere as
authority for conclusions about U.S. constitutional law, but it should be equally clear that I do not
describe the process of learning from experience elsewhere as one that generates "holdings."
55. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997).
56. For a modem illustration, see infra Section V.A.
57. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.1 1 (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 18-20 (James Madison &
Alexander Hamilton)).
58. See James Madison, Notes on Ancient and Modem Confederacies (1786), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 3 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975).
59. See JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1787), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 271 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Charles C. Little &
James Brown 1851).
60. Of course they must, or at least inevitably do, rely on cultural materials generally in
interpreting the Constitution. They will, therefore, rely on comparative materials to the extent that
such materials become available to them as part of their culture. In this form, the license for using
comparative materials is fundamentally the same as the one discussed in the preceding paragraphs
on expressivism.
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bricolage. Often bricolage is an unconscious process: Picking up a piece
from somewhere just seems like a natural thing to do. So, for example, it
seems unlikely that Justice Frankfurter had a strong theory of comparative
constitutional law, an account of the license Justice Scalia argues is needed,
to back up his references to Anglo-American legal traditions as a source
one could consult in interpreting the Due Process Clause.6" To the extent
that bricolage has this unconscious, natural character, the practice warrants
its own use.6' Further, I will argue that functionalist and expressivist
considerations are likely to constrain the effectiveness of bricolage.63
In different ways, then, judges can find licenses for looking to
constitutional experience elsewhere in interpreting the U.S. Constitution.
The remainder of this Article identifies the ways in which they should
conduct that search and offers a number of cautions against thinking that
looking elsewhere will dramatically alter the interpretive conclusions
judges would otherwise draw.
Im. FUNCTIONALISM
According to functionalism, political institutions perform certain tasks
common to all (well-functioning) systems of governance. A functionalist
might claim, for example, that such systems must have some institutions to
resolve conflicts among their components, or mechanisms for ensuring
some stability in a changing extra-political environment. Functionalists
naturally think in comparative terms, for only by examining different
political systems can they identify the functions common to all and the
institutions they think serve those functions. Functionalism faces challenges
from two directions. It must avoid specifying functions so generally that its
purported insights become banal.' But it must also avoid specifying
functions so precisely that every institution performs a complex set of
functions unique to it as an institution.65
This Part examines whether functionalism is a helpful approach to
thinking about how or whether U.S. constitutional law can learn from
constitutional experience elsewhere. I use recent Supreme Court decisions
61. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,416-17 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
62. Cf. BOBBrrT, supra note 19 (offering an account of constitutional interpretation in which
practices are self-legitimating).
63. See infra Section V.B. If so, judicial bricoleurs may accomplish something, but not much,
and perhaps not enough for us to have a serious concern about the justification for their (flawed or
failed) efforts.
64. For example, a useful functionalism cannot assert that a political system's institutions
taken as a whole preserve the system's equilibrium, unless it offers a well-specified concept of
-disequilibrium.
65. That is, a useful functionalism cannot say that an institution is functional because it serves
precisely the functions it serves and no others.
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dealing with selective funding for political and artistic programs as a case
study in the possibilities of functionalist analysis. The study shows how
experiences elsewhere can provide useful insights and elaborations of
functional themes already present in domestic law. I then develop a critique
of comparative functionalism: Identifying common functions across
constitutional systems is always problematic because doing so inevitably
omits institutional details unique to the systems being compared. The Part
concludes by pointing out that the natural response to this critique, which
would involve adding in the details and thereby qualifying the description
of the functions, drives functionalism toward expressivism.
A. The Problem of Subsidies and the Concept of the Quango
1. Introduction
The expansion of government's reach since the New Deal has
transformed the central issues of free speech law. To put it most broadly,
free speech law deals with government actions that favor or disfavor
expression. The classical cases, arising from government efforts to suppress
political dissent, involved laws imposing criminal penalties on people who
said things the government thought dangerous.66 Such cases have almost
disappeared from the courts' dockets. Today, the cases involve government
actions that favor or disfavor speech by awarding or withholding public
resources, ranging from space in a park to hold a demonstration, to time on
a public broadcasting station, to money itself. These actions are
interventions in the marketplace of ideas. And classical free speech theory
has difficulty in dealing with such interventions. One important strand in
classical free speech theory directs us to cast a suspicious eye on
government interventions that are said to skew public debate and
deliberation. One of the things wrong with imprisoning dissenters, for
example, is that the public is deprived of their distinctive viewpoint, and
thus is less able to arrive at its own conclusions uninfluenced by the
government's decisions about which points of view are right.
Government speech and selective subsidies necessarily skew the
debate. Yet, the modem state simply cannot refrain from speaking on its
own or subsidizing speech it favors. The examples are easy to list. The
federal government sponsors an advertising campaign urging people to
"Just Say No" to illegal drugs. A state university's history department
decides that the point of view known as "Cold War revisionism," which
66. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Giflow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
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treats the United States and the Soviet Union as equally responsible for the
Cold War, has become too dominant in the field and hires someone who
insists on the Soviet Union's primary responsibility over an equally
qualified candidate who accepts the revisionist view. A high school makes
its auditorium available after school only to groups whose messages
enhance the school's educational program.
Some selective subsidies must be constitutional if the modem state is to
have the reach we have come to accept.67 Equally clear, however, is that
some selective subsidies must be unconstitutional. The plurality in Board of
Education, Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico6s offered the
canonical example: "If a Democratic school board, motivated by party
affiliation, ordered the removal of all books written by or in favor of
Republicans, few would doubt that the order violated the constitutional
rights of the students denied access to those books."69 Courts and
commentators have struggled to develop ways of drawing lines between
permissible and impermissible selective subsidies. Each proposed solution
has sensible things to say, but to this point, no proposed solution deals well
with all the cases.
This Section uses two recent Supreme Court cases as the vehicle for
exploring the problem of selective subsidies. Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes" arose from a debate for congressional
candidates in Arkansas sponsored by the Arkansas Educational Television
Commission (AETC), the state's public television system. The system's
board was appointed by the state's governor for eight-year terms and could
not hold other public positions, except as educators, while they served on
the board. "To insulate its programming decisions from political pressure,
AETC employs an Executive Director and professional staff' and has
adopted a statement of principles that "counsel[s] adherence to 'generally
accepted broadcasting industry standards."' 7 1  "Working in close
consultation" with an experienced political reporter, the AETC staff
developed a plan for debates among candidates for Arkansas's
congressional seats.72 Each debate would last one hour, which, the staff
concluded, required that participation had to be limited to "'major party
67. Many of the problems, although perhaps not all, could be avoided were we to reduce
sharply the scope of government, or were we to free state (and local) governments from the
constraints imposed by the First Amendment as incorporated in the Fourteenth. The reduction
would be quite severe. Selective subsidy problems routinely arise, for example, in the operation of
public elementary and secondary education.
68. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
69. Id at 870-71. For an expression of some doubt about the obviousness of this claim, see
infra text accompanying notes 92-95.
70. 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
71. Id. at 1637 (citation omitted).
72. See id.
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candidates or any other candidate who had strong popular support."' 7 3
Ralph Forbes qualified to appear on the ballot as an independent candidate;
although he had not run for Congress before, Forbes had been a candidate
in the Republican primaries for Lieutenant Governor in 1986 and 1990,
and, in 1990, he had received almost forty-seven percent of the statewide
vote before he was defeated in a run-off.74 Forbes asked for permission to
participate in the debate for the Third Congressional district seat, and he
sued when AETC denied him permission because he was not a "serious"
candidate. The Supreme Court held that AETC's decision did not violate
Forbes's constitutional rights.
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley75 was a challenge to the
constitutionality of a provision directing that the NEA "tak[e] into
consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public" in making awards for artistic
excellence and artistic merit.76 The NEA makes its awards based on
evaluations by panels of experts in the various fields of arts; the statute
requires that the panels "reflect 'diverse artistic and cultural points of view'
and include 'wide geographic, ethnic, and minority representation.' ' 77 A
handful of grants, including two that indirectly supported work by Robert
Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano that critics said were pornographic and
blasphemous, respectively, attracted substantial public criticism from
members of Congress. After Congress adopted the "decency and respect"
provision in 1990, the NEA interpreted the statute to require that panel
members be selected in a way sensitive to concerns for decency and
respect. The Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to the provision,
saying that it simply identified some considerations that panels had to take
into account but did not preclude the NEA from making any award,
including awards to indecent or disrespectful art that was nevertheless
artistically excellent.78
In what follows, I survey a number of possible approaches to the
problems posed by Forbes and Finley, paying particular attention to two
elements: (1) the strands of analysis in each approach that seem sensible;
and (2) the points at which the approach fails to deal well with either the
obviously constitutional or the obviously unconstitutional forms of selective
subsidy I described earlier. The Section then shows how the sensible
strands can be pulled together by using a concept drawn from constitutional
73. Id. (citation omitted).
74. See id. at 1644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
76. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).
77. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2172.
78. See id. at 2176-77.
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experience in Great Britain, the quango, to give us a way of thinking about
the problem of selective subsidies that advances our understanding.
2. Proposed Solutions in Domestic Law
Treating the question of subsidies as a matter to be resolved
substantively, courts and scholars have offered a range of solutions
designed to ensure that political authorities retain rather wide discretion to
allocate limited public resources to speech without allowing them to engage
in what are regarded as the worst kinds of abuses, of which providing funds
only to those who support one political party is the prime example. Yet,
none is entirely satisfactory. No single solution appears to provide
acceptable answers to all the testing cases. As those hypotheticals indicate,
the real objective is to devise an approach that identifies when
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint is allowed.79 The following
analysis shows that the Court and First Amendment scholars have identified
the importance of politics in constraining the government from adopting
truly troublesome selective subsidies and have suggested a further barrier
through a requirement that subsidy decisions rest on objective criteria.
These themes derive from the First Amendment concern of avoiding
government-induced skewing of public debate. I then turn to comparative
79. The Court has rejected the possibility of treating state funds as public forums, asserting
that "the almost unfettered access of a traditional public forum would be incompatible with the
programming dictates a television broadcaster must follow." Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641. This is a
slight overstatement. The public forum doctrine requires that a government's programmatic goals,
such as ensuring that commuters be able to use the streets to get to work and back home on time,
must yield to interests in expression, in the sense that the programmatic goals cannot be
accomplished to the degree that decisionmakers unconstrained by the Constitution would seek to
accomplish them. The "programming dictates" might similarly have to yield to such interests, at
least to the extent that distributing time on a first-come, first-served basis is not fundamentally
incompatible with the government's programmatic goals. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 116 (1972) ("The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."). The only real
incompatibility I can see here is that the public might forgo operating a public broadcasting
system were access available on a first-come, first-served basis.
Some Canadian cases suggest the possibility of avoiding constitutional analysis by finding
that funding decisions are not governmental action. Compare McKinney v. Board of Governors
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (Can.) (holding that a university was not a government actor), with Lavigne
v. Ontario Pub. Serv. Employees Union [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (Can.) (holding that a community
college was a government actor). The cases turn on such matters as the composition of the actor's
governing board and the precise reporting relation it has to public agencies, and their outcomes
might be influenced by the subject matter of the underlying dispute. (McKinney rejected a
challenge to a mandatory retirement age for professors, while Lavigne involved a challenge to the
use of union funds for political purposes over the objection of a person required to pay the fees
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.) The Canadian cases suggest that the "no state
action" approach is not likely to be workable. For a discussion in the U.S. context, see A. Michael
Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 570-74. The U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the Canadian approach in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger
Corporation, 513 U.S. 374 (1995), which involved a public corporation all of whose board
members were appointed, directly or indirectly, by the President.
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experience as a way of seeing how these themes help identify distinctive
governmental institutions, called quangos, whose decisions might be
subject to the lessened degree of First Amendment scrutiny that seems
necessary to make sense of some of modem government's operations."s
The Court began its analysis in Forbes by asking "whether public
forum principles apply to the case at all." 81 It was concerned that applying
that analysis "would be antithetical, as a general rule, to the discretion that
stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their journalistic
purpose and statutory obligations." 82 The Court concluded, again "[a]s a
general rule," that public broadcasters should not be subject to claims of
viewpoint discrimination, because of "the nature of editorial discretion ....
[E]ven principled exclusions rooted in sound journalistic judgment can
often be characterized as viewpoint-based."8 3 Quoting liberally from
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,84
which involved the journalistic discretion of private broadcasters, the Court
concluded "that, in most cases, the First Amendment of its own force does
not compel public broadcasters to allow third parties access to their
programming." 8'
According to this view, public television stations can dramatically skew
their news broadcasts and other programming. For example, a public
broadcasting system in a state dominated today by a single political
machine, as Louisiana was by Huey Long, could present news broadcasts
that shut out the opposition. A public broadcasting system in the United
States could become "state television" along the lines of the state-
dominated systems in Russia, which were reported to have presented news
80. Frederick Schauer describes the ways in which the Court has hinted at the importance of
drawing distinctions among institutions for First Amendment purposes and suggests that these
hints are incompatible with a more general interpretive preference on the Court for principle-
based rather than policy-oriented constitutional doctrine. See Frederick Schauer, Principles,
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1998). This Section's analysis
deepens Schauer's argument by drawing attention to a description of institutions made available
by constitutional experience elsewhere, a description that can be given an acceptably principled
form, and by noting that the preference for principle-based doctrine is only one of several already
present in contemporary constitutional adjudication.
81. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1639.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
85. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1640. Justice Scalia made a similar point in Finley. In his view,
there was a "fundamental divide" between laws "abridging" speech and those funding it, and the
First Amendment was "inapplicable" to funding decisions. NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2184
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). For Justice Scalia, selective funding decisions,
even those discriminating against particular viewpoints, do not infringe free speech rights because
they "have [no] significant coercive effect." Id. at 2183 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
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stories openly favoring the reelection of Boris Yeltsin as President in
1996.86
The Court's opinion in Forbes suggests one response to the "state
television" problem: the system's statutory obligations.87 That seems
86. See Geoffrey York, Post-Communism, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 21, 1996, at DI
(reporting "an independent study of television coverage" of the 1996 election, in which "Yeltsin
enjoyed 492 more positive reports than negative stories, while almost every other candidate was
given negative coverage," and, in the second round, "247 more positive stories than negative
stories about Mr. Yeltsin, while the coverage of the Communists was almost precisely the
opposite"). I use the term state-dominated television rather than state television because television
in Russia has been nominally privatized, but in 1996 it was dominated by close political allies of
President Yeltsin.
87. An unelaborated footnote in Justice Scalia's opinion in Finley asserts that there is a
solution to this problem. Justice Scalia asserted that "it would be... unconstitutional for the
government itself to promote candidates nominated by the Republican party, and I do not think
that that unconstitutionality has anything to do with the First Amendment." Finley, 118 S. Ct. at
2184 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The basis for the unconstitutionality is unclear.
The most obvious candidate is the Equal Protection Clause (or, in Finley, the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause). But, if the First Amendment truly
does not have "anything to do" with the problem, a decision to fund Republican candidates would
be subject only to rational basis review, and it is trivially easy to devise public-oriented
justifications for favoring such candidates (for example, the legislature reasonably believes that
their election is more likely than the election of their opponents to result in the implementation of
the public-oriented policies laid out in the Republican Party platform). If the selective subsidy is
unconstitutional because the discrimination would not survive some higher level review, the
question then becomes: "What, other than the First Amendment, triggers that higher level of
review?" Professor Daniel Conkle pointed out in an e-mail message to the Conlaw discussion list
(July 6, 1998) that Justice Scalia responded to Justice White's invocation of equal protection
principles in his dissent in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), by saying that the Equal
Protection Clause did no work independent of the First Amendment in Justice White's analysis,
see id. at 384 n.4. That observation seems applicable here as well.
Because Finley involved a federal subsidy, perhaps Justice Scalia meant that he could not
imagine an enumerated federal power justifying a selective subsidy program. That argument
would not be available in Forbes, and in any event it is a non-standard form of analysis of
challenges to distinctions drawn in federal legislation that there be an enumerated power that
would justify the distinction rather than the legislation.
Finally, perhaps the thought is that the constitutional commitment to selection of
representatives through elections entails the conclusion that the representatives themselves cannot
enact laws whose principal (or almost exclusive) effect is to determine more or less directly who
their successors will be. (The qualifications are needed because all good politicians will attempt to
enact laws one of whose effects will be to increase the probability that they, or the people they
favor, will be elected in the next election.) The constitutional commitment could be linked to
Article I, Section 2; the Seventeenth Amendment; and perhaps the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 4. Cf. Australian Capital Television Pty. v. Australia (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106 (Austl.)
(finding constitutional basis for invalidating Australia's campaign finance regulations in its
constitutional commitment to governing through elected representatives). For a discussion of this
case, see Gerald N. Rosenberg & John M. Williams, Do Not Go Gently into That Good Right: The
First Amendment in the High Court of Australia, 1997 SuP. CT. REv. 439. The Australian
experience suggests that it is possible to generate a reasonably full-fledged law of free expression
from the kinds of structural inferences that would be required to justify this third approach, which
in turn suggests that Justice Scalia's attempt to escape from a general First Amendment
jurisprudence might not succeed (at least if the approach he suggests were to be placed in other
hands).
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insufficient standing alone."8 The existence of statutory duties, however,
may signal the possibility of a different, and perhaps more satisfactory,
response. The Court said in Forbes that "[w]hen a public broadcaster
exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of its
programming, it engages in speech activity."8 9 When the government
speaks, either directly or by purchasing the speech-services of others, it
necessarily engages in viewpoint discrimination.0 In light of the scope of
modem government, these interventions have the potential to skew public
debate and understanding quite substantially. Indeed, they are praised if
they do so, as is asserted to be true in the example of government anti-drug
and anti-tobacco propaganda.9" Why do these forms of viewpoint
discrimination fail to present substantial constitutional problems?
The answer, if there is one, lies in politics.9 2 We can begin by noting
that the problem of "state television" arises in Russia because there is little
competition from television stations not dominated by the government's
political allies. But nowhere in the United States does public television have
anything approaching a dominating role as a source of news 3 More
important, in the modem world it is extremely unlikely today that a single
political party would have the degree of influence within a jurisdiction that
Huey Long did in Louisiana.94 The statutory obligations to which the Court
alluded in Forbes arise from party competition, which produces a system of
public broadcasting that prevents it from becoming "state television." 95
88. I doubt that repealing the statutory obligations to which the Court referred would be
unconstitutional in itself, but it is then puzzling how a constitutionally permissible repeal would
somehow convert a previously constitutional action into an unconstitutional one.
89. Forbes, 118 S. CL at 1639.
90. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2190-93 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the constitutionality
of viewpoint-discrimination when the government acts as a speaker or a buyer of services).
91. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 819 (1993)
(asserting that "[mlost people agree that... regulation [of tobacco advertising] present[s] no
constitutional problem" because the regulation is "based on such obvious harms that the notion
that it is viewpoint-based does not even register").
92. In my view, nothing written since has improved significantly on Mark Yudof's analysis
in MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPREsSION IN AMERICA (1983).
93. Competition from private broadcasting might constrain public broadcasters, limiting their
ability to be strongly biased, or it might reduce the impact of skewed public broadcasting on
public understanding. In the extreme, the courts might invoke the First Amendment to restrict the
government's power to reduce competition from private media. Cf. Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (finding unconstitutional a differential tax on newspaper publishers
imposed by Louisiana during the Huey Long era). For background on Grosjean, see gnerally
RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE KINGFISH AND THE CONSTITUTION: HuEY LONG, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN PRESS FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1996).
94. By "jurisdiction" I mean to include states, cities, and towns. The present Mayor Daley of
Chicago dominates the city in a substantially different way from the way the prior Mayor Daley
did.
95. Were a single state to eliminate such obligations, it seems quite likely that federal
regulatory agencies, or Congress itself, would deprive the state's broadcasting system of its
licenses to operate "public" television. The possibility of moving from a lower-level jurisdiction,
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Still, some problems do not seem amenable to an analysis taking the
government to be the speaker.96 The state university's history department
might have one revisionist and one counter-revisionist; it could hardly be
said to be speaking when one of them is advancing a position the other
rejects. The NEA funds so many different kinds of artistic expression that
no one could sensibly say that each artist was speaking for the government.
Rather, as Justice Souter said in his dissent in Finley, "the 'communicative
element inherent in the very act of funding itself is an endorsement of the
importance of the arts collectively" or of the importance of having a
diverse range of views presented in a state university.97 That, however, is an
argument against selective funding; it does not provide the defense that
seems necessary.
An alternative analysis, urged by the parties seeking access to public
resources in Forbes and Finley, is that the cases involved public resources
that had been designated as public forums.9" The government designates a
forum for speech when it identifies a broad class of persons who
automatically qualify for access to the forum and then allocates the use of
the forum on some basis that does not take into account precisely what the
speaker plans to say. So, for example, a city might designate its municipal
auditorium for use by political parties, civic organizations, and theatrical
productions. What is it to do when a civic organization and a theatrical
production request the use of the space on the same Saturday night? The
city could allocate the facility to the first one to apply or to the activity
predicted to attract the larger number of people,99 but it could not reject the
in which one party might dominate, to a higher-level one, in which there is substantial party
competition, reduces the threat posed by one-party domination on the local level, which is a more
serious possibility in today's United States than such domination on the state or, of course,
national level.
96. Politics may not provide a complete answer even to the problems already discussed. The
examples of anti-drug and anti-tobacco propaganda demonstrate that there are issues on which
public agreement appears to be so great that competing voices will have little influence on
structuring the way in which the government speaks. A skeptic might note that, in such
circumstances, the chances that the courts would enforce a constitutional constraint on
government speech are exceedingly small. Forbes itself shows that competition between the major
parties may induce public broadcasters to avoid blatant bias in favor of or against one or the other
major party, but will have little effect on decisions biased against third-party or independent
candidates.
97. NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2190 n.6 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 892 n. 11 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting)).
98. My thinking about the analysis in this and the following four paragraphs was clarified by
the comments made by participants on the e-mail Conlaw discussion list.
99. This latter strategy may be subject to a challenge on the basis that the criterion leaves too
much discretion to the subjective judgment of the facility's manager. See Arkansas Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1648 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing
the "unbridled" discretion present in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123
(1992)).
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theatrical production on the ground that its planned production of Angels in
America, a gay-themed play, would offend many in the community.
Forbes argued that the candidate debate was a designated public forum,
with the criterion for membership in the group eligible to participate being a
qualified candidate in the Third District. The Court disagreed. In the
Court's view, the government designates a public forum when it "intend[s]
-to make the property 'generally available' to a class of speakers."' 00 But it
does not create such a forum when it "allows selective access for individual
speakers rather than general access for a class of speakers." 101 That
description, the Court said, fit the candidate debate. But, the Court
continued: "The debate's status as a nonpublic forum... did not give
AETC unfettered power to exclude any candidate it wished."10 2 The
station's decision had to be "reasonable in light of the purpose of the
property," and, more important, could not have been "based on the
speaker's viewpoint."' 03
Again the Court's formulation is deceptively simple. In elaborating it,
the Court explained:
[T]he government creates a designated public forum when it makes
its property generally available to a certain class of speakers ....
[It] does not create a public forum when it does no more than
reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of
speakers, whose members must then, as individuals, "obtain
permission" to use it."
In Finley,105 the Court described Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
University of Virginia,10 6 another designated-forum case. The forum in
Rosenberger was a fund created by a mandatory student-activity fee. The
Court held that this was a designated public forum and therefore held it
unconstitutional to bar a Christian student newspaper from receiving a
grant. The Finley Court distinguished "the competitive process" 07 used by
the NEA to make awards from the process used in Rosenberger. The
university made awards from the fund, the Court said, to "all student
organizations that were 'related to the educational purpose of the
University."' "' The Court's thought appears to be that anyone within the
100. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,264 (1981)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1643.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1642 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
804 (1985)).
105. NEAv. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
106. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
107. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at2178.
108. Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824).
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class automatically gets access to the resource when a designated public
forum is involved, whereas access to nondesignated forums is discretionary.
The municipal auditorium example shows why the Court's definition of
designated public forums is questionable." 9 Despite what the Court
suggests, access can never be automatic, even to designated forums, when
the resource is limited. The university in Rosenberger had to decide which
student groups, out of all whose work was "related to the educational
purpose of the University," 110 should get an award. The real question is
109. In addition, the Court's definition of designated public forums allows public authorities
to manipulate their designations, perhaps even after the event. The Forbes Court briefly noticed
this difficulty, observing almost in passing that the fact that its "distinction turns on governmental
intent does not render it unprotective of speech." Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1642. The false dichotomy
aside, the difficulty does not lie in the use of intent as such in defining the distinction, but in the
fact that an intent-based criterion opens up the possibility of discriminatory gerrymandering based
on viewpoint. Consider the Angels in America example. When the city's denial of the auditorium
for that production is challenged, the city could contend that it had always meant that the
auditorium was designated for use by family-oriented theatrical productions. (I treat family-
oriented as describing a particular type of subject matter, identifying a class similar to classic
plays or plays about U.S. history, although I concede that it might be regarded as describing a
viewpoint.) It might rely on historical practices, designing its descriptions of the productions that
had used the auditorium to fit a designation that would exclude Angels in America from the "class
of speakers" to whom the facility had been made available. If prior written guidelines referred to
"theatrical productions" generally, the city could respond that it had always intended that to mean
family-oriented productions and that its prior imprecision resulted from the simple fact that the
question had not come up before. Although a court could theoretically get at this sort of
gerrymandering by finding that the facially-neutral criterion was the product of an intent to
discriminate against a particular viewpoint, the Court's experience with various types of
gerrymanders does not make me confident that its intent-based approach would give it the
resources to address what might be widespread practices of gerrymandered viewpoint
discrimination. Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (analyzing gerrymandering in an
Establishment Clause case); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977) (analyzing gerrymandering in a Dormant Commerce Clause case). Similarly, the public
broadcaster in Forbes could have described its candidate debate as a designated public forum
without fearing that it had to open it to Forbes: It would designate the forum for use by serious
candidates for the Third Congressional District seat and then allow everyone in that class to use
the forum. But see Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242,
251,253 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that the Transportation Authority had created a designated public
forum in its display areas because it "accept[ed]... a broad range of advertisements" and
rejecting the argument that the forum was designated for use only by those whose advertisements
were not objectionable "for any reason").
One can summarize the problems with the Court's definition by quoting the point at which it
applied the definition in Forbes:
AETC did not make its debate generally available to candidates for Arkansas' Third
Congressional District seat. Instead .... AETC reserved eligibility for participation in
the debate to candidates for the Third Congressional District seat (as opposed to some
other seat). At that point,... AETC made candidate-by-candidate determinations as to
which of the eligible candidates would participate in the debate.
Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1642-43 (emphasis added). The parenthetical phrase, which comes out of
nowhere but which the Court seems to believe adds something, signals that something has gone
wrong with the analysis.
110. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Unless, as
was not the case in Rosenberger, the university made its awards on a pro rata basis. But that
could never be the case, or at least could not be administered in a way that avoids the underlying
First Amendment issue. Given N applicants for a limited fund, should each get one-Nth of the
fund? That has perverse incentive effects. Should the funds be allocated in proportion to the
1248
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whether awards within the eligible group are made on an "objective"
basis."'
The role of objective criteria in the preceding analysis connects it to a
more promising approach, developed primarily by Robert Post.Y2 Post first
notes the difference recognized in free speech law between the government-
as-regulator and the government-as-speaker." 3 No free speech problems
arise when the government chooses to sponsor a "Just Say, No" anti-drug
campaign; here the government is the speaker. Free speech problems would
obviously be serious were the government to prohibit a privately-sponsored
"Say Yes to Dope" advertisement; then the government would be a
regulator. Only slightly more difficult are cases where the government hires
someone to say what the government wants. Consider the actor hired to
deliver a "Just Say No" message. The government could undoubtedly fire
him if he insisted on saying, "And by the way, I personally think drugs are
great" during the advertisement's filming.Y
number of students who are members of the N groups? That ignores the different programs that
different groups seek to implement and the different costs that result.
111. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178 (differentiating the "content-based 'excellence' threshold
for NEA support" from "objective decisions on allocating public benefits"). That the government
must make objective decisions within the eligible group implies that, to get an award, an applicant
must obtain the government's permission to use the resource, thus collapsing the distinction the
Court drew between designated public forums and nonpublic forums. In addition, while there is a
distinction between a requirement that a decision be made on an objective basis and a ban on
decisions that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, the distinction is quite thin. At the very least,
the failure to have objective criteria might suggest that the decision rested on viewpoint
discrimination. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1757 (1987) (describing as "precious" and
"unworkable" a distinction, suggested by earlier decisions, "between the intent to include the
class of speakers or subjects of which the plaintiff is the representative, and the intent to exclude
the plaintiff"). This makes the distinction between designated public forums and nonpublic
forums less important than it might otherwise appear. (It may be of interest in this connection to
note that on remand of Lebron, the Second Circuit held both that the advertising area Lebron
wanted to use was a nonpublic forum and that Amtrak's policy against accepting political
advertising was not viewpoint-discriminatory. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 69
F.3d 650,656,658-59, amended by 89 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995).)
112. See ROBERT C. POST, CONsTUTIONAL DOMAINs: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT (1995) (providing the clearest statement of Post's general approach). Post's
approach identifies important considerations that will go into any fully developed law, although
his specific doctrinal recommendations probably are inadequate.
113. As a pioneer in the area, Post did not use these precise terms, which became common
currency after he began writing about the problems. Post distinguished between the government's
exercise of managerial authority and its exercise of governance authority. See Post, supra note
Ill, at 1717. This distinction is broader than, though related to, the distinction drawn more
recently in free speech theory between the government as regulator and the government as
speaker. For one use of the more recent distinction, see Schauer, supra note 80, at 100-01.
114. This has come to be the accepted understanding of Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203
(1991), which upheld a regulation denying funding from a federal family planning program to
programs that engaged in activities that encouraged or promoted abortion as a method of family
planning. Post argues that the accepted analysis fails to take enough account of the social
understanding of the patient-physician relationship. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106
YALE LJ. 151,171-76 (1996).
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First Amendment concerns seem quite weak in these cases. But, as the
government uses its power as employer to exercise greater leverage over
speech, such concerns play a larger role."' According to Pickering v. Board
of Education, 16 a balancing approach that would not be used when the
government acts as regulator is appropriate when the government acts as
employer.
Post's insight is that these adaptations reflect a broader understanding.
He divides the "social domain" into three parts: the domain of democracy
and public discourse, the domain of management, and the domain of
community." 7 The government has instrumental or programmatic goals
within the domain of management. 18 When acting there, it may restrict
individual autonomy in the service of its programmatic goals. Those
restrictions, however, need not be imposed only on government
employees." 9 As Post observes, "What is at stake is whether we wish to
115. Consider again the actor delivering the anti-drug message. Could the government
include within its contract a provision depriving the actor of a portion of his salary if, during the
time the advertisement was being broadcast, he made any public speech advocating the use of
drugs? The government's theory would be that such activities would undermine the anti-drug
message the actor was hired to deliver. A private sector example is the discomfort felt by the Beef
Industry Council when it discovered that Cybill Shephard, used in its advertising, did not eat beef.
See Laura Bird, Sour Remarks on Milk May Focus Attention on Big Dairy Campaign, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 1, 1992, at B5. At the same time, however, the government's use of the employment
relation here would have a significantly greater leveraging effect on free speech than the simple
rule that people it hires have to say what the government wants them to say in their capacity as
public employees. Compare Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 (observing that the challenged regulations "do
not force the... grantee to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee
keep such activities separate and distinct from [the funded] activities"), with Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (per curiam) (relying on equitable principles to impose a trust
for the benefit of the United States on profits earned by the publication of a memoir by a former
employee of the CIA who had signed an agreement that he would not publish any information
relating to the Agency without its prior approval).
116. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that, in determining whether a school board properly
disciplined a teacher for a public statement, "[t]he problem.., is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees").
117. The general distinctions are outlined in POST, supra note 112, at 1-10.
118. For a similar concept, which C. Edwin Baker describes as "institutionally bound
speech," see C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 16-21 (1998). Baker refers to "situations where resources and activities are authoritatively
organized to further or accomplish particular objectives within a limited realm of social life.
Institutional realms ... are purposely designed to advance particular functional objectives." Id. at
19. Baker notes that his term "closely resembles Robert Post's emphasis on the distinction
between government action involving management and that involving governance." Id. at 19
n.88.
119. Consider here the modem, restrictive law of the public forum. Members of the general
public seek to use a state fairgrounds or the sidewalks leading to a post office for speech that
would express their autonomy and contribute to public discussion. The Court has held that the
government may bar them from using the public area, not upon a showing that their expressive
uses would substantially interfere with the government's programmatic goals, but simply upon a
showing that the regulation is reasonable. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990)
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consign speech to a social space where 'the attainment of institutional ends
is taken as an unquestioned priority.' This represents a serious contraction
of our ordinary understanding of freedom of expression." 1
20
Deeper difficulties lurk. The government's programmatic goals-what
it manages public resources to accomplish-are determined in the domain
of public discourse. Restrictions on speech in the managerial domain are
simultaneously produced by and affect what happens in the domain of
democracy.12 1 Post suggests that the way out of this dilemma lies in the
process of defining the boundaries between the domains. The definition,
Post argues, is not in the first instance a legal one. It is instead a social
definition, resting on the social practices that construct different
institutions.'
Post recognizes that the question of who "we" are is always
contested."2 Determining what we want requires us to decide first who we
are. For Post, that latter decision is made in the domain of community. 24
And now the difficulties Post's approach reveals become quite severe.
Many selective subsidy programs involve institutions-in Post's terms,
social practices constituted by social roles-whose instrumental goal is
shaping the community's self-understanding." 2 Public education, including
universities, public broadcasting, public sponsorship of the arts-these are
some important institutions through which communities constitute
themselves. In equivalent but more mundane terms, the domain of
community is where we determine the boundary between the domains of
democracy and management, but the institutions I have listed help define
where we think the appropriate boundary is. And yet what is at issue in the
(discussing sidewalks leading to post office); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (addressing state fairgrounds).
120. Post, supra note 114, at 171 (quoting Post, supra note 111, at 1789).
121. Baker concludes from this that we should treat the electoral process as a special
governing institution, allowing the people acting through representative government or direct
democracy to regulate speech to promote the functional goals of the electoral system. See Baker,
supra note 118, at 24-28.
122. See POST, supra note 112, at 252 ("[F]or constitutional purposes an organization's
boundaries can be recognized by the predominance of functionally defined organizational
roles.").
123. In addition, Post's approach seems to direct courts to ask what restrictions we as a
society think are appropriate for institutions composed of people acting in certain roles to impose
on people acting in other roles. But in constitutional cases there usually is a short answer to that
question: We as a society think the restrictions we have imposed to be appropriate. That is, putting
aberrational regulations to one side, Post's approach seems to incline strongly in the direction of
requiring the courts to see what restrictions on speech in the managerial domain emerge from the
democratic domain-and then uphold them all.
124. See POST, supra note 112, at 3 ("Laws instantiating community seek to reinforce this
shared world of common faith and fate.").
125. See id. at 323-24 (describing "public institutions of higher learning" as governed by
"the logic of instrumental rationality").
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cases we are considering is precisely the question of whether to locate the
institutions in the domain of democracy or in the domain of management.
In Forbes, for example, AETC made a managerial decision about the
best use of the scarce public resource of air-time on the public station. That
decision was guided by appropriate journalistic norms that regulate public
broadcasting as an institution in the managerial domain. Obviously, and in
Post's approach unproblematically, the decision also affects deliberation in
the democratic domain. But that deliberation helps constitute our social
understanding of public broadcasting as an institution, which makes
uncertain the normative basis for accepting a public decision to authorize
the station to use managerial norms. Again more mundanely, the station's
managerial norms appear to include a preference for the two-party system,
in the sense that all candidates from the two parties are taken to be serious
candidates while other candidates, whose participation in a debate might
affect the outcome, need not be serious. But allowing the station to use
those norms in allocating the public resource they control may entrench the
two-party system. 126
Post's subtle analysis does not yield recommendations for crisp rules.
Instead, it conforms to the prevailing view among legal academics that
selective funding should be addressed by a multifactor balancing test
sensitive to the contexts in which particular problems arise.127 In the context
of free expression, a version of the test would ask whether the government
has reasons to fund some speech and not others on the ground at issue and
whether its actions in doing so would skew public debate and understanding
to a degree sufficient to raise questions about the public's ability to arrive at
judgments autonomously.1 21
126. As I argue in the next Subsection, Post's approach may ultimately founder on this
difficulty. See infra text accompanying note 178.
127. See, e.g., CAss R. SUNsTErN, THE PARTIAL CONSnTUrION 291-318 (1993); Seth F.
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413 (1989). Sunstein offers the following formulation: "In all the cases considered, the question
is whether the measure at issue interferes with a constitutional right, properly characterized, and,
if so, whether the government has a sufficient justification." SUNSTEIN, supra, at 306; cf. Post,
supra note 114, at 179 (asserting, within a slightly different but related analytic framework, that
"[t]he characterization of government action entails judgments that are contextual and
multidimensional").
128. See, e.g., SuNsTEIN, supra note 127, at 310 (concluding that refusing to fund art projects
the public "find[s] abhorrent... [has] a skewing effect [that] could not plausibly be tolerated");
Sullivan, supra note 127, at 1490 (indicating the importance of recognizing the degree to which
subsidies "determine the overall distribution of power between government and rightholders
generally"). Post argues that the problem with an analysis predicated on the claim that subsidies
"skew public discourse" is that "it is not obvious how to give useful content to the concept of
'distortion' once it is accepted that the government may allocate grants to support particular
values." Post, supra note 114, at 185. He then discusses possible distinctions among "kinds of
distortions." Id. at 186. It seems to me more compatible with the thrust of multifactor balancing
tests to focus, as the formulation in the text does, on the degree to which shifts occur. Cf id. at
192 ("Subsidies that literally overwhelm public discourse.., should be set aside.").
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Forbes and Finley may provide useful contrasts. Arguably the selective
funding decision in Forbes rests on a permissible reason but has an
impermissible skewing effect, while the selective funding decision in Finley
rests on an impermissible reason but has no troublesome skewing effect. On
the reasons for the selection, Forbes finds that AETC made its decisions on
the basis of the candidates' likely appeal to voters.129 This reason certainly
seems permissible, because acting on it promoted the station's permissible
desire to ensure that voters would watch the debate.
130
Forbes suggests another reason for the selective funding decision.
According to the Court: "Were it faced with the prospect of cacophony, on
the one hand, and First Amendment liability, on the other, a public
television broadcaster might choose not to air candidates' views at all," and
"[a] First Amendment jurisprudence yielding [that] result[] does not
promote speech but represses it." 131 Given the choice between all or
nothing, government might choose nothing. Here we must disentangle some
strands in general free speech theory. One strand is that as a general matter
more speech is better than less. That is one reason for the public forum
doctrine and is one reason behind the idea that the best remedy for speech
of which the government disapproves is counterspeech rather than
suppression. 132 So, picking up this strand, the Court in Forbes says that
some speech is better than none.
1 33
At this point, however, we must consider a second strand in free speech
theory, the concern that government actions may skew public debate or
understanding. If a selective funding program actually does that, we cannot
say that funding only some speech is better than funding none at all. Of
course, any selective funding program will have some impact. But the
129. Justice Stevens argued that the facts in Forbes showed that this reason could not have
been the true ground of the station's decision. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
118 S. Ct. 1633, 1645 n.6 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing one district in which the
Democratic incumbent won with 74.2% of the vote over a Republican challenger who,
nonetheless, was invited to participate in the public broadcasting system's debates, despite the fact
that this Republican challenger had raised $6000, which was less than the amount Forbes raised);
id. at 1645 (describing the Republican candidate's narrow margin of victory in the Third District
and Forbes's "strong showing" in recent Republican primaries). For present purposes, that factual
point is irrelevant.
130. In contrast, one possible reason for selective funding in Finley could be that a significant
number of viewers (and voters) would find indecent art works distasteful. This reason either is or
is quite close to distaste as such and might be problematic as a reason for a selective funding
decision.
131. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643.
132. For the latter idea, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). In Whitney, Justice Brandeis noted that "If there be time... to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." Id.
133. Similarly, it seems reasonable to think that, given the choice between funding indecent
art or none at all, Congress would choose to fund none at all. But funding some art is better than
funding none. This analysis of course, gives a government a potentially troubling incentive. It can
avoid First Amendment scrutiny by credibly threatening to withdraw from the area entirely.
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question seems best addressed by considering that impact relative to the
distribution of speech prior to the government's action: If voices speak in
roughly the same proportion after the selective funding decisions as they
did before, the government's action would have some skewing effect, but
one small enough to avoid constitutional difficulty, or at least small enough
that it is offset by the benefits accruing from more speech rather than less.
Determining whether a skewing effect actually occurs, then, requires us
to consider the speech opportunities available in the nongovernment
market."M The station's decision in Forbes might (or might not) have an
impermissible skewing effect, depending on whether commercial
broadcasters were willing to televise candidate debates and on whether
voters find such debates a significant source of information to guide their
choices. The skewing effect of selective arts funding, in contrast, seems
likely to be small relative to the nongovernment market. Private patrons of
the arts have been common in the past and continue to play a significant
role in supporting art, particularly avant garde art of the sort that is likely to
be offensive to the general public.
135
Like all balancing approaches, the one sketched in the preceding
paragraphs has a number of flaws,136 notably its reliance on contestable
empirical judgments and rather personal judgments about what weights to
assign to which factors.'37 Yet, it correctly identifies the important role that
134. See Post, supra note 114, at 178-79 (distinguishing public subsidy of magazines through
favorable mailing rates from public sponsorship of productions at the Kennedy Center on the
ground that"magazines are... completely dependent" on the mail subsidy).
135. For some evidence of the relative importance of public and private patronage, see id. at
193 n.208. Post concludes that direct NEA support for the arts "is about 5% of total donations,"
but he notes as well that "[t]his estimate may understate the extent of NEA influence," because
NEA grants "are often highly leveraged" through matching programs and may have an indirect
leveraging effect by giving private donors a signal about which projects are worth their funds. Id.;
see also David Wasserman, Public Funding for Science and Art. Censorship, Social Harm, and
the Case of Genetic Research into Crime and Violence, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING:
PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION 169, 173 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998) (quoting Daniel
Shapiro as stating that "NEA funding in 1989 was a small fraction of the $114.7 billion in private
giving for the arts that year" and noting Shapiro's speculation that attacks on particular art works
may have improved "the overall funding prospects for [those] kinds of works").
136. The classic modem critique of balancing approaches is T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
137. Consider the following argument, which I personally find reasonable. It could be that
nongovemment sources of support for offensive art are available in New York but not in New
Hampshire, in which case the selectivity in the New York program would be constitutional while
the same provision in the New Hampshire one would be unconstitutional. That is an odd enough
result to raise questions about the general approach. It rests on what some might think an
invidious comparison between New York and New Hampshire, a comparison for which I can
provide no support. Consider as well my argument about the availability of nongovernment
support for the arts. In reaching the judgment that there is a significant amount of such support, I
implicitly have discounted claims by artists of the importance of public funding to their ability to
work because artists have an obvious interest in making such claims. Unfortunately, so do
potential private patrons of art, who will have greater opportunities to spread their money around
if the government, too, is subsidizing art. Because there seems to be no disinterested observer, I
rely on my personal judgments about social reality in the contemporary United States. But that
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free speech law's concern for the skewing effect of government action must
play in whatever constitutional analysis we ultimately adopt.
Finally, we can consider Justice Stevens's dissent in Forbes, which
would have finessed the problems with devising a substantive rule for
selective subsidy cases by adopting a purely procedural approach. He was
concerned that the Court's rule left too much room for the viewpoint
discrimination that it purported to bar. The difficulty was that the Court
allowed AETC to exclude Forbes without having any predetermined
guidelines for its decision: Its staff "had nearly limitless discretion to
exclude Forbes from the debate based on ad hoc justifications."138 Justice
Stevens argued that the Constitution requires the station to have objective
standards to guide the exercise of that discretion. This would "provid[e] the
public with some assurance that state-owned broadcasters cannot select
debate participants on arbitrary grounds." 1
39
AETC's Executive Director had identified a number of reasons for
excluding Forbes: "'[Voters did not consider him a serious candidate,'" 40
and news organizations, including the Associated Press, did not plan to
include Forbes's name in its national election reporting service; Forbes had
little financial support and did not report campaign finances to state or
federal authorities; and Forbes had no campaign headquarters outside his
house. A purely procedural approach would allow the station to exclude
Forbes for these reasons, as long as they were embodied in previously
established criteria. Justice Stevens described standards such as viability
and newsworthiness as impermissibly subjective, 4' but it should not be
difficult to devise standards that capture those ideas in more concrete terms.
So, for example, it is difficult to see why the AP's decision should not
count against including Forbes in the debate.
Justice Stevens emphasized that his approach "would impose only a
modest requirement" that would not substantially affect broadcasters'
counts against using a multifactor balancing test as a legal standard: It is one thing for an
academic to rely on such judgments in an article; it is another for a judge to do so openly in a
decision. It may be inevitable that judges implicitly rely on such judgments as they apply other
tests, and one standard defense of balancing tests is that they bring into the open what the judge
actually is taking into account. They need not do so, of course. A judge may enumerate one
consideration being placed in the balance, which actually has much less weight in the judge's
implicit deliberations than some unmentioned interest. Further, expressing an element of personal
judgment may be inconsistent with general public expectations about the nature of the rule of law.
138. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1645 (1998) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1643 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting AETC Executive Director Susan Howarth's
testimony at trial).
141. See id. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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decisions."' Modest requirements typically produce only modest benefits,
of course. Justice Stevens appears to have believed that his concerns could
not be met unless he imposed a small substantive constraint, that the
station's criteria must be objective. But the modesty of his approach turns
precisely on keeping the substantive constraint modest. The Court was
concerned that this was unlikely. Its decision to treat public broadcasting as
free from constitutional scrutiny except for candidate debates143 was
motivated by the view that any substantive constraint would "implicat[e]
the courts in judgments that should be left to the exercise of journalistic
discretion." 4
The lower courts in Finley similarly attempted to finesse the problem of
developing substantive criteria for determining when selective subsidies are
constitutionally impermissible. The district court held,14 and the court of
appeals affirmed, 14 6 that the statutory directive to consider standards of
decency and respect for the diverse values of the American people was
unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court rejected the vagueness
argument, saying that terms that might be unconstitutionally vague when
used to regulate speech might not be unconstitutional when used as the
basis for subsidizing it.147 It also observed that "if this statute is
unconstitutionally vague, then so too are all government programs awarding
scholarships and grants on the basis of subjective criteria such as
'excellence."'" 4 8
It is worth noting one instinct that may lie behind these efforts to
develop procedural solutions to the problem of selective funding. As
Alexander Bickel pointed out, procedural solutions may be particularly
appropriate in areas where it seems difficult to develop substantive ones.'49
Neither vagueness nor a requirement of prior written standards might be the
142. Id. at 1649 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1649 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that the First Amendment would be satisfied if a station "simply ... set[] out participation
standards before the debate").
143. See id. at 1640 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Although public broadcasting as a general
matter does not lend itself to scrutiny under the forum doctrine, candidate debates present the
narrow exception to the rule.").
144. Id. at 1639. Justice Stevens's approach seems unresponsive to the problems faced by a
public agency feeling its way into a new area. As a first attempt, standards like viability and
newsvorthiness might be all that professional journalists could feel comfortable in using. After
some experience, they might be able to develop more precise criteria, geared to candidates'
campaign finances or organization, or to their showing in polls. Justice Stevens would impose
those requirements at the outset. Despite this concern, however, a procedural approach is
promising.
145. See Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1471-72 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
146. See Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1996).
147. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,2179 (1998).
148. Id. at 2179-80; see also id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that
"the constitutional rule against vague legislation.., has no application to funding").
149. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 150-53, 177-83 (1962).
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right procedural solution, but Bickel's insight-that a procedural approach
may help avoid resolving difficult substantive questions-might still
deserve consideration.
I have sketched a number of approaches to the problem of selective
subsidies in U.S. constitutional law. Each gets at something important in the
selective subsidy problem, but none is entirely satisfactory. A concept
drawn from comparative constitutional experience suggests a way of
incorporating the key insight scattered through the U.S. approach to the
problem: the perception that it somehow matters that the decisions in
Forbes and Finley were made by journalists and art specialists, who are
likely to be guided by the standards of judgment that characterize their
professions."'
3. The Idea of the Quango
During the 1970s, British political observers noted an interesting
transformation in governance."' Decisions that formerly had been made
within governmental departments were now being made by new bodies.
They called these bodies quangos: quasi-autonomous nongovernmental
organizations." 2 The government exercises power through different types
of institutions. First, sometimes the government exercises its power through
subordinate agencies whose officers are entirely responsible to higher-level
political appointees. 53  Second, sometimes the government uses
independent agencies to act. In the United States, the heads of these
agencies are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate and have statutory terms of office."5 They typically are understood
150. This perception radiates into many of the topics discussed in this Section, suggesting, for
example, one source of the political constraints that diminish the "state television" threat.
151. See Gavin Drewry, Quelling the Quango, 1982 PuB. L. 384, 386 nn.12 & 13 (citing the
British literature). A more recent collection is THE QUANGO DEBATE (F.F. Ridley & David
Wilson eds., 1995), which includes a discussion of the politics of the debate in Great Britain. See
Tony Stott, "Snouts in the Trough": The Politics of Quangos, in id. at 145.
152. Taken as an abbreviation, the term is a bit misleading. The institutions are actually
quasi-autonomous governmental organizations, and some early discussions did use the term
quaggo. But this was rather rapidly replaced by the more euphonious quango. For a brief history
of the term, see Craig Alford Masback, Note, Independence vs. Accountability: Correcting the
Structural Defects in the National Endowment for the Arts, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 177, 183
n.34 (1992). See also Drewry, supra note 151, at 385 (quoting a source asserting that the term
quasi-nongovermuent organization "was invented during the late 1960s as an administrative
quasi-joke in the United States of America." (citations omitted)). It has had little impact on public
law scholarship. The most substantial discussion is in Froomkin, supra note 79, which focuses on
operating (that is, goods-producing) government corporations. Masback provides an extensive
discussion of the idea of the quango in connection with the NEA. See Masback, supra, at 185-88.
153. This is clearer in Great Britain, where the term "government" typically refers to the
Prime Minister and Cabinet, who govern through lower-level officials for whose decisions
Cabinet members have personal responsibility.
154. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994) (regarding the Federal Trade Commission).
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to be agencies making general policy decisions in areas where
specialization is important. Third, sometimes the government delegates its
power to truly nongovernmental, entirely autonomous bodies. 5
Quangos might be thought of as a fourth device for exercising
government power.'56 The key feature of the quango is its quasi-autonomy.
Its decisionmakers, appointed by political officials,157 respond not only to
ordinary political concerns and the special policy issues associated with
their areas of expertise, but also to professional norms that arise from and
are supported by social structures outside the government. 8 For example,
history departments in state universities may be sensitive to the concerns of
the state legislature, but they are also--and probably are more-responsive
to the norms of the historical and academic professions.'59 Public librarians
see themselves as professionals in providing information services; library
boards may see themselves as more responsive to the public the library
serves. An official British publication describes the purposes of quangos as
including "distancing activities from direct ministerial responsibility in
order to demonstrate the independence of judgements" and "involving
outside interests in a representative capacity... in executive responsibility
for decisions." 160
Quangos vary in the degree of their autonomy. The professionals who
administer a quango's program are sure to be more responsive to
professional norms than the quango's governing board. Board members will
be appointed by political authorities, and the appointing officials may draw
nominees from pools whose members have varying degrees of sympathy
for the staff's professional orientation. We should not be surprised to find,
for example, that members of the NEA's relatively apolitical advisory
155. Probably the most significant example in the United States is the self-regulation of the
stock exchanges. For a description, see Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-
Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation,
62 N.C. L. REV. 475,475-87 (1984).
156. See Ian Harden, A Constitution for Quangos?, 1987 PUB. L. 27, 27 (the "original
connotation" of quango was "as one element for a fourfold classification of organisations into
government, quasi-government, quasi-non-government and non-government").
157. For a somewhat defensive description of the appointment process in Great Britain,
written by a member of Parliament who served as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, see
David Hunt, Worthwhile Bodies, in THE QUANGO DEBATE, supra note 151, at 14, 19-22. But see
John Stewart, Appointed Boards and Local Government, in id. at 48, 51-54 (criticizing that
appointment process).
158. Cf. Paul Hirst, Quangos and Democratic Government, 48 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 341,
349 (1995) (referring to "the common presence of like-minded personnel" in the institutions of
"the major public but non-state bodies" with which the government dealt at "arms' length"
before the rise of the quango).
159. See Frederick Schauer, The Ontology of Censorship, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING,
supra note 135, at 147, 162 (asserting that the case of academic freedom suggests that
"professional competence (or, more skeptically, guild prerogative) rather than censorship" is at
issue in these controversies).
160. NON-DEPARTMENTAL PUBLIC BODIES: A GUIDE FOR DEPARTMENTS 4-5 (2d ed. 1985),
quoted in Harden, supra note 156, at 30.
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council are more sympathetic to the concerns of the arts community than
more purely political appointees to state university boards of regents are to
the concerns of the academic community.161 Autonomy is affected as well
by the degree to which a quango is subjected to legislative oversight and the
degree to which oversight committees think it appropriate to delve into the
details of decisions taken by the quango with primary reference to
professional norms. For example, some legislators will be more deferential
than others to the NEA's judgments about which projects have artistic
merit.
Oversight is connected to another element of autonomy. Quangos vary
in the ways in which they are authorized and funded by the government. A
quango that has a short authorization of three years is less autonomous than
one authorized for five years,162 and both are less autonomous than a state
university that is not subject to any sunset provision at all. Further, quangos
funded almost entirely by annual appropriations are less autonomous than
ones receiving substantial funding from sales of products, as universities do
in charging tuition and public broadcasting may through licensing products
and annual fund-raising drives. These funding variations define different
ways in which quangos are accountable. The appropriations process makes
the quango accountable to the public understood in one way-the electorate
speaking through its representatives. In that process, a certain kind of
public-oriented deliberation may take place, as representatives and interest
groups articulate the grounds for support and criticism. Fiscal support
through fees and sales makes the quango accountable to the public
understood in a different way-the consuming public speaking through its
purchases. In that process, a different kind of deliberation takes place, as
consumers choose between purchasing a good from the quango and
purchasing on the private market. 6
The issue of accountability introduces a final matter of greatest
importance here.164 Legislative oversight hearings provide one way of
161. Cf. Masback, supra note 152, at 183 (noting the argument that "public citizens would be
members of NEA advisory bodies, thereby providing a significant buffer against government
meddling").
162. See id. at 179-80 (asserting that the "combination of limited authorizations and annual
appropriations hearings guarantees congressional scrutiny of the NEA on a regular basis, too
much scrutiny for the organization to be characterized by either program independence ....
process independence.... or fiscal independence"); c. id. at 190-92 (describing NEA oversight
mechanisms).
163. Cf. Hirst, supra note 158, at 358 (critically noting that "[q]uangos are a means of
farming out government functions based on... the belief that [the public is) best left as passive
consumers"); Stewart, supra note 157, at 58-59 (describing and criticizing a Conservative
minister's argument that "accountability has been strengthened by making public services
responsive to consumers").
164. British discussions of quangos have focused on the extent to which the quangos' lack of
accountability is troubling in a system of parliamentary supremacy and ministerial responsibility.
See, e.g., Drewry, supra note 151, at 387-88; Hirst, supra note 158; Stewart, supra note 157, at
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assessing the merits of what a government agency has done. They are, in
short, a form of substantive review of agency performance. Judicial review
is another form of substantive review. The insight suggested by the
identification of quangos as a fourth form of governance is that perhaps we
could subject decisions by quangos to a different level of judicial review
than we do decisions by less autonomous agencies. With respect to some
constitutional guarantees, and in particular the First Amendment, their
lesser degree of accountability to directly representative officials actually
justifies a lesser degree of judicial scrutiny of their decisions.16
Randall Bezanson's recent discussion carefully lays out the
argument. 166 He notes that arts funding decisions, library acquisition
decisions, and tenure decisions all rely on criteria that would be
"foreclosed" in general to courts.167 But, he points out, they are all made
"within a specialized professional culture, a culture that serves to assure
expertness and experience," and "a defined and common procedure exists
by which the professional judgment... is made." 168 Deferential review of
these decisions gives "part of government" acting "pursuant to fairly
circumscribed conventions and procedures" the authority to make
judgments that would be troubling if made by legislatures or even courts.1 69
Bezanson says that such deference is "a product of necessity" because "[i]f
the government can and must [make such decisions], they must be
undertaken with the creative freedom and pursuant to the qualitative criteria
that would mark choices made by private institutions." 
170
Bezanson's analysis does not quite get to the ultimate conclusion. It
explains why deference may be a necessity, but not why the courts would
not be routinely upholding practices that threaten First Amendment values.
To develop such an explanation, we should consider one rationale for
stringent judicial review in the area of free speech: We are concerned that
political actors, concerned about preserving their own position, would make
decisions that skew public debate and understanding in a direction that
54-55 (noting explicitly the connection between the problem of quango accountability and the
system of ministerial responsibility); Stuart Weir, Quangos: Questions of Democratic
Accountability, in THE QUANGO DEBATE, supra note 151, at 128-44; see also Masback, supra
note 152, at 188 ("There is an inevitable tension between the values of independence and the
values of accountability in a quasi-governmental body.").
165. This is a procedural approach that works on a more general level than the ones examined
in the preceding section. See Masback, supra note 152, at 184 (defining process independence
with reference to an agency's "organizational scheme, the frequency and degree of congressional
oversight, and the extent to which congressional or executive program directives restrict agency
freedom").
166. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Quality of First Amendment Speech, 20 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 275, 375-79 (1998).
167. Id. at 377.
168. Id. at 377, 378.
169. Id. at 378.
170. Id. at 379.
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favors the "ins" against the "outs.""' A quango's quasi-autonomy might
reduce that concern somewhat. The quango's decision would be less
influenced by these sorts of political concerns than would decisions by
political actors and so would be less likely to skew public debate and
understanding in this particularly troubling way.
The idea that decisions made by quangos are constitutionally distinctive
helps organize some themes that are scattered through the cases and
commentary and resonates with broader themes in a few modem Supreme
Court decisions. For example, it helps explain the relevance of the Court's
factual descriptions of the AETC board's membership and the board's
decision "[t]o insulate its programming decisions from political pressure"
by hiring a professional staff and adopting "Principles of Editorial
Integrity" that invoke professional journalistic standards. 72 It gives us
some reason to support a common intuition that decisions made by city
councils are somehow different from decisions made by librarians.17 3
The limits of the argument about quangos should be clear. To say that
decisions made by quangos should be subject to only a loose form of
judicial review because quangos are relatively insulated from ordinary
political pressures and operate according to professional norms leaves a
large number of questions open. How insulated must quangos be? The
governing boards of public universities are not entirely apolitical, and a
governor who stays in office long enough is likely to have appointed all the
members of one or more such boards. They may be unable to carry out
extraordinarily gross political actions because they are constrained by
traditions of academic freedom that will be asserted against them by
faculties and newspaper editorialists; governing boards may, however, be
able to discriminate on the basis of politics in a way that remains
171. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 105-06, 111-12 (1980).
172. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1637.
173. The argument made here about quangos is connected to the perhaps still-born idea of
what Laurence Tribe called structural due process. See Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due
Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 269 (1975). In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 116 (1976), the Court invalidated a regulation adopted by the federal Civil Service
Commission that barred aliens from most federal civil service jobs. The Court assumed that such a
ban would be constitutional if it had been adopted by Congress or the President. Id. But the Civil
Service Commission was supposed to be concerned with technical questions about the federal
bureaucracy's efficient operation, not with wide-ranging foreign policy issues. Id. at 114. The
Court thereby recognized that an agency's bureaucratic mission bears on the constitutionality of
what it does. Similarly, in the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, one reason Justice
Lewis Powell gave for refusing to allow the University of California to justify its affirmative
action program as a remedy for general societal discrimination was that the University's mission
was education, not legislative policy of that sort. See 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.). Structural due process generalized from these cases constitutional principles
connecting varying substantive standards and standards of review to the decisionmaking structures
from which these decisions issued. The special role that the preceding argument accords quangos
can be understood as a component of such a theory.
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normatively troubling. Similarly, the degree to which a quango is subject to
regular and, perhaps, aggressive, legislative oversight, as well as the degree
to which it depends on annual appropriations, appropriations for a longer
term, and self-financing through fund-raising and sales all will affect the
degree to which it will be free from overtly political control. 174 And these
considerations have enough subjectivity to them to suggest that
distinguishing between those quango actions that are subject to low-level
judicial scrutiny only, and those that trigger more intensive scrutiny will
often be fairly difficult.175
In addition, Forbes shows that professional norms are themselves
limited in ways that might be troubling. 7 6 Forbes was excluded from the
debate because of judgments made by the public broadcasting system's
professional staff, acting after consulting the state bureau chief of the
Associated Press. We can assume that the staff was accurately applying
norms common in the profession of journalism. Justice Stevens's dissent
brought out facts suggesting that those norms were themselves too limited.
According to journalistic norms, any candidate nominated by either the
Democratic or Republican Party is by that fact alone a serious candidate,
even though the candidate may have no greater chance than Forbes of
winning the election (and less chance than Forbes of influencing its
outcome).177 Journalists, that is, are committed to the two-party system. The
idea of the quango helps explain why decisions by quangos that skew
public debate need not be as troubling as decisions by clearly political
bodies: The quangos' composition and orientation ought not lead them to
tilt public understanding in favor of the political "ins" or against the
political "outs." But Forbes shows that this may not be so; there,
professional norms converged with the interests of the "ins" against the
"outs." Some quangos operate in ways that stabilize the status quo, and one
might find the limitations on speech that result when professionals apply
their norms at least as troubling as those that emerge when politicians act
for partisan advantage.178
174. See Masback, supra note 152, at 197-204 (advocating structural changes in the NEA to
ensure greater autonomy in the service of artistic freedom).
175. It recalls, for example, the difficulties the Canadian courts have had in explaining why
their doctrine distinguishes between universities and community colleges. See supra note 79.
176. See also Schauer, supra note 159, at 151, 161 (describing decisionmaking by librarians
and curators as a form of censorship).
177. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text (describing Justice Stevens's account
of the facts in Forbes).
178. See Schauer, supra note 159, at 162-63 ("In the context of funding for the arts, the
question is whether the judgments of artistic peers, themselves infused with the politics of art as
well as the judgments of professionals, should be preferred to the judgments of public
officials .... ). In the particular context of Forbes, I should note that the Supreme Court is
committed to the two-party system too, which makes it unlikely that it would act in a sustained
way to support that system's challengers. The Court found the state's interest in supporting the
two-party system to be a sufficient justification for a restriction on speech in Timmons v. Twin
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Several broader concerns deserve mention as well.179 First, the idea that
quangos' decisions can be given low-level scrutiny rests on an account of
free speech theory in which the central concern is to avoid the skewing of
political debate by decisionmakers driven by political considerations. There
are, of course, other free speech theories, as to which the fact that a
condition is imposed or administered by a quango is irrelevant: The source
of the condition does not matter, for example, if one's free speech theory
makes autonomous decisionmaking by citizens (including candidates and
artists) central or if it takes maximizing the opportunities for speech as its
goal.180
Second, the approach I have proposed for quangos might work when
rules issued by quangos are challenged. Suppose, however, that the rule in
question was adopted by a legislature, as in Finley.181 We might treat the
NEA as a quango, using panels of experts in artistic excellence to make
decisions about awards, and then would invoke low-level review had it
decided to take general standards of decency into account. But what of
Congress's decision?182 We might say that Congress, having established a
quango, must let it operate according'to its own norms, subject only to the
sort of retrospective political control that occurs through legislative
oversight hearings, the appropriations process, and the process of
nominating and confirming the NEA's head. Or we might apply full-
fledged judicial review to Congress's action.183 The approach I have
outlined gives no leverage on the choice between those options.184 Finally,
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369-70 (1997). For discussions of the Court's recent
decisions endorsing the two-party system, see Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why
The Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States To Protect the Democrats and Republicans from
Political Competition, 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 331; and Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643 (1998).
179. Nothing in what I have said is a defense of quangos, whose operations often raise
troubling questions about democratic legitimacy and responsiveness. Rather, my argument is
conditional: If a quango exists, its insulation from direct political control provides a reason for
adopting a less demanding standard of First Amendment justification for its actions.
180. Those theories have their own problems, of course. For example, reconciling a theory
centering on maximizing the opportunities for speech with the state action doctrine is not an easy
task.
181. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,2170-71 (1998).
182. See Masback, supra note 152, at 184 (noting that legislative program directives can
restrict a quango's autonomy).
183. For an argument suggesting that Congress must use quangos, see David Cole, Beyond
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992).
184. See Schauer, supra note 80, at 97 n.70 (noting this point). It might provide some modest
support for the Court's resolution of Finley. The majority interpreted the "standards of decency
and respect" provision to do no more (and perhaps less) than identify for NEA panels some
matters they ought to take into account in making awards, without prescribing the weight to be
given to those standards in any particular decision. This interpretation makes the provision an
extremely modest alteration of the NEA's autonomy.
In addition, the approach I have sketched might help resolve the vagueness puzzle in Finley.
The Ninth Circuit had held the provision unconstitutional because it was vague. See Finley v.
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the possibility of barring Congress from regulating a quango's
decisionmaking processes once it creates one raises the most general
concern about the approach I have described. The rule I have proposed is
that governments that create quangos must allow them to operate fairly
autonomously so that their boards and panels can apply professional
standards or else accept substantive review of the quangos' decisions. But
what in the Constitution gives this special status to quangos?" s In the areas
of concern here, the Constitution may impose substantive limits on what
government may do, but it does not appear in any obvious way to prescribe
the decisionmaker who must make particular decisions. 86
The concept of the quango, drawn from the ways in which theorists
have tried to understand constitutional experience elsewhere, provides some
illumination of the selective funding problem by drawing together the
themes of professionalism, objectivity, and political limits that already
appear in U.S. law. But, it should be clear, it does so only because we
already know a great deal about the problem from analyses cast solely in
domestic terms. 187 I turn next to more general concerns about functionalism
and argue that functionalist efforts to learn from constitutional experience
elsewhere may run up against such severe constraints that they may
contribute even less to constitutional interpretation than the preceding
analysis suggests.
NEA, 100 F.3d 671, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court rejected that conclusion in part because the
provision was no more vague than the unchallenged directive that awards be made on the basis of
artistic excellence and merit. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179-80. It could be, however, that the
standard for determining whether a criterion is unconstitutionally vague should vary depending on
whether it is a criterion going to the core values of the profession of the administrators of the
quango that applies it. So, for example, the NEA could apply the standard artistic excellence, and
university boards could apply the standard academic merit, but neither could apply a "decency"
standard, because determining what is decent and what indecent lies outside their areas of
professional expertise. (It should be clear that this suggestion is subject to a fair amount of
pressure around its edges.)
185. In terms used earlier, the Constitution may not provide any license for making
"quango" a constitutionally relevant concept The theory of structural due process foundered on a
similar problem: Where in the Constitution can the Court find authority for prescribing the
decisionmaking processes of legislatures and executive agencies? This is particularly true in a
case like Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), where the theory
of structural due process required the Supreme Court to prescribe decisionmaking processes for
state governments, in the face of a constitutional text whose only relevant provision appears to be
the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
186. The Constitution does, of course, prescribe decisionmaking structures in creating a
separation-of-powers system. These prescriptions, however, implicate general categories of
decisions (for example, is some exercise of public power an instance of legislation or of the
execution of the laws?) rather than the content of any decision. In addition, these prescriptions
involve the national government. The problem I describe in the text is most acute in a case like
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309, where Justice Powell appeared to impose limits on how the people of
California could allocate decisionmaking power among their institutions. The constitutional
warrant for such a prescription is quite obscure.
187. That is, the contribution of comparative constitutional law is marginal. But so are all
increments to knowledge.
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B. Critiques of Functionalism
Montesquieu observed that "the political and civil laws of each
nation... should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made
that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another."' This
comes close to an express statement that one constitutional system cannot
learn from another. To do so, one people would have to rely on the
experiences that were "appropriate to" another-and were at least
presumptively inappropriate to themselves. We can understand this claim as
an internal critique of functionalism. Every society's law is tied to so many
aspects of that society-its politics, its particular history, its intellectual life,
the institutional forms in which its activities are conducted, and many
more-that no functionalist account can identify and take into account all
the variables that might affect the degree to which participants in one
system can learn from the experience in others." 9
The critique of functionalism that emerges from these observations
comes in two versions. The first is that functionalist analysis always omits
some relevant variables; the second is that once even a limited number of
additional variables are taken into account, the number of cases from which
one might actually learn turns out to be too small to support any
functionalist generalization.
Bruce Ackerman's essay on world constitutionalism provides a useful
illustration. Ackerman at least occasionally describes his work in
functionalist terms. 9 ' Ackerman's short essay proposes two basic scenarios
for the transition to constitutionalism. The first describes a process through
which a treaty-based relationship among relatively independent states
becomes a constitution for a relatively unitary state; the second involves a
reasonably self-conscious effort on the part of constitution-designers to set
an existing nation-state on a new course. As it turns out, however, each of
these processes comes in contradictory variants. Not only can a group of
states transform a treaty relationship into a constitutional one, but a
constitution can become a treaty. 9' Presumably, a treaty can remain a
treaty, although Ackerman does not describe this case. A functionalist
might want to try to figure out when each scenario occurs, explaining the
conditions for its realization. But, as Ackerman recognizes, this is
impossible. The treaty-to-federation scenario is constructed on the basis of
188. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWs 8 (Anne
M. Cohier et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
189. I refrain from an extended discussion of a different critique of functionalism. According
to that critique, functionalist analysis depends on securing agreement that different systems seek
to perform similar or identical functions, albeit with different institutions.
190. See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 789 (referring to "functional reasons" and a "functional
need for a relatively impartial judge to coordinate the on-going institutional interaction").
191. See id. at775-78.
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one-and-a-half cases: the United States and the apparently emerging
relation between the post-Communist regimes in eastern and central Europe
and the (emerging) European federation. The federation-to-treaty scenario
is based on a single case, Canada.19 2 It is hard to see exactly what sort of
functionalism is really at work here.
Claus Offe's analysis of the transitions in eastern Europe and East
Germany provides another example of the difficulty. 93 Offe, a German
sociologist, begins by classifying the transitional nations into three groups,
each containing two nations. So, for example, Czechoslovakia and East
Germany went through short transitions, while Hungary and Poland
underwent long ones, and Bulgaria and Romania underwent very short
ones. 94 The latter two nations were "remote from Western Europe," while
the first group were "front-line states."' 95  Offe lists seventeen
characteristics that distinguish the three groups.'96 Then, after introducing
and defending this typology, Offe argues against it: " [I]nstead of the
straightforward '2-2-2' grouping. .. , we should opt for a '1-5' division
according to which [East Germany] is a clearly emphasized exceptional
case." ' Offe establishes East Germany's exceptional status by examining
in some detail the precise "starting conditions, course and results of the
upheaval" in East Germany.'98 These details identify a large number of
omitted variables, demonstrating that even a list of seventeen characteristics
cannot capture the constitutional experience of a group of nations. The
omitted-variables critique suggests that Hungarian or Romanian or Polish
scholars could present evidence at a similar level of detail to show that the
transitions in their nations were as exceptional as the East German one.
Clearly one cannot develop functional generalizations from these
instances. As Ackerman puts it, "the number of variables [is] much too
large." ... In the end, Ackerman says that "[t]here is no way out but an
192. See id. at 777. The same problem of limited numbers infects Ackerman's account of the
"new beginnings" scenario. Here, too, it turns out that the scenario comes in contradictory forms.
One version is "the triumphalist scenario," see id. at 782, which has, according to Ackerman, "a
five-stage dynamic," see id., which starts with a mass mobilization centered on a party led by a
charismatic leader who, however, rejects party rule after a constitution is created and instead seeks
to transfer the leader's and the party's charisma to the constitution itself, see id. at 782-83. For this
scenario, Ackerman has a few more cases: India, France, and-he hopes-South Africa. See id. at
782-84. But there are also failures, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, see id. at 784, and
ambiguous cases, such as Mexico and perhaps contemporary Russia, see id. at 785-87.
193. See CLAUS OFFE, VARIETIES OF TRANSITION: THE EAST EUROPEAN AND EAST
GERMAN EXPERIENCE 131-61 (1996).
194. See id. at 139 tbl.7.1.
195. Id.
196. See id. The list is qualified by eight footnotes indicating some inaccuracies in
classification for some periods.
197. Id. at 144.
198. Id. at 159.
199. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 775.
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appeal to old-fashioned insight."' 2 It is entirely unclear how a U.S.
constitutionalist could learn anything about U.S. constitutionalism from the
distinctive cases Ackerman has assembled. In reality, all he has done is
attach functionalist labels to different cases; functionalism, however, is not
doing much analytic work when there is a different label for each case.
Insight, as a method, can be productive when it is backed up by a theory
that strips away case-specific peculiarities and produces generalized
explanations or predictions from something less than everything one could
know about each individual case. To do so, however, one needs a
theoretical account of why the omitted variables are irrelevant. The critique
of functionalism asserts that functionalist analysts have rarely produced
such an account. Further, the critique claims, we must therefore build into
our functionalist analyses all variables we have no reason to omit, but when
we do so the number of cases becomes entirely too small to be useful.2"'
The difficulty of learning when the number of cases available for
comparison is small would seem to weaken the argument made earlier
about quangos, which relied on experience in England and some Western
European nations, surely a small number of cases. 2 Inferences from small
numbers are possible, however, if they are supplemented by a theoretical
account that provides reasons for thinking that particular cases exemplify
more general social tendencies. The argument that follows offers such an
account.203
We can begin to see the structure of the argument by considering
whether quangos exemplify more general forms of constitutional
development. Why do quangos emerge as a new form of governance? The
British legal academic and sociologist Paul Hirst places the rise of quangos
in historical perspective.2 4 He identifies two trends. The first is the
extension of suffrage to the point where democratic regimes are
characterized by nearly universal suffrage. The second is economic
development, and particularly the increasing complexity of national
economies. The democratic electorate places increasing demands on
representative government, seeking to have it deal with the consequences of
economic development. But, Hirst argues, these demands have come to
outstrip the governing capacity of classical representative institutions such
200. Id.
201. Cf. Glendon, supra note 15, at 531-32 (noting that including a large number of factors in
a functional analysis produces "speculation [that] leads only to the sort of conclusions that make
sociology so unsatisfying to many people").
202. The inferences one can draw from the British developments, for example, would be
limited if they are best understood in light of that country's particular history (that is, in the
current jargon, if what happened there is path-dependent).
203. I offer it without strongly endorsing its particulars and primarily to demonstrate the
appropriate form of argument.
204. See Hirst, supra note 158, at 342-43.
12671999]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108:1225
as the legislature or, in Great Britain, the ministries. 5 Responding to these
demands, governments develop novel governing mechanisms, including
quangos.
Gunther Teubner, a German legal academic and sociologist, offers a
parallel evolutionary account." Although his account may be overly
formal, Teubner makes an important contribution in identifying a new form
of legal regulation appropriate to the new mechanisms of governance. He
calls this new form reflexive law, in which the legal system "orients its
norms and procedures to a theory of social autonomy and structural
coupling." 207 The legal system interacts with other social systems, including
the arts community and professions such as journalism. Reflexive law is the
method by which the legal system merges with those other systems.
Teubner argues that one of the most important characteristics of reflexive
law is the mutual "interference" between two interacting systems. 25 Finley
provides an example.2' Lawmakers believe that they are imposing their
norms on the arts community, but because they are using a quango to
administer their program, the arts community effectively asserts its norms
to constrain what Congress may have sought to achieve z.2 " As Teubner puts
it, "What is gained, in terms of direct communicative contact .... has to be
paid for with problems of motivation and information in the interfering
worlds of meaning." 
211
205. See id. at 347; see also Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of
Analysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 3, 9 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds.,
1985) (defining "state capacity" as the ability of governments "to implement official goals,
especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups").
206. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIBTC SYSTEM (Zenon Benkowski ed. & Anne
Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., 1993), collects essays laying out Teubner's general evolutionary
approach. In what follows, I extract from Teubner's work some themes that seem to me most
relevant to the discussion here. I understand that in doing so I may be depriving Teubner's work
of the scientific character he seeks for it, but to my mind that is an improvement. But cf Edward
L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 521, 563-65 (summarizing and
approving, with qualifications, Teubner's approach).
207. TEUBNER, supra note 206, at 97. For a general discussion operating at roughly the same
(lower) theoretical level as my account, see Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L.
REV. 86 (1986).
208. See TEUBNER, supra note 206, at 90-91 (describing the phenomenon of interference).
209. Teubner cites two articles applying his approach to "constitutional issues of the freedom
of art." Id. at 123-24 (citing Leonie Breunung & Joachim Nocke, Die Kunst als Rechtsbegriff
oder wer definiert die Kunst?, in LrrERATUR VOR DEM RICHTER: BEITRAGE ZUR
LITERATURFREIHEIT UND ZENSUR 235 (1988), and Christoph Beat Graber, Pecunia non olet,
oder: Wer rettet die Kunst vor ihren Glnnern?, 110 ZErTSCHRIFr FOR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT
237 (1991)).
210. Teubner thereby accounts for the fact that the Supreme Court interpreted the statute at
issue in Finley to do rather little to impose Congress's prescribed norms on the arts community.
For Teubner, the Court's narrow interpretation of the statute is the legal system's
acknowledgment of the fact of normative interference when two systems interact.
211. TEUBNER, supra note 206, at 90. Again, I do not endorse the sociological framework
implicit in Teubner's precise choice of words.
1268
Comparative Constitutional Law
A functionalist can respond to the "omitted variables" problem by
offering a theoretical account explaining why the few variables she uses are
in fact important. But, as my cautious comments on Hirst's and Teubner's
accounts suggest, everything then depends on whether the theory is correct.
The experience of social scientists who have tried to develop well-
supported theories indicates that we might properly be rather skeptical
about what we can truly learn when we think about constitutional
experience elsewhere in functionalist terms.
C. Conclusion
Functional analysis is possible when a few "case studies" are placed in
a more general theoretical context. Then, of course, the theory rather than
the case studies does the analytic work. Still, examining a few cases-
comparing the U.S. with foreign experience-may alert us to some theories
about which we might want to think, and the comparison may suggest that
something that seems initially to be a purely local phenomenon, such as the
persistent problem of figuring out what to do about selective subsidies,
actually exemplifies some more general trends. This is not everything that a
strong functionalist would claim for comparative analysis, but it is not
nothing either.
The "omitted variables" critique of functionalism has prepared the way
for a consideration of the expressivist approach to comparative
constitutional law. As an analyst introduces one new variable after another,
she comes close to treating each constitutional system as the unique
expression of the particular values each variable takes on. In this sense,
expressivism might not be different from a full-fledged functionalism,
except that expressivism abandons the language of science in which
functionalism is usually cloaked.
IV. EXPRESSIVISM
A. Introduction
The expressivist tradition in comparative legal analysis goes back a
long way. For Hegel, a constitution is "the work of centuries.... the
consciousness of rationality so far as that consciousness is developed in a
particular nation." '212 More recently, Mary Ann Glendon has vigorously
212. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 286-87 (T.M.
Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1942) (1821).
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promoted the idea that law "tells stories about the culture that helped to
shape it and which it in turn helps to shape.
213
For the expressivist, constitutions emerge out of each nation's
distinctive history and express its distinctive character.214 Here we should
distinguish between constitutions with a small c, to which Montesquieu and
Hegel referred, and documents like the U.S. Constitution.2"5 The
expressivist claim is plausible-perhaps even tautological-with respect to
the former class. In contrast, nations vary widely in the degree to which
their written constitutions are organically connected to the nation's sense of
itself. To return to Glendon's formulation, perhaps small-c constitutions tell
stories about their cultures and help shape them, but the degree to which
large-C Constitutions shape cultures surely varies from nation to nation.
Pathological documents like those of the former Soviet Union aside, we
still can see written constitutions that operate at a substantial remove from
their nation's character. The Indian Constitution, for example, has been
reasonably vigorously enforced by India's Supreme Court, some of whose
decisions are articulate confrontations with the dilemmas posed by the
efforts of the nation's founders to design a secular and democratic
constitution for a highly stratified and religiously pluralist society.216 And
213. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN VESTERN LAW 8 (1987). Some
aspects of expressivism develop out of, or are a form of, a critique of functionalism. See Kennedy,
supra note 4, at 590 n.75 (describing Glendon as offering "the critique of functionalism in the
name of a philosophical search for universal value and principle").
214. For an example of the expressivist approach, see Glendon, supra note 15, at 524.
Glendon asserts that differences between the rights given constitutional status in the United States
and elsewhere "are legal manifestations of divergent, and deeply rooted, cultural attitudes toward
the state and its functions." IdL For a discussion of the idea that a nation can have a national
character, see infra text accompanying notes 254-255.
215. Another qualification should be noted. Some nations may take openness to foreign
influence as a dimension of their national character. For example, the South African Constitution
directs that courts "may consider foreign law" " [w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights." S. AFR.
CONST. § 39(1)(c). Seen expressively, this provision is a statement that South Africans view
themselves as participants in a world-wide system seeking to implement fundamental rights that
have a transnational (if not necessarily universal) character. In what follows, I assume that the
U.S. Constitution does not express a similar national commitment to transnational legal norms.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to "define ... Offenses against the Law of Nations." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Recent commentators have discussed the proposition that customary
international law, which today includes some human rights norms, is part of those "Laws of the
United States" that the Supremacy Clause makes "the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2. Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997), with
Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998). To
the extent that Congress exercises its power, or to the extent that customary international law is
part of "the supreme Law of the Land," the U.S. Constitution may be said to express a national
commitment to learning from experience elsewhere. In my view, this version attenuates the
expressivist argument so much that it would be unprofitable to explore it in detail here.
216. See, e.g., Ashabhai Patel v. Dabhi Fulsinji, (1965) 1 S.C.R. 712, 717-21 (India)
(discussing differences between religion and myth in Indian political discourse). For a critical
discussion of the Indian Supreme Court's efforts to distinguish between religion and mere
ceremony, see V.S. Rekhi, Religion, Politics and Law in Contemporary India: Judicial Doctrine
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yet, because the Indian Supreme Court does not occupy a large space in the
nation's political culture,"' it seems inaccurate to suggest that the Indian
Constitution as interpreted by the nation's Supreme Court expresses much
about India. 18 Similarly, one would not expect to learn much about what it
means to be French from reading the decisions of the French Constitutional
Council. 19 In contrast, scholars seeking to describe the American character
routinely refer to the Constitution and Supreme Court decisions." Again
invoking Glendon, we might say that the constitutions of some nations tell
clearer stories about who those nations are, or that constitutions vary in the
extent to which they shape the cultures in which they are located.
The expressivist claim about constitutional law might still matter for
the purposes of this Article in spite of the skepticism I have suggested about
its broadest version. One can plausibly contend that the United States lies at
an extreme and that to be an American is to be attached to the principles of
the written Constitution.22 For the United States, then, the large-C
Constitution does express our national character. This notion raises a
difficult question: How can we learn from experience elsewhere as we try
to interpret our Constitution, if that Constitution expresses our national
character?
in Critical Perspective, in RELIGION AND LAW IN INDEPENDENT INDIA 179 (Robert D. Baird ed.,
1993).
217. Carl Baar, writing in 1992, called the Indian Supreme Court "the world's most active
judiciary," but he concluded that the Court had a limited impact. See Carl Baar, Social Action
Litigation in India: The Operation and Limits of the World's Most Active Judiciary, in
COMPARATIvE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 77, 77 (Donald W. Jackson & Neal C.
Tate eds., 1992); see also CHARLES R. EPp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS,
AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATVE PERSPECTIVE 71, 80-81 (1998) (asserting that India's
Supreme Court is "greatly revered among the educated classes," has "great popular support," and
"clearly tried to spark a rights revolution-but little happened"); Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism
and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 515
(1989) (asserting that Indian "formal legal arrangements exist in almost metaphysical isolation
from social reality").
218. The decisions may of course illustrate the positions taken by members of particular
segments of Indian society, but that seems different from providing support for the expressivist
claim.
219. For excerpts from some important decisions by the Constitutional Council involving
fundamental rights, see JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 308-55 (1992). I should
qualify my claim by noting that the Constitutional Council has held that French law must conform
to the "fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic." Cons. const., July 16,
1971, D. 1972, Jur. 685, reprinted and translated in id. at 272-73. Over time decisions identifying
such principles might come to define a distinctively French national character.
220. For two recent examples of "culture criticism" that rely on U.S. constitutional law for
important points, see ANNE NORTON, REPUBLIC OF SIGNS: LIBERAL THEORY AND AMERICAN
POPULAR CULTURE (1993); and MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996).
221. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181-82,
188-93 (1999) (defending this proposition, in part by confining the commitment to the "thin"
Constitution defined by the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution's
Preamble, as distinguished from the "thick" Constitution containing detailed prescriptions for
organizing the national government).
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We can see the difficulty by noting that the Irish Supreme Court has
issued numerous decisions interpreting fundamental guarantees of human
rights. Consider the Irish Constitution's Preamble:
In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority
and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States
must be referred,
We, the people of tire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord,
Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial,
Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to
regain the rightful independence of our Nation,
And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of
Prudence, Justice, and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of
the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity
of our country restored, and concord established with other nations,
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.
222
This statement is extremely rich. Its express reference to individual
freedom and dignity is an attractive way of making a point about the
purpose of constitutional guarantees of human rights. One might think a
U.S. court could refer to it in defending a particular view of the First
Amendment. On a more theoretical level, the statement that the people
"give to ourselves" the Constitution suggests a relation between a
constitution's framers and ratifiers on the one hand and their successors on
the other: We today might be induced to take the constitution seriously
when we understand that it was "given" to us by "our fathers," who
struggled for our benefit, as fathers do, in the Preamble's vision.
222. IR. CONsT. preamble. The referendum held to ratify the Good Friday Accords added the
following provision to the Constitution, elaborating on the concept of national unity expressed in
the Preamble, which was not amended:
It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people
who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and
traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful
means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both
jurisdictions in the island. Until then, the laws enacted by the Parliament established by
this Constitution shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws enacted
by the Parliament that existed immediately before the coming into operation of this
Constitution.
Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Constitutional Issues, Annex B, Art. 3, 37
I.L.M. 751,755 (1998).
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Yet these phrases come with others from which they cannot be
separated. The Preamble refers to the particular struggle for Ireland's
independence, for example, and it is easily imaginable that specific
constitutional interpretations will flow from the particular historical
experience from which the Constitution emerged. Germany's Constitutional
Court referred explicitly to the nation's experience during the Hitler era as a
reason supporting its decision to restrict the German legislature's power to
permit abortions.' A nation that did not have the experience of having to
live with the knowledge that its people put Hitler in place might not be in a
position to learn much from the German abortion decisions.224
Even more obvious is the Catholic commitment expressed in the
Preamble of Ireland's Constitution. One might find the references to
"Prudence, Justice, and Charity" attractive, but they too can only be
understood within the framework of Catholic thought about the social and
political order. To see why the Irish Constitution's expression of a
distinctively Irish (and therefore Catholic) national character limits what
someone outside Ireland can learn from the Irish constitutional experience,
consider how the Irish High Court addressed the claim that water
fluoridation violated individual rights and the rights of families to control
their children's upbringing.2 The Constitution enumerates some rights,
prefacing them with the words in particular. One issue in the fluoridation
case was whether the courts could enforce unenumerated constitutional
rights. In a widely cited analysis, Judge John Kenny agreed that they could.
As he saw it, the Irish Constitution conferred a personal "right to bodily
integrity"226 because it "include[d] all those rights which result from the
Christian and democratic nature of the State."' 7 The conclusion that there
was a right to bodily integrity, Judge Kenny wrote, "gets support from a
passage in the Encyclical Letter, 'Peace on Earth.'" 2 s
The question of constitutional protection for unenumerated rights is, of
course, a familiar one in U.S. constitutional law. But one would be hard-
pressed to say that in deciding that question the U.S. courts should learn
from the Irish experience considered in expressivist terms. 9 Precisely
223. See West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 JOHN MARSHALL J.
PRAc. & PRoc. 605, 637-38 (Robert E. Jonas &John D. Gorby trans., 1978).
224. For a contrary view that stresses Germany's social democratic traditions and the parallel
tradition drawn from the social teachings of the Catholic Church, rather than the experience of the
Holocaust, see GLENDON, supra note 213, at 26-27.
225. See Ryan v. Attorney Gen. [1965] I.R. 294 (Ir.).
226. Id. at 313.
227. Id. at 312.
228. Id. at 314.
229. One might learn from the Irish experience in some ways. For example, the experience
might be used to counter claims that courts that enforce unenumerated rights tend to lose
legitimacy in the public's eyes (if this empirical claim is supported by evidence). In my view,
however, this amounts to a functionalist reliance on experience elsewhere.
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because Judge Kenny defended his conclusion by referring explicitly to the
Christian character of Irish constitutionalism, U.S. courts would have to put
his analysis to one side as implicating considerations that are quite
problematic, if not entirely impermissible, as a matter of constitutional law
in a nation whose Constitution includes the Establishment Clause.
In light of these difficulties, how might an expressivist argue that U.S.
constitutionalists can learn about interpreting our Constitution by
examining constitutional experience elsewhere? I next examine some
aspects of discussions of hate speech regulation to show how the skepticism
described here might be weakened.
B. Expressivism and the Controversy over the Constitutionality of Hate
Speech Regulation
Mar Matsuda's widely-cited article on racist speech contains a section
on the treatment of hate speech in international law, which for Matsuda
includes its treatment in the domestic law of foreign nations.31 She points
out that the United States is "alone among the major common-law
jurisdictions in its complete tolerance of [hate] speech." " Matsuda's critics
sometimes rely on experience elsewhere as well. Offering a functionalist
critique, for example, Nadine Strossen concludes that "[h]istory teaches us
that anti-hate speech laws regularly have been used to oppress racial and
other minorities" because hate speech laws "inevitably" give enforcers
substantial discretion, which is likely to be exercised against racial
minorities."
Functional arguments may, however, miss the point of expressivist uses
of comparative constitutional law. Recall Glendon's idea that small-c
constitutions tell stories about and help shape their societies. Sometimes
230. My formulation here is designed to bracket the highly controverted question of the
degree to which lawmakers, including judges, can expressly advert to religious considerations in
justifying the conclusions they draw. My view is that they can do so without violating any non-
establishment norm, but that prudence generally cautions rather strongly against doing so. See
TuSHNET, supra note 221, at 91-94. For the conclusion that, whatever is the case for legislators,
judges should not advert to such considerations in their opinions (although they may rely on them
in coming to their conclusions), see KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND
PoLrTcAL CHOIcE 239 (1988). Greenawalt states: "[O]pinions should not contain direct
references to the religious premises of judges." Id.
231. See Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2341-48 (1989). A survey in 1996 found that this article was then the
most-cited article of those published in 1989. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review
Articles Revisited, 71 C.-KENT L. REv. 751,766 (1996). In what follows, I discuss only a small
portion of the response to Matsuda's article.
232. Matsuda, supra note 231, at 2347-48.
233. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990
DUKE L.J. 484, 556. Matsuda herself refers to such arguments. See Matsuda, supra note 231, at
2351-52.
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discussions of comparative experience with the hate speech issue invoke
this idea almost off-handedly. Susan Gellman, for example, notes that
"[p]erhaps some of those European nations, with a long history of official
toleration of 'beyond speech' hate crime such as pogroms, purges, and
blood libel, feel they cannot afford a First Amendment as well as the United
States can.'' 3 More generally, Kent Greenawalt writes, "Any country's
dominant culture will place more or less emphasis on individuals or
communities, and this will affect the kind of latitude the political branches
and courts will afford to speech."" He makes the temperate observation
that the Canadian Supreme Court's free speech "outlook is somewhat more
centered on communities" than is the U.S. Supreme Court' s."26
I treat Robert Post's exploration of the way in which constitutional law
constructs the public domain of democracy against the background of an
equally constructed private domain of civility as the best recent analysis of
U.S. free speech law from an expressivist point of view. 237 Post's premise is
that constitutional law is among the social activities that define various
domains of life, which means that understanding constitutional law is at
least in part an exercise in cultural analysis."5 Common law communicative
torts, for example, identify and enforce community norms of civility, which
themselves help define the domain of private life. And, according to Post,
the existence of such a domain is a predicate for democratic self-
governance. Democracy entails the possibility of endless self-revision of a
community's self-understandings. Its preservation therefore requires the
existence of a private domain, which provides the location in which citizens
can develop values that they might use in the political domain to challenge
prevailing views. As Post presents the argument, the public domain of
democracy must have some essential characteristics, independent of any
cultural construction, whereas the private domain is constructed in part by
234. Susan Gellman, Sticky and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can Words Increase Your
Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV.
333, 392 n.230 (1991); see also Edward J. Eberle, Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany,
47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 797, 897-98 (1997) (connecting Germany's willingness to subordinate
expression rights to privacy interests to "the deep desire to protect the integrity of the human
person, a lesson learned bitterly from the horrors of Naziism").
235. KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LE3RTiEs
OF SPEECH 8-9 (1995). For a detailed study illustrating the point, see Eric Stein, History Against
Free Speech: The New German Law Against the "Auschwitz"-and Other- "Lies," 85 MICH. L.
REV. 277 (1987).
236. GREENAWALT, supra note 235, at 27.
237. See POST, supra note 112. This is a severe simplification and, to some extent, distortion
of Post's subtle work, which attempts to develop an account that is simultaneously expressivist
and normative. I have my doubts about the possibility of doing so, but I acknowledge that my
discussion of Post's work truncates it.
238. On the limited contribution of law to the construction of norms, see, for example, id. at
65. Post notes, "[Tihe common law can maintain only a small subset of these norms. The law
itself claims to enforce only the most important of them .... Id.
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norms of civility that express a particular community's self-understanding.
In Post's terms, "these [civility] rules... define the very community
that... [a person] inhabits." 9
Post is, of course, acutely aware that this identifies a deep paradox:
Public authorities, acting through law and expressing the community's
values, help construct the private domain from which challenges to the
community's values, sometimes expressed through law, are to be
launched." ° The cultural analysis that Post relies on allows him to say that
U.S. constitutional law addresses this paradox, though it does not resolve it,
by insisting on a vision-resting on an interpretation of the U.S.
community's deepest values--of a highly individualist First Amendment.
As Post puts it in criticizing as "collectivist" Alexander Meildejohn's view
that free speech is valuable because it contributes to the development of
public policy, "Traditional First Amendment jurisprudence uses the ideal of
autonomy to insulate the processes of collective self-determination . ,, 41
It is significant for Post's analysis that he refers to "tradition" and "First
Amendment jurisprudence," locating his analysis in the specific United
States context, rather than "principles of free speech," a phrase looking
more globally or philosophically.
Post deploys this argument in his analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,24 which imposed severe
restrictions on the ability of a public figure to recover damages from a
publisher who intentionally inflicted emotional damage on him.243 Post
explains, and to some degree defends, the result in Falwell on the ground
that the nation's commitment to a particular kind of free speech culture
precludes the community from attempting to extend its definition of civil
discourse into the public domain.2'
What sort of culture is constituted by U.S. free speech law? One of the
most celebrated versions is Justice William Brennan's description in New
York Times v. Sullivan of "a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open." 245 We can juxtapose this description to the statement in Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire,246 defining fighting words as "those which by their very
239. Id. at 56.
240. Frank Michelman explores the paradox with his usual care. See Frank I. Michelman,
Must Constitutional Democracy Be "Responsive"?, 107 ETHICs 706 (1997) (reviewing POST,
supra note 112).
241. POST, supra note 112, at 278.
242. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
243. See id. at 57.
244. See PosT, supra note 112, at 174-78.
245. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
246. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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utterance... tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."247 Feminists
and critical race theorists have pointed out that this definition implicitly
invokes a male standard, calling up the image of a man who will swing out
at a person who utters fighting words to him. 48 One might adapt a phrase
from Harry Kalven to assert that the nation is committed to an equally
worthy and profound tradition that debate should be nuanced, careful, and
respectful.249 Or, using Post's framework, one could suggest that cases like
Falwell and issues like the regulation of hate speech provide the
opportunity for the United States to reconsider, and possibly to redefine, the
boundaries it has heretofore drawn between the public domain of
democracy, over which the community should have no control, and the
private domain of civility, which is defined by the community? °
Matsuda might then be taken to be arguing for revitalizing the tradition
or for a revision of our cultural self-understandings." The argument would
have two components. Against those who would characterize our national
commitment as univalent, it points out that the nation may have always
been committed to free speech considered abstractly but that the meaning of
free speech has always been contested. There is no single profound national
commitment to a well-specified free speech principle, only a history of
repeated confrontations over-or, to use less male-identified terms,
repeated discussions of-the meaning of our national commitment to free
speech.
Second, the argument would show the places in free speech law where
alternative understandings of the meaning of free speech have actually
become established. Matsuda describes doctrines providing what has come
247. Id. at 572.
248. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of
Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 560-61 (1993) (" Mhe fighting words standard, as it has been
interpreted thus far, is based upon a male stereotype; it presupposes an encounter between two
persons of relatively equal power who have been socialized to respond to insults with violence.");
Charles R. Lawrence IiI, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
DUKE L.J. 431, 454 ("The fighting words doctrine is a paradigm based on a white male point of
view.").
249. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADIrTON: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). In a different work, Kalven described New York Times v. Sullivan as
"'an occasion for dancing in the streets."' Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note
on "Tihe Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191,221 n.125 (quoting
and agreeing with Alexander Meiklejohn).
250. Cf. POST, supra note 112, at 14 ("The location of that boundary [between democracy
and community] will no doubt be unstable and contestable."). Although he does not focus directly
on the possibilities for change in a community's understandings of democracy and free speech,
Lawrence Lessig provides a helpful critique of Post's discussion of the possibility of change and
the role law might play in it. See Lawrence Lessig, Post Constitutionalism, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1422, 1455-65 (1996) (reviewing POST, supra note 112).
251. Cf. Jordan M. Steiker, "Post" Liberalism, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1059, 1073 (1996)
(reviewing POST, supra note 112) (describing Post's discussion of "recent, unsuccessful efforts to
regulate pornography in the United States ... as an attempt to break the hold of individualism in
First Amendment jurisprudence").
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to be known as "low-value speech" with less protection than speech
consisting of arguments about desirable national poicy.12 She identifies
areas of free speech law where balancing competing interests replaces crisp
categorical approaches 3 In short, she sketches a legal argument
supporting the constitutionality of her proposed hate speech regulations.
From an expressivist point of view, the significance of this legal
argument lies in the way it connects to a particular-and, of course,
contested-version of the nation's commitment to free speech. Just as
Germany's ability to reconcile regulation of hate speech with principles of
free expression derives from its particular history, so, the expressivist
argues, the U.S. version of free speech expressed in Justice Brennan's
statement in New York Times v. Sullivan derives from a particular vision of
U.S. history. Further, the way in which German law reconciles hate speech
regulation with free speech principles helps constitute the German people in
their constitutional aspect. And, similarly, U.S. free speech law helps
constitute the people of the United States-perhaps even more so in the
United States because of the central place that the U.S. Constitution has in
the self-understanding of the American people. But, once we see that a
people's constitutional character is constituted in part by contestable and
contested characterizations of constitutional requirements, we can then see
Matsuda's proposal as an effort to reconstitute the American people through
an alternative version of constitutional law that is already available to us.
In reaching this point, I have redescribed the strongest version of the
expressivist claim. In that version, constitutional law expresses a nation's
constitutional culture. And, in that version, the expressivist claim has a
curiously old-fashioned ring. Among other things, it evokes historical
scholarship of the 1950s and 1960s seeking to describe the American
national character. 4 Even at the time, sophisticated historians knew that
this scholarship was not really about the national character but about claims
about the nature of that character made by historically-situated proponents
of particular visions of the national character, claims that were contested at
the moment that they were made. 5
252. See Matsuda, supra note 231, at 2354. For the "low-value" characterization, see, for
example, STONE ET AL., supra note 6, at 1196-97.
253. See Matsuda, supra note 231, at 2355.
254. Probably the most influential study was DAVID M. POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY:
ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER (1954). Another important study
identified differences between the Northern and Southern characters. See WILLIAM R. TAYLOR,
CAVALIER AND YANKEE: THE OLD SOUTH AND AMERICAN NATIONAL CHARACTER (1961).
255. For a study casting doubt on the claim that there is a distinctive Southern constitutional
character, see James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the
Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEx. L. REV.
1219 (1998). I include this reference, among other reasons, because it shows how the study of
constitutional history can provide many of the benefits claimed for the study of comparative
1278 [Vol. 108: 1225
Comparative Constitutional Law
Emphasizing the contested nature of claims about national-and
therefore about constitutional--culture is important in assessing the
contributions that expressivists can make to constitutional understanding.
Expressivism's strong version is troubling because it might make available
a criticism of proposals like Matsuda's that they are inconsistent with the
nation's constitutional character or culture. And, just as discussions of
American character in the 1950s were inextricably linked to concerns over
what was and what was not "un-American," 6 so the strong expressivist
claim might serve to heighten criticism of proposals like Matsuda's as
anticonstitutional. The more tempered expressivist claim allows us to see
such proposals differently. They are simply a modem version of a general
phenomenon in constitutional culture. And, to the extent that they are truly
challenging a dominant version of the constitutional culture, they seek to
retrieve a subordinated version.
Post acknowledges that a nation's self-understandings, which are
expressed in constitutional law, are always contested. Indeed, that is his
defense of what he describes as the U.S. form of democracy: It allows any
vision of the nation to prevail in public discourse. And to preserve that
possibility our democratic order cannot bar anything from public
discussion." Comparative constitutional law lets us see the precise nature
of the cultural claim offered here. Lawrence Lessig's review of Post's book
pointed out that Germany describes its constitutional law of free speech as
committed to "militant democracy," which means that the law must be
militant on behalf of democracy in order to suppress antidemocratic
speech. 9 The German example is entirely consistent with the cultural
dimension of Post's analysis. Germany's understanding of what democracy
entails obviously emerged from the nation's experiences under Hitler and in
confrontation with the Soviet bloc, but the mere fact that German
constitutional law allows more substantial limits on free expression than
U.S. constitutional law does not undermine the assertion that Germany is a
constitutional law. Cf. L.P. HARTLEY, THE Go-BETwEEN 9 (1953) ("The past is a foreign
country: they do things differently there.").
256. For some indications of the connection, see PETER NovICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE
"OBJEcTIvITY QUESTION" AND THE AimERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 323 (1988) (" [F]rom
1948 onward, among historians as among other academics and intellectuals, there was ... a rapid
accommodation to the new postwar political culture."); id. at 333 (" '[C]onsensus' became the key
word in postwar attempts to produce a new interpretive framework for American history, focusing
attention on what had united Americans .... ). Novick does not, however, refer specifically to
historians' work on the American character in these passages.
257. In postmodemist jargon, the subordinated tradition is a dangerous supplement to the
dominant one.
258. More precisely, it cannot do so without having exceedingly strong reasons for believing
that social harms other than a transformation of self-understanding are quite likely to occur if the
speech is allowed to proceed unchecked.
259. Lessig, supra note 250, at 1463-64.
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democracy-a different kind of democracy from the United States, but a
democracy even so.
We might return here to the observation that comparative scholarship
sometimes seeks to displace a sense of false necessity only to be met with
the objection that the necessity is indeed a true one. So, in the present
context, the expressivist might reply to the invocation of Germany as a
perfectly acceptable democracy that German democracy is perfectly
acceptable for the kind of nation Germany is, but that it would not be
acceptable for the kind of nation that the United States is. Post then would
be understood to be offering not a description of what democracy
transcendentally requires but what democracy as it has been constituted in
the United States requires. As Frank Michelman puts it, the theory of
democracy that Post describes "has such centrality in American life that we
can't let go of the theory without ceasing to be the people we are." 26 Or, in
Post's own terms, in discussing proposals to regulate sexually explicit
material, experience in England shows that different approaches are each
"compatible with a system of freedom of expression. The question of
which we choose turns on the kind of social world that we want to use the
First Amendment to help construct." 2
61
The German example shows that a democratic nation can be committed
to a version of democracy that is different from the one to which Post
claims that the United States is committed. And, Matsuda challenges Post's
claim about the form of democracy to which the people of the United States
are committed. She urges her readers to expand their horizons to see that
the United States has encompassed a larger "we" than Post's account
suggests. On doing so, she claims, they will see that the nation-properly
understood-accepts her description of democracy's requirements rather
than Post's.
Matsuda's proposal might be understood as an intervention in a cultural
contest. She can be understood to be attempting to transform the culture in
which her proposal does indeed not (yet) fit through the very act of making
the proposal and demonstrating how it is consistent with a tradition
available to people in the United States and with some elements of
prevailing law.262 We should cease to be the people we are, in her view,
260. Michelman, supra note 240, at 711.
261. POST, supra note 112, at 116.
262. Cf. Michelman, supra note 240, at 717 (finding that Post's argument is "cogent at every
step, once we accept that the 'responsive' theory of democracy's relation to freedom is so firmly
entrenched in American political consciousness as to make that theory, for the time being,
nonnegotiable. Is that, however, a sound and true premise? The question is empirical."). I believe
one could similarly recast suggestions by Mary Ann Glendon and Donald Kommers that U.S.
constitutional law could profit from shifting from what they describe as its current absolutist
rights discourse to an approach that they find in European, and particularly German, constitutional
law in which courts balance the competing claims of community and individual. Cf. GLENDON,
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because the people we are perpetuate a system of racial hierarchy that the
subordinated tradition to which she appeals condemned.263 Or, more
pointedly, claims about who "we" are are themselves interventions in
cultural contests and carry no force against claims that "we" ought to be
something else.
This analysis of Matsuda's proposal allows us to see the issue in
Stanford v. Kentucky in a new light.2' Justice Scalia understood the
dissenters to be arguing that the views of other nations had weight in
determining what was cruel and unusual punishment simply because they
were the views held by many people, and he responded that the
Constitution made only the views of Americans relevant. Perhaps, however,
the dissenters could have been understood as making a point about
American constitutional aspirations toward universalism and, as the
Declaration of Independence put it, "a decent respect to the opinions of
mankind."26 That is, the dissenters might have been asserting that the
distinctive American character called on us to take account of foreigners'
opinions.2" Put more broadly, we express our national character by learning
from experience elsewhere.
Of course, this is a contestable account of the American national
character. Perhaps looking elsewhere denies, rather than respects, who we
are as a people.267 Expressivism's strength, however, lies in its ability to
allow us to engage in a discussion of what our constitutional character is,
rather than leaving us to take it for granted.
C. Expressivism and Functionalism
One can raise both functional and expressivist objections to reliance on
constitutional experience elsewhere to aid in interpreting the U.S.
Constitution. Functionalist considerations might induce some caution in
relying on foreign experience with the hate speech problem. Most
obviously, the simple language of the applicable constitutional provisions
supra note 213; Donald P. Kommers, Can German Constitutionalism Serve as a Model for the
United States?, 58 ZETscHRIFT FOR AUSLA.NDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT
787 (1998). Clearly, balancing as an interpretive method has been a prominent part of U.S.
constitutional discourse, although perhaps a subordinated one in recent years on the topics of
concern to Glendon and Kommers. Their references to constitutional experience elsewhere can be
taken as their effort to remind us that balancing is part of the U.S. constitutional tradition too.
263. Cf. POST, supra note 112, at 291 ("We cannot overcome that history without changing
ourselves and therefore also our legal order.").
264. See supra text accompanying notes 20-27 (discussing Stanford).
265. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
266. Cf. TUSHNEr, supra note 221, at 181-85 (describing the project of American
constitutionalism in related terms).
267. Proponents of this claim might give American exceptionalism a positive valence, or they
might present a less attractive nativism.
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varies. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms authorizes "such
reasonable limits [on fundamental rights] ... as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." 2 68 Kent Greenawalt suggests that
this language makes it relatively easy for Canadian courts to develop an
analysis that balances social interests in maintaining a free and democratic
society against infringements on fundamental rights whereas the more
conceptual and categorical language in the U.S. First Amendment makes it
more difficult for U.S. courts to be comfortable in developing and
administering legal standards that call for explicit balancing.269
Lacking a written constitution, Great Britain might understandably
administer its racial hatred law270 in a distinctive manner. As first amended
in 1965,271 the law requires that prosecutions for hate speech be brought
only by the Attorney General or with his consent.272 This provision
immediately limits the possibility that U.S. constitutionalists can learn from
British &xperience. By centralizing administration, this mechanism
enhances its oppressive potential: Whoever controls the national
government can strongly bias the definition of prohibited hate speech. No
single hate speech regulation poses such a threat in the United States, where
the administration of criminal prohibitions is widely distributed among an
enormous number of jurisdictions. And, looking at the problem from the
other direction, in Great Britain a single sensible administrator can ensure
that the racial hatred law is enforced in a way that minimizes threats to free
speech values, while in the United States a number of imprudent local
prosecutors could enforce hate speech laws in ways that even their most
vigorous academic proponents would reject. Functional differences between
the legal regimes in the United States and Great Britain thus make it
difficult to learn anything relevant to the United States from the British
experience.
268. CAN. CoNsT. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms),
§ 1.
269. See GREENAWALT, supra note 235, at 13-14; see also Eberle, supra note 234, at 897
(arguing that "German civility norms of privacy and reputational interests are a stronger limiting
influence on communication freedoms than American ones" in part because "the German Basic
Law expressly circumscribes communication freedoms and orders more highly personality rights,
in comparison to the textually unbounded First Amendment, which encounters no other express
constitutional limitation").
270. See Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64 (Eng.).
271. See Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, § 6 (Eng.).
272. See Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, § 27(1) (Eng.) ("No proceedings for an offence
under this Part may be instituted in England and Wales except by or with the consent of the
Attorney General.") (superseding section 5A of the Public Order Act, 1936); see also Race
Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 70 (Eng.) (adding a new section 5A to the Public Order Act, 1936,
and superseding section 6 of the Race Relations Act, 1965). For a discussion of the British racial
hatred acts, see Kenneth Lasson, Racism in Great Britain: Drawing the Line on Free Speech, 7
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161 (1987).
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Nothing in the foregoing expressivist account of Matsuda's argument
refutes the functionalist objections to her proposal, which in the end
persuade Post to reject it.273 But the course of the argument shows the value
of comparative constitutional law in illuminating an important issue in U.S.
constitutional law.274 Comparative experience suggested some functional
objections to Matsuda's proposal. I then recast the proposal in expressivist
terms to connect it to Post's analysis. Post presents his argument in cultural
or expressivist terms, but experience elsewhere helps show that Post may
not sufficiently understand the way in which legal proposals can be
interventions in contests over cultural transformation or preservation.
The preceding discussion should have clarified the way in which an
expressivist might say that we can learn from experience elsewhere, but it
also indicates why one might think that the knowledge thus gained was
worth rather little. The expressivist argument turns on the recognition that
constitutional law is culturally contingent. That may be true enough, but
Post's glances in the direction of a transcendental notion of democracy
show that one might well think that cultural contingency has no normative
bearing. Suppose Post believes, and correctly so, that the endless possibility
of revision in a community's self-understandings defines democracy, in the
sense that it provides the best normative understanding and defense of the
practice of democracy. That would be a sufficient reason for rejecting
Matsuda's claims for a cultural transformation that would limit the
possibility of such revisions. Expressivism is normatively interesting, in
short, only to the degree that some form of cultural relativism is defensible.
Recent developments in the Russian law of religion help make the
point. In 1997, Russia's parliament adopted a law on religion that
distinguished between religions that had a long tradition in Russia and those
that were new.275 The law's preamble "acknowledg[ed] the special role of
Orthodoxy in the history of Russia and in the origin and development of its
spirituality and culture."276 This resembles the preamble to the Irish
273. I have not addressed the details of Matsuda's proposals, nor of related ones. I should
note, however, that most proponents of hate speech regulation shape their arguments in ways that
can fit into Post's framework: They are suggesting ways of redrawing the boundary between the
private domain regulated by community-prescribed civility norms and the public domain in which
uninhibited speech prevails for Post's democracy-preserving reasons. I do not see in Post's
account the resources to challenge such arguments. See generally POST, supra note 112.
274. It is perhaps worth noting at this point that I have used comparative experience in a way
different from Matsuda. Her version approaches the suggestion that U.S. law should borrow
solutions arrived at elsewhere, to use the term familiar in comparative law scholarship generally.
As I have noted, such suggestions are vulnerable to functional objections. I have suggested, in
contrast, that we can learn from experience elsewhere by seeing how constitutional law helps
constitute particular cultures and how it might be used to transform those cultures.
275. See Law on the Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Association (1997), in
RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A RULE-OF-LAW STATE AND A MARKET
ECONOMY 116 (William E. Butler & Jane E. Henderson eds. & William E. Butler trans., 1998).
276. Id. at 117.
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Constitution.277 But, unlike that preamble, the Russian law on religion does
have legal consequences.278 New religious groups have the right to have
worship services, but they may not, for example, own property or carry out
religious activities in hospitals and prisons, as could religious organizations
that had existed in Russia for at least fifteen years (that is, during the Soviet
era when the government was officially hostile to religion). 79
A representative of Orthodoxy, speaking before the statute was
adopted, defended preferences for the older churches as a solution to the
"'spiritual crisis"' facing Russia in the 1990s. 8' The newer evangelical
churches, he said, were "'offering to the people another simple solution...
[that] reinforces the old psychology, in which simple slogans were offered
in return for immediate minimum rewards but great rewards in the future.
Russian Orthodoxy is more complex and more difficult.""'28 Preferences
for Orthodoxy, on this view, were a valuable contribution to Russia's
efforts to democratize; they were both functional and expressive. We might
reject this claim if we believed that democratic societies were necessarily
committed to a principle barring discrimination among religions. And this
would be true no matter how accurately the Russian law on religion
expressed Russia's commitment to Orthodoxy and the other religions that
had a long pedigree in Russia.s2 Democracy, in short, cannot be relativized
to the point of finding discrimination among religions normatively
acceptable.
The foregoing argument develops a functionalist version of
expressivism.283 The idea is that once we understand that law can express
cultural values, we can encourage courts to use it to help reshape those
values, at least in cultures like that of the United States, where
constitutional law plays a significant role in defining national character.2"
277. See supra text accompanying note 222.
278. As discussed above, however, the Irish preamble's identification of the nation with the
Roman Catholic church might shape the way in which constitutionalists in that country understand
other constitutional norms. See supra text accompanying note 225.
279. See Law on the Freedom of Conscience, supra note 275, art. 27(3), at 134 (specifying
the rights not held by religious organizations in existence for less than 15 years).
280. Harold J. Berman, Religious Rights in Russia at a Time of Tumultuous Transition: A
Historical Theory, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 285, 302 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) (quoting a
"representative of the Moscow Patriarchate").
281. Id. at 302-03.
282. We might also discount the argument as self-interested, though it strikes me as not
entirely implausible.
283. For a formulation that links the terms directly, see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
284. One would of course have to be appropriately cautious and note that courts might botch
the job of reshaping values, perhaps because they fall to appreciate the ways in which law-as-
expression must mesh with law-as-function. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes
and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997).
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Beyond this functionalist expressivism there is a purer version of
expressivism."' To the expressivist, constitutional decisions express the
nation's legal culture. An expressivist would therefore note that Matsuda's
argument is constitutionalist to the core. Even a person who presents herself
as speaking for outsiders thinks it important to speak in the constitutionalist
language of insiders. 6 Matsuda's constitutionalist discourse exemplifies
the important fact that constitutionalism in the United States occupies
almost all the territory available to critics of existing policy. 7 As Robin
West points out, most critics confronted with the argument that one of their
policy proposals is unconstitutional do not respond by saying that the
proposal's unconstitutionality shows that the Constitution is unworthy of
respect." s Instead, they engage on the constitutional ground. Dissidents,
then, may challenge the way in which the Constitution is being applied, but
they do not challenge the Constitution itself. Their very dissidence
expresses their commitment to the Constitution. And that is a phenomenon
of some significance that need not accompany constitutionalism as such.
One could, of course, see the U.S. Constitution in expressivist terms
without looking elsewhere. But seeing how things are done in other
constitutional systems may raise the question of the Constitution's
connection to American national character more dramatically than
reflection on domestic constitutional issues could. If so, expressivism can
be another way in which we learn from constitutional experience elsewhere.
V. BRICOLAGE
Claude Lvi-Strauss distinguished between engineering and
bricolage. 9 The engineer, according to Ldvi-Strauss, has a project in mind
and sees what materials are available with which to work. The engineer
285. I discuss an extension of this argument infra Part V.
286. It could be, of course, that doing so is an entirely strategic choice made on the basis of a
judgment that speaking in constitutionalist terms is more likely than anything else Matsuda could
do to advance outsiders' interests. For Matsuda's defense of the outsider methodology, see Man J.
Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989).
287. See Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1992).
288. See id. at 766,768-69. The most prominent counterexample is William Lloyd Garrison's
endorsement of a resolution adopted in January 1843 by the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society,
that the Constitution was "'A COVENANT WITH DEATH, AND AN AGREEMENT WITH
HELL'-INVOLVING BOTH PARTIES IN ATROCIOUS CRIMINALITY,--AND SHOULD
BE IMMEDIATELY ANNULLED." AILEEN S. KRADITOR, MEANS AND ENDS IN AMERICAN
ABOLmONIsM 200 (1967) (emphasis in original). That position lost its historical viability when
Frederick Douglass rejected it. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, ORATION, DELIVERED IN
CORINTHIAN HALL, ROCHESTER, JULY 5TH, 1852 (Rochester, Lee & Mann 1852), reprinted in
THE OXFORD FREDERICK DOUGLASS READER 108, 127-28 (William L. Andrews ed., 1996).
289. See Ltvi-STRAUSS, supra note 17, at 17.
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then assembles or designs tools to use those materials to carry out the
project. The bricoleur, in contrast,
make[s] do with "whatever is at hand," that is to say with a set of
tools and materials... [that] bears no relation to the current
project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent
result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the
stock.290
Constitution-makers and interpreters find themselves in an intellectual and
political world that provides them with a bag of concepts "at hand," not all
of which are linked to each other in some coherent way. As engineers, they
would sort through the concepts and assemble them into a constitutional
design that made sense according to some overarching conceptual scheme.
As bricoleurs, though, they reach into the bag and use the first thing that
happens to fit the immediate problem they are facing. Levi-Strauss's insight
is that we are mistaken in thinking that large domains of our culture are best
understood as engineering. Rather, he argues, culture is far more the
product of bricolage.
We can apply that insight to constitution-making and interpretation as
well. I begin by using the idea of bricolage to explore some difficulties with
a particular strategy for interpreting the Constitution, which links a highly
rationalized textualism to some form of originalism. The argument starts
with the modest suggestion that some constitutional provisions should be
understood to result from compromises that rest on no single coherent
principle. Invoking the idea of bricolage, however, it broadens that
suggestion into a far more general perspective on interpretation that brings
into question first the idea that the Constitution is the result of rational
deliberation, including rational compromises, and then the idea that
interpretation is something other than the transformation and coopting of
the legal materials that the interpreter's culture makes available. I follow by
briefly discussing the way in which functionalism and expressivism may
limit the possibility of appropriating something that might seem to be "at
hand" and conclude by suggesting that, nonetheless, recent interest in
comparative constitutional law shows how experience elsewhere has
become available to U.S. constitutionalists who now find themselves
participants in a world-wide legal culture.
290. Id.
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A. Bricolage as the Source of Critique
Justice Scalia suggested in Printz v. United States that those designing
constitutions might learn from constitutional experience elsewhere.29'
Examining how constitutions are constructed may also give some guidance
to us in interpreting our own Constitution, and the concept of bricolage may
be particularly helpful here.
Consider two stylized accounts of any particular constitution. On one
account, a constitution is a tightly integrated document in which every piece
articulates precisely with its neighbors, making the whole a harmonious
unity. In interpreting such a constitution we would think it appropriate to
adopt interpretations that preserved the structural integrity that was
designed into it. Bricolage describes the other account: A constitution is
assembled from provisions that a constitution's drafters selected almost at
random from whatever happened to be at hand when the time came to deal
with a particular problem. There are many ways to interpret this sort of
constitution, but adopting interpretations that preserve a structural integrity
imputed to the intentions of a constitution's designers may not be one of
them.29
2
Is the U.S. Constitution the product of a process yielding a tightly
integrated document, or of bricolage? The Federalist Papers open with an
assertion that the people of New York, and through them the rest of the
nation, were being offered the unique opportunity to decide "whether
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government
from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend
for their political constitutions on accident and force."293 In L6vi-Strauss's
terms, Hamilton was claiming that in adopting the Constitution the people
of the United States would be engineers.
Against this, however, are common assertions that many constitutional
provisions result from compromises made at the time of framing.294 James
291. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997).
292. It is important to be precise here. There may be reasons other than consistency with the
designers' intentions to interpret a constitution as if it were a structurally integrated document.
The argument I develop is only that, where the constitution results from bricolage, it does not
make sense to do so on originalist grounds.
293. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The
assertion of uniqueness comes in the prefatory statement that this question had been "reserved to
the people of this country." Id.
294. See, e.g., Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 340 (1990) (describing the
compromise between a fear of a national standing army and the "danger of relying on
inadequately trained soldiers" that resulted in Article I, Section 8, Clause 16); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 119 n.2 (1970) (Black, J.) (describing Article I, Section 4, as a compromise
between those "who wanted the States to have final authority over the election of all state and
federal officers and those who wanted Congress to make the laws governing national elections");
Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 168 (1901) (calling "[t]he regulation of commerce by a
majority vote and the exemption of exports from duties or taxes ... one of the great compromises
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Madison, speaking in the first Congress in opposing the creation of a
national bank, asserted: "It is not pretended that every insertion or omission
in the Constitution is the effect of systematic attention. This is not the
character of any human work, particularly the work of a body of men." 
295
Or, as Justice William Patterson put it in the early case of Hylton v. United
States: "The constitution has been considered as an accommodating
system; it was the effect of mutual sacrifices and concessions; it was the
work of compromise."29 6 Justice Joseph Story drew an interpretive
conclusion from this: Because "many of [the Constitution's] provisions
were matters of compromise of opposing interests and opinions .... no
uniform rule of interpretation can be applied to it, which may not allow,
even if it does not positively demand, many modifications in its actual
application to particular clauses." 
297
Story referred to compromises affecting particular provisions. More
generally, though, we might see the Constitution's larger structures, such as
the presidency or federalism, or the Constitution as a whole, as tightly
integrated or the product of compromises.298 Wiktor Osiatyfiski, a Polish
legal scholar, contrasts a constitution of compromise with a constitution of
principle.299 In doing so, he suggests that compromises are unprincipled. On
this view, we can impose a structure of principle on a constitution of
compromise, but we cannot defend our actions by invoking some originalist
theory of constitutional interpretation.
We can see the difference between viewing the Constitution as tightly
integrated and viewing it as the result of bricolage in an important recent
effort to develop an account of a tightly integrated Constitution, which the
authors conclude creates a unitary executive solely responsible for law-
execution." The aim in what follows is to decouple a rigorous textualist
of the Constitution"); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 157 U.S. 429, 563-64 (1895) (describing
the compromise that resulted in counting each slave as three-fifths of a person for the purposes of
representation and imposition of direct taxes). For a discussion of the interpretive implications of
the last of these compromises, see Bruce Ackerman, Taration and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1999).
295. 2 ANNALS OFCONG. 1899 (1791).
296. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 177-78 (1796).
297. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 610 (1842). I should note that one might
refuse to follow the interpretive gnidance offered by Prigg and Pollock on the ground that their
guidance endorsed (explicitly in the former case, implicitly in the latter) compromises designed to
ensure the adherence of the slaveholding South to the Constitution.
298. I should emphasize that by "compromise" I do not mean here the reasoned
accommodation that results in some adjustment of competing principles, but rather a resolution
that allows people to wrap up their work and go on with their lives.
299. See Wiktor Osiatyfiski, The Constitution-Making Process in Poland, 13 LAW & POL'Y
125, 129-30 (1991).
300. To summarize the argument: Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes begin by pointing out
the linguistic parallels between Article II and Article III, and their differences from Article I.
Article I gives Congress powers "herein granted"; Articles 1I and Ill "vest[]" "the" executive
and judicial powers. Articles II and III both say that these powers "shall" be vested, and the best
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approach to constitutional interpretation from originalist versions with
which textualism is sometimes associated.3"' A rigorous textualism insists
that every constitutional provision-every jot and tittle-contributes
meaningfully to the creation of a constitution structured by a set of
principles, all of which cohere tightly with each other. As before, I follow
an extended discussion focused tightly on the U.S. Constitution with an
examination of constitutional experience elsewhere to show how that
experience might help us understand how to interpret the U.S. Constitution.
interpretation of that word is that it means those powers must be vested. See Steven G. Calabresi
& Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1153, 1199-1200 (1992). Article II grants Congress the power to regulate the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction, and to create lower federal courts, in terms that can be given broad readings.
Article II, in contrast, gives Congress only a limited power to give the courts or department heads
the authority to appoint inferior officers. Calabresi and Rhodes argue that the latter congressional
power is clearly narrower than the powers Congress has with respect to the judiciary, and that
those who defend the courts against jurisdiction-stripping should find even stronger textual
reasons for defending the presidency against parallel incursions on executive authority. See id. at
1192-93. (Calabresi and Rhodes point out that Article II generally uses the word all to mean
every; Article II generally uses it as a placeholder, or as a substitute, for the. See id. at 1185. They
do not, however, place much weight on this difference. See id. at 1193.) In addition, Article II
lists nine areas to which the judicial power extends; Article II also has a list, but it is "not
offered.., as an exclusive" one, in contrast to the Article III list. Id. at 1195-96. Finally, and
most important, Article III creates a plural judiciary, opening up the possibility of substantial
congressional power to distribute work among Article III courts, while Article II creates a single
President, the ultimate repository of all executive power. See id. at 1203-04.
The claim about the unitary executive must be specified precisely. It is not that across a wide
range of activities it makes sense to commit law-execution to officials directly subordinate to the
President. Much of the originalist material provided by Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash
supports only this proposition. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). Rather, the claim is the stronger one, that
the Constitutioi precludes lawmakers-ordinarily, a majority in both houses of Congress with the
agreement of the President, but sometimes a supermajority of both houses overriding a President's
veto--from deciding that, in some instances, law-execution by someone not subordinate to the
President provides the people with better government. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein,
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 n.21 (1994) (describing the
"modem unitarian view"); id. at 41 (describing the alternative view, in which "some powers fall
clearly within the domain of 'the executive' (and these [the Framers] constitutionalized), but the
balane ... they believed would be assigned pragmatically, according to the values or functions of
the particular power at issue"). The discussion directed to the choice between these alternatives in
Calabresi and Prakash's article is almost entirely textualist and structuralist, not originalist. See
Calabresi & Prakash, supra, at 620-22. It produces a single quotation from the period of the
Framing to support its conclusions. See id. at 622 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential
Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 905, 921 (1989-1990) (quoting James Wilson)).
301. Calabresi and Rhodes's article is almost entirely textualist, although the authors
occasionally throw in an off-hand reference to originalism. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra
note 300, at 1189 (referring to a "formal, original construction of Article II"); id. at 1213
(referring to "a textualist originalist theory"). The authors revert to originalism in arguing that it
is permissible for the courts to depart from settled interpretations to return to original
understandings. See id. at 1213-14. Yet their substantive analysis turns almost without exception
on text rather than original understanding. A subsequent article argues that "either the text or the
relevant 'legislative' history, considered separately, demonstrates that the founding generation
fully embraced [the unitary executive view].... [Tlhe originalist textual and historical arguments
for the unitary Executive, taken together, firmly establish the theory." Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 300, at 550.
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We can consider the affinity between rigorous textualism and
originalism by noting that Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes support their
argument for a unitary executive by asserting that "[i]f one reads the
Article II Vesting Clause to mean '[tihe judicial Power ... must be vested
in one Supreme court, and in such inferior Courts,' one is compelled to read
the Article II Vesting Clause to mean '[t]he executive Power must be vested
in a President.""'3 2 They point out that "no one has argued for different
interpretative approaches to the same word when it appears in analogous
clauses of both Article II and Article Il, and for good reason-such an
argument cannot be sustained."303 This rigorous textualism commits what
Walter Wheeler Cook called the "original sin" of interpretation, "[t]he
tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules,
and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have
precisely the same scope in all of them."" The pejorative aside, Cook's
characterization illuminates the connection between rigorous textualism and
originalism. While Cook would have analysts reason from purposes to
textual meaning, rigorous textualism reasons from textual meaning to
purposes. So, for example, Calabresi and Rhodes rely on their careful
textual analysis to support the conclusion that the President is the unitary
repository of all executive power. It is easy to redescribe this as an assertion
that the text's purpose is to create a unitary presidency. And from there the
next move is easy as well. Texts do not have purposes; people do. So, the
textualist may claim, the Constitution's authors intended to create the
unitary presidency their text reveals.3 5
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein have presented a broad challenge
to Calabresi and Rhodes's analysis on both originalist and functionalist
grounds.0 6 The bricoleur's perspective is different, focusing on a tiny
problem that nags at any account treating the Constitution's construction of
the presidency as a tightly integrated piece of work. The problem is this:
What is the Opinion in Writing Clause doing in Article II? That Clause
appears immediately after the obviously important provision stating that the
President "shall be Commander in Chief," and it reads, "he may require
the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices." 307
302. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 300, at 1178 (emphases added).
303. Id. at 1178-79.
304. Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE
L.J. 333, 337 (1933) (emphasis added).
305. I use the word "authors" to avoid taking a position on whether the people with the
relevant purposes were the drafters, the ratifiers, or the people of the new nation taken in the
aggregate.
306. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 300, at 1.
307. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.I.
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As Justice Robert Jackson wrote, the Clause describes a power
"inherent in the Executive if anything is." ' The Opinion in Writing
Clause is an embarrassment to any theory that treats the Constitution's
construction of the presidency as tightly integrated.0 9 Calabresi and
Rhodes's account emphasizes the structural unity of the executive branch.
Would that unity be diminished if Article II lacked the Opinion in Writing
Clause? Surely not. On their account, even without the Clause the President
could ask a cabinet officer for an opinion in writing, backed up by the threat
to discharge a recalcitrant officer.3" As they put it, "The President could
not possibly be said to have all of the executive power in order to be able to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed if he could not tell his
subordinates what to do." 311
What structure, then, is implied by the presence of the Opinion in
Writing Clause? We could take Justice Jackson's observation seriously. The
power identified in the Clause is inherent in the Executive if anything is.
So, we might conclude, there simply are no inherent executive powers. The
President has the precise powers enumerated in the Constitution and
nothing more.312
308. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 n.9 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
309. Cf. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 300, at 32 (stating that the Clause "raises an
enormous puzzle" for the unitarian view); A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of
Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 799-800 (1987) (treating all of Article II as
an embarrassment of this sort, because no more than its first sentence would be necessary if that
sentence conferred the entire range of executive power).
310. The Opinion in Writing Clause does not even give the President clear shelter in the
Constitution from criticism in such a case, because, on Calabresi and Rhodes's account, the
Constitution clearly shelters the President anyway. It is hard to see how a President could do any
better in suppressing a firestorm by pointing to the Opinion in Writing Clause to justify firing the
officer, instead of pointing to the Take Care Clause and the general unity of the executive branch
that Calabresi and Rhodes say the Constitution creates. But see Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note
300, at 1196 n.216 (arguing that the Opinion in Writing Clause limits the President's power to
require opinions in writing, because of the Clause's references to "principal Officer[s]" and
"Subjects] relating to the Duties of their... Offices"). I find it hard to believe that Calabresi and
Rhodes think that a President could not fire a Secretary of Commerce who refused to give an
opinion in writing on a matter clearly outside that department's duties-for example, on whether
the Department of Veterans Affairs should pay veterans' health care costs attributable to smoking.
(If that example fails because it involves a "commercial" matter, it nonetheless must be true that
there are some subjects outside the duties of a particular Cabinet officer, lest Calabresi and
Rhodes's points become empty.) Calabresi and Prakash elaborate the argument by asserting that
the Clause limits the President to demanding opinions "only ... on governmental matters."
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 300, at 585. But that is certainly not what the Clause says:
"Governmental matters" is significantly broader than "Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices."
311. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 300, at 1207.
312. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political
Departments, 1 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 13, 14-15 (1974). This position is, of course, in tension
with the common inference from the difference between the first words of Article I, Section 1
("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress" (emphasis added)) and the
first words of Article 11, Section 1 (" The executive Power shall be vested in a President"
(emphasis added)). See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 300, at 1175-78 (drawing the inference
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A more limited conclusion is available, but one equally damaging to the
idea that the Constitution treats the presidency in a tightly integrated way. 3
The existence of the Clause suggests a concern that Cabinet officers might
develop political support independent of the President. 4 The Opinion in
Writing Clause is a way of enforcing a President's desire to unify the
administration-a desire that we can expect presidents to have but that, the
presence of the Clause suggests, the Constitution does not itself create. The
Clause makes it possible for the President to insist that Cabinet members
take responsibility for administration decisions. Unless the President can
demand an opinion in writing, for example, the Cabinet officer might
spread the word to her political supporters that a directive issuing from her
department really did not conform to the Cabinet member's personal views.
A President armed with a statement in writing that the Cabinet member
supported the directive could impede the Cabinet member's quest for
independent political support. As The Federalist No. 70 put the point in
defending the drafters' decision to create a single President, it makes sense
to design a structure that allows the people to know who is responsible for
what decisions: Where many decisionmakers are involved, "it may be
that the Clauses give the President all executive power but Congress only some legislative power).
Calabresi and Rhodes argue that the significance of the list of powers in Article II, Section 2, lies
in the fact that each clause limits an executive power that would otherwise be unlimited. See id. at
1197-98. The Pardon Clause, stating that the President "shall have Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment," U.S. CONST.
art. 1I, § 2, cl. 1, "explains that the President's pardon power reaches only 'Offenses against the
United States' and does not reach 'cases of Impeachment."' Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 300,
at 1196 n.216 (emphasis added). Calabresi and Rhodes, who are fond of posing alternative
language to accomplish goals more directly, see, e.g., id. at 1177-78; see also Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 300, at 577 n.134, 581, do not suggest that this limiting purpose could have
been achieved more directly by a provision stating that the President's pardon power (created by
the Vesting Clause) "shall not extend to offenses against a state, or to cases of impeachment." For
a discussion of the difficulties in making the argument that the Opinion in Writing Clause limits
presidential power, see supra note 310.
313. Calabresi and Prakash conclude their discussion of the Clause by acknowledging the
possibility that it is redundant, restating a power conferred in the Vesting Clause, and asserting
that "[t]he Constitution is full of redundancies." Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 300, at 585.
That, however, is to say that the Constitution is not a tightly integrated document, each word of
which contributes something essential to its structure. See also id. at 594 nn.202 & 204
(discussing "imperfections" in the Constitution); id. at 622 n.352 (discounting expressions from
"the founding generation" that the President's veto power was "a means of defending the
President from congressional encroachments" on the pure policy ground that "the veto is a very
imperfect defense" in light of Congress's power to override a veto or enact statutes with one
President's agreement with which a later President disagrees).
314. Lessig and Sunstein make this point, though in slight different terms. They argue that a
Constitution without the Opinion in Writing Clause would allow Congress to "mak[e]
administrative departments wholly independent from the President." Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 300, at 34; cf. GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD
43-44 (1997) (describing "the direct link... between the secretary [of the Treasury] and the
Congress" created by the statute establishing the Treasury Department, and suggesting the
important, and possibly independent, role played by Alexander Hamilton as the first Secretary of
the Treasury).
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impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been
incurred is truly chargeable."315 A written opinion makes the Cabinet
member from whom it is received "chargeable" with the outcome.
Thus, the Opinion in Writing Clause plugs a hole in the Constitution." 6
In doing so, one might think, the Clause helps create the tightly unified
structure Calabresi and Rhodes describe."7 One might have the image of a
jigsaw puzzle missing a small piece, supplied by the Opinion in Writing
Clause. Even without the Clause, however, the big picture would be clear-
a powerful presidency administering a unified government. There is,
however, an alternative image available, suggested by the fear of
independent political power in Cabinet members. We could see the
Constitution as creating a loosely articulated network of relations within the
executive branch. I8 Perhaps the network would fall apart without the
Opinion in Writing Clause, or perhaps the Clause simply expresses
something that happened to occur to the drafters as they were putting
Article II together. In either case, its presence does no more than allow the
315. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 293, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton).
316. See Froomkin, supra note 309, at 800 (arguing that the Clause exists "because it was not
assumed, or at the very least not obvious, that the President had absolute power over Heads of
Departments"); see also Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 300, at 1184-85 (arguing that the Clause
"suggests that the heads of departments... are a subordinate part of the executive department").
But see J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEo. L.J. 2079, 2134 n.240 (1989)
(calling Froomkin's analysis "silly," without providing an argument in support of that
description).
317. Calabresi and Rhodes struggle to offer "more plausible interpretations of the Clause."
Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 300, at 1207. It might imply "that only the President, and not
Congress, can obtain information from principal officers." Id.; see also Neil Thomas Proto, The
Opinion Clause and Presidential Decision-Making, 44 Mo. L. REv. 185, 196-97 (1979) (arguing
against the existence of congressional power to restrict presidential receipt of advice on demand).
This, however, is inconsistent with their reading of the other provisions of Article I, Section 2, as
limitations that would not otherwise exist on presidential power. See supra notes 310, 312. In
addition, consider a constitution without this Clause, but with a President who can fire
subordinates at will. Congress could not require a subordinate to refrain from delivering an
opinion to the President under such a constitution either, because the President could fire the
subordinate who followed Congress's rather than the president's direction. For the same reason,
Congress could not require the subordinate to provide it with information over the President's
objection.
Calabresi and Rhodes suggest that the purpose might be "to enable [the President] to issue
binding orders." Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 300, at 1207. Again, however, that power would
seem to be a necessary part of the power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, with
what counts as faithful execution being identified by the orders. Or, finally, they suggest that it
applies only to principal officers because only they "must be confirmed by the Senate and thus
might not be wholly loyal to the President." Id. I do not see where the thus comes from. Calabresi
and Rhodes appear to believe that this interpretation supports the view that the President can fire a
Cabinet officer at will "by giving the President the power to solicit opinions from Senate-
confirmed officers precisely in order to decide whether to fire these officers for disloyalty." Id. at
1207-08. I simply do not understand the point here. The President, they argue, clearly can fire at
will anyone not confirmed by the Senate. Do they mean to suggest that, absent the Opinion in
Writing Clause, the President could not fire a Cabinet member suspected of disloyalty for refusing
to provide an opinion in writing?
318. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 300, at 74 (asserting that "the framers thought it
enough to draw a few clear lines and leave the balance to Congress").
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loose network that, on this view, is the Executive to get on with the public's
business.319 Finally, if we think that most constitutions and constitutional
structures result from compromises rather than carefully integrated design,
we might think that the latter image conforms more to the designers'
understanding than the former one.320
A comparison of constitutional framings suggests that the conditions
under which the U.S. Constitution was developed might well produce a
document that is unified by a few important principles but not tightly
integrated. Two important conditions are that the Constitution was framed
in a time of perceived crisis and by a group that believed itself to be under
rather severe time constraints.321 More generally, descriptions of recent
constitutional framings regularly identify key compromises on central
issues.322 Sometimes, too, the presence of a political figure of great
stature-such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Vaclav Havel in
Czechoslovakia, and George Washington in the United States-structures
the constitution-framers' vision of how the constitution they are designing
will actually work.3" A constitution designed when people know who the
first national leader under it will be may well have different features from
one designed under conditions of greater uncertainty.324 The framers may
319. This undermines Calabresi and Rhodes's strongest point, that the Opinion in Writing
Clause is too "nebulous a provision" to have such a large effect. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note
300, at 1208. That is true only if one starts with the assumption that the Constitution is a tightly
integrated document. But that is precisely what they are attempting to establish.
320. None of this is to say that some version of the unitary executive theory is incompatible
with the original understanding. For example, I am persuaded by the originalist material I have
read that the Constitution was understood to embody a general principle of unitary executive
administration of the laws, in the important but limited sense that the framing generation
understood it to be an important feature of a good government that, in general, law-execution
should ordinarily be the province of officials subordinate to a single President. But this is a
different general principle than the one Calabresi and his co-authors tried to establish through
their rigorous textualism.
321. For a discussion of the significance of these conditions, see Jon Elster, Forces and
Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DuKE L.J. 364 (1995). On the relation
between these conditions and the Opinion in Writing Clause, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573,
646 n.312 (1984) (noting that the Constitutional Convention did not resolve issues of executive
power "until the final days of the Convention, under pressures that produced understandably
imperfect drafting").
322. See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, The Indeterminacy of Constitutions, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 383, 396 (1996) (describing the Polish "Little Constitution" of 1992 as "a compromise
document" and quoting a prominent Polish political leader who called it "an 'imperfect act of
compromise"').
323. See Jon Elster, Introduction to THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF
COMMUNIsM 12-13 (Jon Elster ed., 1996) ("In the process of bargaining over the presidency in
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland... the presidency was designed to fit a particular candidate for
the office."). Of course, the bargaining process between a party already holding power and an
opposition, as in the former Soviet bloc countries and South Africa, differs from the process in the
late 1780s, which involved divisions within an already successful revolutionary group.
324. Elster observes, however, that predictions about who the first president will be can be
mistaken. See id. at 13 (asserting that "the calculations and expectations that went into the
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have particular fears about the leader who is about to take the helm, and so
may design an institution that will cabin her actions. Or, as may have been
the case in the United States, they may have so much confidence in the
leader that they devote relatively little attention to precise institutional
details, leaving it to the leader and the government to be chosen soon to
work out conventions that will guide later generations.3 5 These roughly
functional observations cast some doubt on the proposition that originalism
and rigorous textualism are compatible.
Kim Lane Scheppele's analysis of what she calls Hungary's
"accidental constitution" suggests how constitution-making can best be
understood as bricolage.3 26 Hungary's post-Communist constitution resulted
from so-called round table negotiations among the governing Communist
regime and various opposition groups. Unsurprisingly, the most contentious
issues, the ones occupying the time of the key negotiators, involved
questions of government structure. The negotiators knew, however, that any
new constitution had to protect individual rights. They delegated the task of
devising those protections to a small group of young lawyers, who were
charged with presenting proposals to the round table for further
consideration and discussion. The drafters went beyond their charge, and
the negotiators had little time to deal with the individual rights proposals. In
outline, the drafters simply assembled a set of individual rights provisions
that seemed sensible to them, drawing on constitutional provisions they
found in existing constitutions. They presented their proposals to the
negotiators as something of afait accompli, and the proposals were written
into the new constitution.
Scheppele argues that this process was almost random. Little thought
was given to delegating the task to the group of drafters, and to the extent
that anyone did think about it, it seemed that there would be some
supervision of the drafters' work. And the drafters themselves did not
approach their task in an entirely systematic way either. The Hungarian
Constitution's framers basically had no understanding of the provisions
bargaining and log-rolling were almost invariably proven wrong by later events"). A concrete
example is provided by the expectation among the U.S. Constitution's drafters that the selection
of a President regularly would fall to the House of Representatives. See JACK N. RAkOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrTrUnON 265 (1996)
(asserting that "few of [the drafters] expected the electors [in the electoral college] to do anything
more than nominate candidates").
325. See A.E. Dick Howard, Constitution-Making in Central and Eastern Europe, 28
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 5, 7 (1994) (pointing out that "a constitution's provisions [may] reflect the
place an important political figure has in the mind of the country at the time of the constitution's
adoption. The leader may be admired and respected, he or she may be feared or distrusted.").
326. The discussion in this and the next paragraph relies on a presentation by Professor
Scheppele at a symposium entitled "Contextuality and Universality: Constitutional Borrowings
on the Global Stage." Kim Lane Scheppele, The Accidental Constitution, University of
Pennsylvania Law School (March 21, 1998).
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they accepted, except in the sense that they thought that having a set of
individual rights roughly like those elsewhere in Europe was a good idea.
Scheppele concludes that a Hungarian constitutionalist could not defend the
claim that the constitution's individual rights provisions are binding law
because they were endorsed by the constitution's framers. In this way, she
decouples the constitution from the framers' understandings.
Scheppele's analysis can be extended by examining the experience in
drafting South Africa's Constitution. There the process explicitly
distinguished between large principles and smaller details, in the way one
might expect if a constitution consisted of loosely organized strands of
ideas and institutions. The structure of the drafting process was determined
by the political confrontation between the African majority, represented by
the Mandela-led African National Congress (ANC), and several political
groupings that were represented in the official institutions of government in
the Republic of South Africa when negotiations began.327
The initial negotiations were called the Convention for a Democratic
South Africa (CODESA). During the CODESA stage, the ANC took the
position that all of South Africa's governing institutions lacked democratic
legitimacy. For the ANC, some new institution had to be created to develop
the ground rules for a new regime. The opposing groups acknowledged the
need for constitutional change but insisted that they have an important
voice in that process. And, as they saw it, CODESA itself could be the
venue for drafting a new constitution. The multiparty negotiations in
CODESA would produce a new document, which the people of South
Africa would ratify in a referendum. The ANC found this unacceptable,
because treating CODESA as a drafting body implied that the government
and its allies came to the table with some legitimacy. As Albie Sachs, a
participant in the negotiations, put it: "In order to gain legitimacy, the body
that drafted the constitution also had to be legitimate. Thus, it had to be a
body mandated to act by the entire nation.""32
The eventual solution favored the ANC position. General elections,
with nondiscriminatory suffrage, would be held to elect a parliament
consisting of a national assembly and a senate. As parliament, it would
perform the ordinary operations of a legislature. But the two houses would
sit together as a constituent assembly (to be called the Constitutional
Assembly) to draft a new constitution, to be completed within two years, by
April 30, 1994. Having been elected through essentially universal suffrage,
327. These groupings included the government itself, dominated by the Afrikaner National
Party, and the Inkatha Freedom Party, the political organization of a faction of Zulu nationalists
headed by Chief Mangosuthu Buthulezi. For a brief discussion of the political background, see
Albie Sachs, The Creation of South Africa's Constitution, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 669, 670-71
(1997).
328. Id. at 671.
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the Constitutional Assembly would have the democratic legitimacy the
ANC regarded as a precondition for the regime change. But the
Constitutional Assembly would not be free to adopt any constitutional
provisions it chose. Here, the other half of the compromise became
relevant. The new constitution would have to satisfy certain broad
principles agreed on at the CODESA stage. These principles included
requirements for a bill of rights, separation of powers, and substantial
power in provincial governments. The existing government and its allies
reluctantly agreed that the enumerated principles would protect their
interests sufficiently. The ANC did not regard the principles as major
concessions, because, in general, the principles expressed values to which
the ANC was committed.
Of course, it was possible, even likely, that the government and its
allies would find some new institutions inconsistent with the broadly stated
principles, while the ANC would not. The government clearly envisioned
that the provinces under the new regime would have a fair amount of
autonomy, holding out the possibility that one or more provinces might not
be controlled by ANC governments. In contrast, the ANC was less
interested in provincial autonomy. The principles referring to provincial
government plainly left much open.329 To avoid a steam roller in which the
Constitutional Assembly simply asserted that its proposals satisfied the
fundamental principles, the CODESA negotiators agreed that the
parliament would create a Constitutional Court, one of whose functions was
to certify that the proposed constitution did indeed do so.
330
329. Consider, for example, Constitutional Principle XVIII (2) ("The powers and functions
of the provinces defined in the Constitution... shall not be substantially less than or substantially
inferior to those provided for in this Constitution."), or Constitutional Principle XXI (1) ("The
level at which decisions can be taken most effectively in respect of the quality and rendering of
services, shall be the level responsible and accountable for the quality and rendering of the
services, and such level shall accordingly be empowered by the Constitution to do so."). See Ex
Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) SALR 744, 913 (CC) (S. Ar.) [hereinafter Certification
I]. The latter principle is generally called subsidiarity, and while there is widespread agreement
that it states a sensible rule to guide policymakers, there is much less agreement that it can provide
a legal standard of the sort the Constitutional Court was supposed to apply. For a discussion of the
political and legal status of subsidiarity in the European Union, see generally George A. Bermann,
Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 331 (1994).
330. The Constitutional Court's initial certification decision is Certification 1, 1996 (4) SALR
at 744. The court certified the bulk of the constitution, but it held that a number of provisions were
inconsistent with the fundamental principles. The proposed constitution did not provide sufficient
independence to a number of high civil servants, for example. See id. at 824-25 (referring to the
Public Protector and the Auditor General). Because it was not clear what the powers of an
independent civil service commission were, the court was unable to conclude that the constitution
provided an undiminished "basket" of powers for provincial governments, id. at 908. The
proposed constitution also did not specify the structure of local government, as the fundamental
principles required. See id. at 861. The proposed constitution allowed the bill of rights to be
amended in the same manner as other constitutional provisions could be, and the Constitutional
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There were a large number of fundamental principles the new
constitution had to satisfy; conventionally, the number is given as thirty-
four, although, as we will see, that number is misleading in an important
way. The list of principles was obviously a compromise, and it would be
difficult to contend that the list compelled the adoption of any particular
constitutional arrangement. As the Constitutional Court put it in its decision
on certifying the constitution, "Within the broad requirement of separation
of powers and appropriate checks and balances, the [Constitutional
Assembly] was afforded a large degree of latitude in shaping the
independence and interdependence of government branches. 331 And the
point could be made far more generally. The compromises in the list of
fundamental principles strongly suggest that a rigorous textualist approach
to the enacted constitution will in the end be inconsistent with an originalist
interpretive method.
This is not to say that one cannot interpret a constitution satisfying all
the principles to be a tightly integrated document. Indeed, the Constitutional
Court's interpretive approach encourages such an outcome. According to
the court: "All 34 CPs [constitutional principles] must be read holistically
with an integrated approach. No CP must be read in isolation from the other
CPs which give it meaning and context. It accordingly follows that no CP
should be interpreted in a manner which involves conflict with another." 
32
But the textualist interpretation may clash with the original understanding
of the fundamental principles.
The precise way in which the principles developed shows this rather
dramatically. The CODESA negotiations produced the basic idea of a
proposed constitution whose compliance with a list of fundamental
principles had to be certified by the Constitutional Court, and it produced a
list of fundamental principles. The Inkatha Freedom Party and a number of
white dissidents refused to participate in the constitution-drafting process.
As the April 30 deadline approached, the ANC continued to negotiate
changes that would, in the Constitutional Court's words, "encourage
political formations which had refused to participate in the transition
Court held that the fundamental principles required that bill of rights provisions be entrenched
more firmly than other constitutional provisions. See id. at 822-23. The Constitutional Assembly
responded by redrafting the objectionable provisions, making changes that appear to an outsider to
be relatively minor. Cf. Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification
of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1997 (2) SALR
97, 108, 112 (CC) (S. Aft.). As to the bill of rights, the new provision would allow amendment by
the two-thirds majority required for amending other provisions, plus the agreement of six
provinces in the National Council of Provinces, the new constitution's replacement for a senate in
which the provinces were represented. See id. at 126-27. The Constitutional Court then certified
the constitution, as amended, as consistent with the fundamental principles. See id. at 162.
331. Certiflcation I, 1996 (4) SALR at 811.
332. Id. at 786. I should note that the Court gave purposive and teleological interpretation a
higher priority. See id.
1298 [Vol. 108:1225
Comparative Constitutional Law
process to change their minds and to support the transition to a new
political order." '33 These changes were incorporated in the already
developed list of fundamental principles. One important new fundamental
principle at least strengthened, and may have transformed, the idea of
provincial autonomy, stating that the principle of self-determination "of the
South African people as a whole... shall not be construed as precluding,
within the framework of the said right, constitutional provision for a notion
of the right to self-determination by any community sharing a common
cultural and language heritage." a  It is barely possible that a tightly
integrated constitution could track original understandings with respect to
the initial list of fundamental principles, but it would be extraordinary if the
same constitution, or one modified in the last few days of drafting, would
continue to do so with respect to the augmented list.
335
Jack Rakove's analysis of the process by which the U.S. presidency
was constructed at the Constitutional Convention is consistent with these
accounts of constitutional experience elsewhere. Rakove summarizes the
process in saying, "To derive a coherent theory of executive power from
what Madison called these 'tedious and reiterated' debates is not easy." 
336
Having stripped executives of power during the Revolution and
Confederation period, the Constitution's drafters struggled to reconstruct a
sufficiently energetic executive through painful steps, against opponents
who continued to express suspicion of overpowerful executives. As Rakove
sees it, the only unifying "first principle" was "the desire to enable the
executive to resist legislative 'encroachments.' 337 The drafters went back
and forth on fundamental design issues, and in the end the provisions
dealing with the presidency were adopted seriatim. For example, the
requirement that the President "'take care that the laws... be duly and
faithfully executed"' entered the draft at a point when the Senate had the
power to make treaties and remained there as the treaty power became
divided between the President and a supermajority in the Senate.3 ' Nor,
Rakove's presentation suggests, was the ultimate result the product of a
gradual realization among the drafters of some overriding logic demanding
a tight integration of the structures defiming the presidency. Instead, what
happened was that the Constitution's provisions dealing with the presidency
took their shape from a series of compromises. Had the drafters had more
time, some issues that had been provisionally resolved might have been
333. Id. at 862.
334. Id at915.
335. See Howard, supra note 322, at 402 (noting through a section title that "[i]ndeterminacy
results when drafters attempt, within the same constitution, to adopt competing norms or
traditions").
336. RAKOVE, supra note 324, at 244.
337. Id. at 259.
338. See id. at 262-63.
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reopened. But, facing the need to get the job done, the drafters simply
stopped when time expired.
The experience with constitution-drafting suggests a general
conclusion, which I present in quasi-functionalist terms: The conditions
under which constitutions are written makes it likely that they will be
constitutions of principle with respect to broad themes, exemplified by the
principles with which South Africa's permanent constitution had to
conform, and constitutions of compromise with respect to the details. Under
the pressure of time and the need for political compromise, a constitution's
drafters are likely to latch on to whatever solution is near at hand to the
immediate problems they face. They will not have sharp understandings
that the institutions they are creating have some necessary characteristics
flowing from the very nature of the institutions. With respect to details, they
are, in short, bricoleurs.339
Thinking about constitution-making as a process of bricolage casts
doubt on a form of textualism that attributes to the constitution's writers a
purpose of creating a tightly integrated document governed by a form of
conceptual determinism. The compromises and sheer randomness found in
the constitution-making process suggest that it would be wrong to think of
the writers as having so highly rationalized an understanding of their work
as this form of textualism attributes to them.' Of course, casts doubt and
suggests are the key terms here. It could be true that, whatever is the case
with respect to other constitutions, a rigorous textualist interpretation of the
U.S. Constitution is consistent with originalism. In addition, other forms of
textualism remain available. Charles Black's textualism, for example, infers
large principles from the Constitution's general structures as defined by the
339. Calabresi and Prakash correctly argue that constitutional interpretation should not turn
on small differences in wording. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 300, at 628-31. Referring to
such a difference to which Lessig and Sunstein, supra note 300, referred, Calabresi and Prakash
say: "Throughout the Convention, individual participants had used any number of terms in
discussing what we today call Secretaries. In this particular proposal, they happened to be labeled
'Heads of Departments."' Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 300, at 630. This captures the
randomness of bricolage. But a related principle, cautioning against making interpretation turn on
small similarities in wording, seems equally appropriate, and for the same reason: Similarities as
well as differences can result from bricolage.
340. It might be, of course, that one need not rely on the idea of bricolage or comparative
constitutional law to see this. Domestic critics of this form of textualism might observe, for
example, that the arguments made to establish the text's tight construction are too elaborate to
have been readily available to people making decisions under serious time constraints. See
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 300, at 551 (asserting that the originalists' claim that "the text of
the Constitution, as originally understood by the people who ratified it, is the fundamental law of
the land" (emphasis added)). But see id. at 570 (referring to "hitherto-unnoticed provisions of the
Constitution"). The critic would argue that it seems unlikely, and is unsupported in the material
presented, that the people who ratified the Constitution understood the subtle textual arguments
these authors present. If a provision of the Constitution has been unnoticed by scholars for a
century, it seems unlikely that it was noticed in the relevant way by the people who ratified the
Constitution, in support of the interpretation Calabresi and Prakash offer.
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text."4 And even rigorous textualism is unimpaired by the critique
suggested by the idea of bricolage, as long as it is not connected to an
intentionalist originalism 42
Levi-Strauss's work suggests, however, a broader conclusion. Hamilton
did describe the constitution-making process as one of "reflection and
choice."" But, L6vi-Strauss might suggest, in doing so he was acting as a
bricoleur. That is, the tool of presenting one's work as the product of
reflection and choice was part of the accumulated cultural stock on which
Hamilton drew and on which we continue to draw. In light of that cultural
stock, saying that one is acting on reflection and choice need not be an
assertion of some objective truth about one's activity. For Lvi-Strauss, it is
simply another act of bricolage.
Finally, consider what might happen if we came to think that the
criteria of rationality Hamilton invoked were themselves culturally
contingent. We might then come to think that interpretation is not a process
of rational choice among competing candidates but is rather a process in
which existing legal materials are coopted and transformed to address a
problem at hand.' Interpreters could not use the idea of bricolage to
generate new interpretations, but this perspective would deprive critics of
arguments in which the words creative or activist are pejorative. To a
person who understands all interpretation as bricolage, creativity and
activism simply describe interpretation and so cannot be used to criticize
any particular act of interpretation.
B. The Limitations of Bricolage in Light of Functionalism
and Expressivism
Functionalism and expressivism also limit bricolage, understood as a
process of constitution-making. Consider whether a new institution or
interpretation can simply be dropped in to an otherwise unchanged
constitutional system. Robert Bork has proposed a system by which
legislatures could override Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
341. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTrnIONAL LAW (1969).
342. Originalists have an account of the binding nature of the Constitution that links it to
original understandings. That account is, of course, controversial. Once rigorous textualism is
decoupled from originalism, even that account becomes unavailable. Still, one could defend
rigorous textualism as the best method for interpreting the Constitution because it works better
than any other method to constrain judges to accept the outcomes of democratic processes unless
some objective criteria-for the rigorous textualist, the text's meanings-are satisfied.
343. THE FEDERALIST No. I, supra note 293, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
344. This perspective offers a slightly different understanding of my interpretation of
Matsuda's argument. See supra text accompanying notes 262-263. Instead of seeing her as
seeking to transform our national self-understanding, we would see her as engaged in the ordinary
process of interpretation, which always involves the transformation of existing materials.
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Constitution.' Bork's proposal is a more moderate version of a provision
in Canada's Charter, which allows a legislature to override some
constitutional protections even before the Supreme Court rules on the
constitutionality of the legislature's substantive proposal.' It is yet more
moderate than the provision in the Dutch Constitution stating that none of
its provisions are enforceable in the courts! 7 But Bork's proposal has
gotten nowhere in the U.S. political world."
The reasons show how functionalism and expressivism limit the
possibilities of learning through bricolage. Mark Graber has argued
persuasively that judicial review serves the interests of political leaders
often enough that they prefer to have the institution, even though it might
sometimes produce rulings with which they disagree, than to eliminate it.34'
Graber points out that politicians sometimes find themselves facing issues
that threaten to divide their political coalitions. They can avoid the
difficulty of attempting to resolve the issue within the coalition by sending
it to the courts for resolution. They can welcome a court decision that
proves acceptable to enough members of the coalition, and they can
denounce the courts for interfering with democratic decisionmaking if the
court's solution proves unacceptable. An expressivist perspective adds to
this functionalist point that proposals like Bork's are in substantial tension
with the U.S. constitutional culture, which has grown up centering on
judicial review.
It is easy to imagine what would happen if a ban on judicial review
were suddenly inserted into the U.S. constitutional system. Congress would
immediately pass a statute creating judicial review. The "new" institution
of judicial review might differ in some details from the one we have now,
but it would not be a dramatically different institution because functional
and expressive concerns limit how much we can change in a short time.
But, to revert to a point made in connection with the discussion of
345. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GoMoRRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERIcAN DECLINE 117 (1996) (proposing "a constitutional amendment making any federal or
state court decision subject to being overruled by a majority vote of each House of Congress").
346. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 33; Attorney Gen. of Quebec v. La Chaussure Brown's Inc. [1988J 2 S.C.R. 712
(Can.) (interpreting section 33 to allow the legislature to override Charter rights before the
Supreme Court has ruled on the substantive statute's constitutionality).
347. See NETH. CONsT. art. 120. The Netherlands Supreme Court does invalidate legislation
when it finds it to conflict with international law that is directly enforceable in Dutch courts. See
id. art. 94.
348. Indeed, substantial opposition has developed to the very idea of amending the
Constitution in any particular. For an expression of the reasons, see CIZENS FOR THE
CONSTITUTION, "GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS": DEVELOPING STANDARDS FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997).
349. See Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 35 (1993).
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Matsuda's proposal, proposals like Bork's are not designed for immediate
adoption. They are taken seriously when there is already enough political
support for them to make substantial changes in our self-understanding-
and in the functions we ask our institutions to serve-not only thinkable,
but even plausible.
C. Bricolage as Symptom
The perspective developed in this Part should raise questions about one
widely discussed topic in comparative constitutional studies written from a
U.S. perspective, questions that in turn offer a different way of thinking
about the utility of L6vi-Strauss's concept of bricolage. The topic is "the
influence of the United States Constitution abroad," as the subtitle of one
collection has it.351
Undoubtedly, one can find in constitutional developments outside the
United States citations to U.S. constitutional law and its institutional
supports. 52 Imitation can occur for many reasons: a desire to satisfy
external constituencies who seek reassurance that a new constitutional
system is well-designed,353 an attempt to "borrow" the prestige of U.S.
institutions to shore up what otherwise might be the shaky foundations of
new institutions, or a functionalist assessment of the new constitutional
systems' perceived needs. 4 The term influence, however, connotes
something else-adopting something used in the United States because
there are good reasons for the U.S. rule or institution. Such influence may
occur, of course, but we should not overlook the possibility that what we
350. See supra text accompanying notes 262-263.
351. CONSTITIrONALISM AND RIGHTS, supra note 4.
352. It would be tedious to present a collection of citations, but two illustrations are
Morgentaler v. The Queen [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 46 (Can.) (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)); and Australian Capital Television Pty. v. Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 177 C.L.R.
106, 111 (Austi.) (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
353. Recent constitutions of nations in the former Soviet bloc either explicitly or through
early judicial interpretation ban capital punishment, which was a condition of entry into close
political and economic relations with the signatories of the nominally optional Protocol 6 to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights abolishing capital punishment. For a
compilation noting the connection between adoption of Protocol 6 and accession to the Council of
Europe, see Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: The USA in World Perspective, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L.
& POL'Y 517,526-27 (1997).
354. A.E. Dick Howard provides a helpful catalogue of these reasons:
A country's leaders may see a new constitution as the means of achieving international
acceptance-the adoption of widely proclaimed norms as a measure of living up to
international standards. Similarly, a country may hope to achieve admission into a
regional arrangement, for example, the European Community. Moreover, a country,
hoping to shore up its security interests, may seek to curry the favor of a powerful
country or patron .... Drafters might also see a constitution as a way of attracting
western trade and investment.
Howard, supra note 322, at 405-06.
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observe is bricolage rather than engineering." Most constitution designers
today know something about the U.S. constitutional system; in L6vi-
Strauss's terms, its features are "at hand" to them. They have to get a job
done, and they may sometimes simply use what they find lying around-
that is, features they know about from the U.S. system.
The idea of bricolage can enhance the analysis of constitutions as
expressive as well. Consider what one might say about-not to-a judge
considering whether to invoke constitutional experience in some other
nation as part of her justification for a particular constitutional
interpretation. The judge's willingness to do so tells us something about the
nation's culture; it tells us that the culture is already open to learning from
experience elsewhere. The expressivist could not say anything more than
that if the judge goes ahead and relies on such experience. The perspective
suggested in this Part, however, allows us to describe the judge as a
bricoleur. We might then ask, what in the judicial culture of the late
twentieth century placed comparative constitutional experience in the
judge's tool kit, ready to be picked up for use when it seemed appropriate?
In what follows, I use expressivism as the foil to develop the idea that
references to comparative constitutional experience are symptoms of
changes in the legal culture-that judges in their role as bricoleurs now find
constitutional experience elsewhere to be part of the materials at hand. For
those who describe what they observe as bricolage there is nothing
unexpected about a judge using materials that happen to be at hand; the
only interesting question may be: How did that particular tool happen to be
at hand now, when it seems not to have been available earlier?
The very fact that a judge relies on experience elsewhere expresses the
nation's culture, for the judge is a participant in, and builder of, that culture.
Expressivism cannot support critical evaluation. To tell the judge that she
should not have invoked experience elsewhere is to suggest that there are
criteria from outside the culture that can be used to evaluate the judge's
performance. But for the expressivist there are no such criteria. Nor can
expressivism be used to recommend that a judge take any particular foreign
experience into account. Recommendations are likely to be futile. If the
culture is not receptive to them, they will go unheard. And if it is receptive
to them, the recommendation can do no more than act as a catalyst,
precipitating out of a diffuse legal culture a particular rule that was already
there to be brought into view.
355. Cf. Rett R. Ludwikowski, "Mixed" Constitutions-Product of an East-Central
European Constitutional Melting Pot, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 64 (1998) (asserting that the work of
constitution drafters in Europe's formerly Communist nations "resembles 'gardening' rather than
'engineering').
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Consider again the example of hate speech regulation. Perhaps the U.S.
legal culture is deeply committed to the macho form of near-absolute
protection of free expression I have described. If so, pointing to the
Canadian experience will elicit a variety of deprecatory responses. For
example, it might be said that Canadians are less confident of their society's
ability to resist hate speech through counter-speech than we are in the
United States. Or it might be said that our tradition of free expression is
plainly superior to theirs, as demonstrated by the fact that we have had a
First Amendment for over two hundred years while they have had a Charter
of Rights and Liberties for less than two decades.
Alternatively, the U.S. legal culture might be ready to accept hate
speech regulation because of some purely internal transformation, such as
the rise of an identity politics that extends quite widely. If so, references to
the Canadian experience are unlikely to do much work in the legal
arguments. Proponents of regulation might point to that experience to
counter assertions that regulation of hate speech leads inevitably to a highly
repressive regime of thought control. But, on the assumption that the legal
culture was already receptive to hate speech regulation, such assertions
would already be heavily discounted and probably would not require
empirical disconfirmation by reference to the Canadian experience.3 6
References to the Canadian experience will matter only if the U.S. legal
culture is almost ready to adopt such regulations, but needs some
reassurance that thought control is not in the offing, that there are tangible
benefits from adopting the regulations, or something else.357
Thinking about constitutional interpretation as bricolage can serve a
diagnostic purpose, however. The very fact that Supreme Court Justices
assert the relevance of comparative constitutional law to domestic
constitutional interpretation and that other Justices find it necessary to
356. In this connection, the invocation in U.S. discussions of the Canadian experience with
the regulation of pornography seems to me illuminating. Canada's Supreme Court adopted a
version of one form of feminist argument supporting restrictions on the availability of
pornography in Butler v. The Queen [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.). Critics of U.S. proposals for
similar restrictions regularly assert that the consequence of the Butler decision was the
suppression of gay- and lesbian-oriented, sexually explicit material. See, e.g., NADINE STROssEN,
DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 230-39
(1995); Jeffrey Toobin, X-Rated, NEW YORKER, Oct. 3, 1994, at 70. The evidentiary base on
which those assertions rest is fiercely contested. For observations critical of these assertions, see
The First Amendment, Under Fire from the Left, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at
42, which contains comments of Catharine MacKinnon, and Valerie Fortney, See No Evil,
CHATELAINE, June 1996, at 62, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. The empirical
evidence matters much less than the consistency of the critical claim with the prevailing version of
the U.S. culture of free expression.
357. Advocates of reliance on experience elsewhere may take the position that we cannot
know whether a particular legal culture is far away from, or on the verge of, some shift until we
try. Drawing attention to constitutional experience elsewhere might be part of a reasonable
strategy for testing the waters.
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respond to such assertions shows that the legal culture is different from
what it was when such assertions were rare or were made only by those on
the margins of the mainstream legal culture. It seems clear that interest in
learning from experience elsewhere is part of the wider phenomenon that
goes under the cliched label globalization. Constitutional experience in
other nations has become relevant to U.S. legal culture because of the
tighter connections between legal practice in the United States and
elsewhere that have developed in the past few decades." 8 A few decades
hence, constitutional lawyers may find it as natural to invoke constitutional
experience elsewhere in support of their arguments for interpretations of the
U.S. Constitution as today's lawyers arguing a tort case in New York find it
natural to invoke developments in Michigan or California tort law to
support their arguments for what New York tort law should be." 9
VI. CONCLUSION
According to Laurence Sterne, "an English man does not travel to see
English men." 36 His traveler Yorick describes the varieties of travelers,
including the "[i]nquisitive" traveler who seeks to learn lessons from
foreigners.36 Yorick clearly prefers the sentimental traveler, who
empathizes with the distinctive-and initially seemingly peculiar-
practices of the people he meets. But Sterne manages to show us that
Yorick is so unself-conscious that he empathizes as an Englishman, which
is to say that he is less sentimental than he believes. 6
358. I can report that some law clerks for Justices in 1973 regarded Justice William 0.
Douglas's reference to press censorship in Brazil in CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 412
U.S. 94, 158 n.9 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring), as confirmation of his eccentricity rather than of
his legal acumen.
359. If that occurs, it would then also be natural for a practice of critical comparative
constitutional law to develop. In such a practice, a critic might point out that a functionalist has
failed to take crucial differences between the systems into account and, more broadly, that the
very idea of functionalism rests on a contestable claim that different legal systems nonetheless
have the same functions to perform. Or the critic might point out that appropriating institutions or
doctrines from other legal systems, no matter how carefully done, might have unintended-
ideological consequences. I should note as well that the perspective developed in this Section
allows us to see how this Article is itself a symptom of change in the legal culture. See, e.g., Riles,
supra note 4.
360. LAURENCE STERNE, A SENTIMENTAL JOURNEY THROUGH FRANCE AND ITALY (1768)
reprinted in MEMOIRS OF MR. LAURENCE STERNE 537 (Douglas Grant ed., Harvard Univ. Press
1951). Giinter Frankenberg's influential article uses the metaphor of tourism to describe some
forms of comparative law scholarship. See Glinter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-
thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411,411-12 (1985).
361. STERNE, supra note 360, at 535.
362. Cf. 2 LITERATURE CRITICISM FROM 1400 TO 1800, at 372 (Dennis Poupard ed., 1985)
(referring to Steme's "facility for taking an ironic view of his most intense feelings"); Keryl
Kavanagh, Discounting Language: A Vehicle for Interpreting Laurence Sterne's A Sentimental
Journey, 22 J. NARRATIVE TECH. 136, 136 (1992) (describing the "problem[] of interpretation" in
determining "[h]ow far is Sterne separate from his narrator").
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Throughout this Article, I have emphasized the ways in which
arguments to which comparative experience might direct our attention are
themselves available from within the U.S. constitutional order. In doing so,
I have perhaps fallen into one of the traps Sterne identifies: In seeking to
learn from comparative constitutional law, U.S. lawyers, academics, and
judges run the risk of going abroad only to meet ourselves.3 "3 As an
expressivist might put it, we necessarily see experience elsewhere as
Americans. And yet, the need for a license to refer to comparative
experience shows that this risk is actually a requirement. Comparative
experience is legally irrelevant unless it can connect to arguments already
available within the domestic legal system.
In what way, then, can we learn from comparative constitutional law?
The famous opening line of A Sentimental Journey-" -They order, said I,
this matter better in France--" 3 -- suggests one answer, which I have done
my best to avoid. 65 That answer would be that we can learn by directly
appropriating better ways of ordering the matter that other constitutional
systems have discovered. My discussions of functionalism and
expressivism identified the difficulties with direct appropriation. Particular
institutions serve complex functions in each constitutional system, and there
is little reason to think that directly appropriating an institution that
functions well in one system will produce the same beneficial effects when
it is inserted into another.
I have argued that constitutional experience in other nations can inform
the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, but only if one holds a theory of
interpretation that licenses reliance on that experience, and that not all
theories of interpretation provide such a license. 366 In addition, I have
argued that each of the three ways of using comparative constitutional
experience might have its own distinctive license. Functionalism, for
example, is licensed by an interpretive theory in which constitutional
institutions serve purposes that can be identified at a middle level of
generality and will be useful to the extent that the interpreter has a theory
about institutional development that allows the interpreter to generalize
from one nation's institutions to another's without requiring comprehensive
comparisons.367 Expressivism, by contrast, is licensed by an interpretive
theory in which the Constitution is an expression of a distinctive national
character and will be useful to the extent that the interpreter understands
363. Cf. HELENE MOGLEN, THE PHILOSOPHICAL IRONY OF LAURENCE STERNE 102 (1975)
(" [Sterne] suggests the potentially solipsistic nature of all empathic experience.").
364. STERNE, supra note 360, at 529. The leading and concluding dashes are important parts
of the quotation.
365. For essays adopting this answer (though reversing the teacher and the learner), see, for
example, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS, supra note 4.
366. See supra Part II.
367. See supra Part ll.
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that the precise content of that character is always subject to renegotiation
and revision.36 Finally, the interpretive perspective suggested by the idea of
bricolage receives its license from an interpretive theory that sees insistence
that the Constitution is a highly rationalized document as only one,
historically contingent view of the Constitution.69
These alternatives suggest a different answer to the question of what we
can learn from constitutional experience elsewhere. That answer is
suggested by an imbalance readers will undoubtedly have noticed in my
presentation. The discussion of U.S. law is more substantial than that of
foreign constitutional law.37 As I have developed this Article's argument,
constitutional experience elsewhere passes through the medium of the three
analytic approaches I have described, before that experience becomes
useful for U.S. constitutionalists. I intentionally use the metaphor of
filtration here, to suggest that we can learn from experience elsewhere only
to the extent that we avoid too much detail about that experience. For
example, if we identify a complex set of functions closely tied to particular
institutions elsewhere, we will be unable to learn about how we might alter
or understand our institutions as they perform their somewhat different set
of functions, and if we insist that a constitutional provision expresses the
entire body of another system's constitutional culture, all we will be able to
say is that our constitutional arrangements similarly express our
constitutional culture.37' This accounts for this Article's imbalance between
U.S. and foreign constitutional law. We can learn from experience
elsewhere by looking at that experience in rather general terms, and then by
seeing how those terms might help us think about the constitutional
problems we confront.
We might contrast the examples I have developed in this Article with
other forms of "comparative" learning. Imaginative literature, particularly
utopian science fiction, frequently offers models of constitutional design.
And anthropology, both historical and contemporary, describes small-c
constitutional orders.372 I believe that we would find efforts to learn from
368. See supra PartIV.
369. See supra Part V.
370. It may be, of course, that the imbalance results from my personal limitations as a scholar
more familiar with U.S. constitutional law. I believe, however, that it may have a different source,
discussed in the remainder of the paragraph.
371. In thinking about a particular domestic institution or rule, we may discover that as we
consider new details about another system's institution or rule and ignore others we had
previously thought important, we refine our understanding of the domestic institution or rule.
372. Historical anthropology has been the source of the controversial assertion that the
federated institutions of the Iroquois confederation influenced the development of U.S.
federalism. Compare Gregory Schaaf, From the Great Law of Peace to the Constitution of the
United States: A Revision of America's Democratic Roots, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 323 (1989),
with Erik M. Jensen, The Imaginary Connection Between the Great Law of Peace and the United
States Constitution: A Reply to Professor Schaaf, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 295 (1990).
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those sources to have a rather different feel from the examples I have used
in this Article. They would seem, I believe, simply too foreign to be useful
in even the indirect way I have suggested. Perhaps, then, we can identify a
limitation inherent in the constitutionalist enterprise itself on the breadth
with which we can look for knowledge to inform our constitutional
thinking. If the requirement of a license limits our search in one way,
perhaps constitutionalism itself limits our search to systems falling roughly
within the constitutionalist tradition that is our own.
And yet, perhaps not. Justice Louis Brandeis taught us that "if we
would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."373 We
can find that guidance virtually anywhere. We can learn from comparative
constitutional experience, then, just in the way we learn from anything else.
Thinking about that experience can be part of the ordinary liberal education
of thoughtful lawyers. That may be enough to justify Judge Calabresi's
reliance on constitutional experience elsewhere to inform his, and our,
understanding of U.S. constitutional law.
373. Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504,520 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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